The Truceless War, A catalyst for a far greater conflict Options

[Hamilcar Barca]

Forward: I wasn't sure about sticking this up here but Skanderberg somewhat encouraged me by putting up one of his own write-ups.


The bloody conflict known as The Truceless War 241BC-237BC, fought between Carthage and it's mercinary armies following the first Punic War is one of the lesser known conflicts fought in the ancient world, mainly on behalf of the fact that all Carthaginian accounts were likely destroyed along with the city in 146BC. However, Polybius' account of the war did survive and I have used it as my primary source in sumarising this conflict and its key battles for anyone who is interested. The key figure brought to prominance as a result of the eventual Carthaginian victory was Hamilcar Barca, father and mentor of Hannibal. Hamilcar's ultimate victory allowed him to completley re-organise the mercinary armies and also secure a foothold in Spain which would prove to be Carthage's greatest military resource.

The Truceless War
241BC – 237BC

The Carthaginian army was one of the most diverse and complex factions in military history. Apart from its officer corps, the entire army consisted of mercenaries drawn from all over the ancient world. It consisted of Spaniards, Libyans, Numidians, Italians, Greeks, and Gauls. There was no common language or religion, yet they managed to fight together as a powerful unit and were at times the best of their class in the entire ancient world. The reason for its reliance on mercenaries rather than its citizens to make the bulk of the army rested on the fact that Carthage’s indigenous population was relatively small and an army of professional soldiers was in all ways superior to that of a conscripted one. Furthermore, Carthage was the wealthiest trading state in the Mediterranean and could easily afford to pay for its vast mercenary armies, but after their humiliating defeat by Rome in the First Punic War, everything changed.

While Carthage had officially surrendered following its defeat at the Aegates Islands, Hamilcars 20,000 strong mercenary army had been victorious in Sicily and they were to return to Carthage as champions. Upon their return, the Carthaginian senate found that its treasury was close to bankruptcy so because of the large cost of the war and the reparation payments forced upon them by Rome. Unable to pay its army, the mercenaries became restless and started to openly rebel in Carthage. The Senate then ordered the army to be moved out of Carthage and into the nearby town of Sica where they were promised payment upon their arrival. This promise never eventuated and when the Carthaginian commander Gisgo met with them to negotiate further, the angry mercenaries kidnapped him and his entourage whilst dejecting from Carthage’s service. Seeing Carthage helpless without an army, the two Mercenary captains, Spendius and Mathos now cited war against their previous employers. Word spread quickly of the rebellion and many Numidian and Libyan tribes joined the mercenaries and the “Truceless war” as it became known had begun.

There was now no Carthaginian army to face the mercenaries. Mathos set up the rebel base at Tunis and quickly besieged the cities of Utica and Hippacritae, whilst Carthage itself was completely surrounded on land. The Carthaginian senate appointed Hanno the Great (“Great” for his African conquests during the First Punic War) to raise and field a new army which he accomplished with remarkable efficiency, creating a well disciplined citizen militia. After been supplemented with siege weapons and Elephants, he led a successful attack on the rebel army besieging Utica. But Hanno’s success was short lived; the war-hardened rebels quickly regrouped and wheeled around to counter-attack at Hanno’s camp, routing the militia and seizing his artillery and supplies. Hanno himself managed to escape with a few shattered remnants of his army.

The Senate now looked to Hamilcar Barca and pleaded with him to take command. Hamilcar agreed but found his position hardly encouraging; Mathos continued his sieges of Utica and Hippacritae whilst thousands of Numidians, encouraged by the mercenary victory at Utica revolted and joined the rebel army. Hamilcar managed to string together a small militia force composed of the citizenry but it was his superior generalship skills which would turn the tide. In the summer of 240BC, Hamilcar sneaked his army out of Carthage under cover of night and led a daring attack on Spendius’s troops on the Bagradas River. Despite been outnumbered, he cleverly routed the rebel force and won a major victory for Carthage. Following his success, a Numidian prince named Narava took to Hamilcars side with an addition of 2,000 cavalry. Hamilcar then engaged the rebels at Hippacritae where he was victorious again, killing 10,000 and capturing 4,000. However, in an attempt to win favor with the rebels, his prisoners were pardoned and released while others freely turned over to Hamilcars side and strengthened his ever-increasing army.

With the war now entering its third year, Mathos and Spendius grew exasperated as they had never expected the conflict to become so long drawn. Worse still, Hamilcar was threatening to undermine the entire rebellion by offering friendship to his captured foes, this they could not allow and they required a means to aggravate him. With Gisgo still in their possession, Mathos had him and 700 other Carthaginians brutally tortured. Their hands and feet were amputated, their knees smashed and their eyes burned out before been thrown into a trench to die. Upon hearing the news, the mortified Hamilcar responded by capturing more rebels and having Elephants stamp them to death. It was by these and more atrocities to follow that the rebel conflict became known as The Truceless War.

While Carthage now looked to be the dominant power of the battlefield, the war quickly slid back in favor of the rebels. Hamilcar and Hanno became involved in a bitter feud over military management while the cities of Utica and Hippacritae dejected to the rebels and slaughtered their Carthaginian garrisons. With the financial support of these cities, the rebel recruitment base increased dramatically, their cause also been joined by a Libyan chief called Zarzas, whose own forces supplemented the Rebel army to create a force in excess of 50,000 men.

The Carthaginian senate quickly grew weary over Hanno and Hamilcars arguing and Hamilcar was chosen as the sole commander of the army with Hannibal (not his son) appointed as his deputy. Hamilcar immediately took to harassing the rebel army but as he was heavily outnumbered he refrained from pitched battle. Instead, he fought a brilliant campaign of attrition, out marching and outwitting the rebels while scouring the countryside, attacking their supplies and eventually the rebels began to starve. In 239BC, in the most brilliant engagement of his career, Hamilcar eventually forced almost the entire rebel army into a boxed canyon known as “The Saw” and fortified the high ground. The starving army of over 40,000 men was eventually forced to surrender and their leaders, Spendius, Autaritus and Zarzas (Mathos managed to escape) were captured while their entire army was executed. Now, all that separated Hamilcar from victory was Mathos and his smaller army at Tunis. Hannibal was to take command here and prior to the battle he had Spendius, Autaritus and Zarzas crucified on a hill so that the rebels could see. But the rebels had their vengeance, they smashed through Hannibal’s defense and stormed his camp, capturing Hannibal and after taking their own leaders down from the crosses, had Hannibal and his officers crucified in their places.

The following year Rome capitalized on Carthages internal crisis and in clear violation of the peace treaty with Carthage, seized the island of Sardinia. Hamilcar was outraged and demanded it back but Rome threatened with war and more reparation payments should Carthage resist. However, with Carthage still struggling for military resources and rebel armies still in field, Hamilcar was forced to accept, but it was in spite of this action that Hamilcar swore to forever hate Rome and he would pass this hatred onto his son Hannibal. But for now Hamilcar turned his attention to the rebels and assembled another militia army, totaling his forces to 20,000. While Mathos still outnumbered him, his troops were now primarily composed of Libyans and most of his veterans had been killed at the Saw. Hamilcar engaged Mathos at Leptis, where his forces were smashed and he was captured. With their armies defeated and their leaders dead or captured, the war was won and Hamilcar was hailed as the savior of Carthage.

Despite the Atrocities of the Truceless war, Carthage would continue to rely on mercenaries for its army. Hannibal Barca and his mercenary army would be the terror of Rome in the following years. But payment was never again an issue, following his victory at Leptis; Hamilcar established Carthaginian power in Southern Spain and proceeded to greatly increase Carthages wealth from its numerous valuable resources, easily affording recruitment of the best soldiers in the world for a new army.

Major Battles

Bagradas River, 240BC
Carthaginian Victory

Carthaginian Strength: 10,000 militia, 500 cavalry and 70 elephants commanded by Hamilcar Barca
Mercenary Strength: 15,000 infantry commanded by Spendius

Needing a way to bypass the Rebel armies who were guarding the Bagradas River, Hamilcar and his men discovered that they could cross the river mouth at low tide without been seen. Making the crossing under cover of night, the militia arrived behind the 5,000 rebel guard the next morning. Informed of Hamilcars sudden advance, Spendius immediately marched out another 10,000 men to join the guard force and overwhelm Hamilcars inexperienced citizen militia. Hamilcar started the battle by ordering a faked retreat and the over anxious rebels were lured into a disorderly pursuit. All at once, Hamilcar turned and ordered an elephant charge which literally crushed Spendius’s attack. While Hamilcars militia held the line, his cavalry hacked at the rebel flanks. The rebel army never managed to regain control after Hamilcars sudden onslaught and soon retreated having lost half of their infantry. Bagradas marked Carthages first success of the Truceless war and also marked the second occasion it had achieved victory at the River, the first been against Rome in 255BC.

Carthaginian Casualties: About 500 infantry killed
Mercenary Casualties: 6,000 infantry killed and 2,000 men captured

The Saw, 239BC
Carthaginian Victory

Carthaginian Strength: 10,000 Infantry and 2,000 cavalry commanded by Hamilcar Barca
Mercenary Strength: 50,000 infantry commanded by Spendius, Zarzas and Autaritus

In 239BC, Hamilcars forces succeeded in destroying the supply lines of the rebel army who now amassed in excess of 50,000 men. While the rebels had been besieging Carthage, the cease of supplies threatened to starve them and they were forced to withdraw. The Rebels then began a tiresome pursuit of Hamilcars army which constantly managed to evade the rebels. Despite been badly outnumbered and incapable of a pitched contest, Hamilcar devised a plan to destroy the rebels at a box like canyon known as “The Saw”, which allowed easy entry but made escape extremely difficult. Hamilcar ambushed the marching rebel army in the rear, and in their panic managed to herd the greater part of the enemy into the canyon while entrenching on the high ground, sealing them in. The rebels now faced certain starvation and turned to cannibalism as thousands began to die. Their commanders Spendius, Autaritus and Zarzas came forward to discuss terms of surrender with Hamilcar but they were subsequently seized and imprisoned. Fearing the worst for their own fates, the mercenaries made a desperate attempt to escape the canyon but their efforts failed. Then, in his most ruthless show of butchery, Hamilcar ordered the execution of the starving 40,000 rebels who were left. The result of massacre at the Saw was that the Mercenary army strength was drastically decreased and that Carthage had overcome its greatest challenge of the war.

Carthaginian Casualties: Unknown, minimal
Mercenary Casualties: 45,000 infantry killed

[Guest_Scanderbeg_*]

Hamilcar Barca. Underrated Genius.
Great work.

[Germanicus]

Great work Hamilcar, I knew nothing of these wars.

[Primus Pilus]

The mercenary war is so often overlooked yet so pivotal in the chain of events leading up to the Second Punic War. It allowed Rome to seize Sardinia and Corsica, and eventually forced Carthage into Hispania (to find new resources, etc.) I wonder, had Carthage maintained enough treasury to maintain its mercenary army (or at least had enough to disperse the army peacefully), if the scope of the Second Punic War may have been completely diminished.

[Hamilcar Barca]

Thanks for the feedback guys.

But yes, if the Truceles war never happened, history may have unfolded radically different. I think that the 2nd Punic War would still have enevitabley come about but it may not of happened for another 50 years or so. What is also intersting to contemplate is how the 2nd Punic war would have turned out if Hamilcar had not been assassinated. These is almost a parallel between Hamilcar and Hannibal and the likes of of Phillip and Alexander.

[Guest_Scanderbeg_*]

Except I doubt there was any rivarly between the two but yea there is a definite parallel. However we will never know exactly how Hamilcar would have fared and any assumption , for the better or worse, it ultimately baseless...

[Hamilcar Barca]

Indeed, but what is indisputable is that both men were charismatic, brilliant leaders whose military and tactical knowledge was the inspiration and envy of countless generals in the millenia to come. However, as Maharbal mused at Cannae, "Hannibal, you know how to win a victory, but not how to use one". Hamilcar on he other hand capitalised on any success he achieved, no matter how small it was. It was such a trait that allowed him ultimate victory over the Mercinaries. Now if both men had led the war against Rome along with the tag team brothers, Hasdrubal and Mago ... but yes we will never know.

[Guest_Scanderbeg_*]

"Hannibal, you know how to win a victory, but not how to use one"

I never liked that quote much. Even its very occurrence is questionable. Personally, I believe this quote was mostly past around after the days as they believed Hannibal had the chance to take the city and never really questioned it. So this quote could have gven them a sort of explanation as to exactly why it he did not. Also Maharbal was saying to Hannibal to capitalize on this victory and head for Rome and Hannibal's invasion of Italy inorder to capture Rome has never had much backing. He didnt have that many soldiers, his supplies were not sent to him as he had no supply chain, he ate off Roman land, Most of his men were Barbarian recruits and there were plenty of Roman armies in the area. So in my opinion, that quote is just missused. Then again, Hannibal's plan of NOT taking Rome has never really been proven either. But personally, I don't see how he could possibly have had the chance. I think he did his best to capitalize on his victories but he was in an area where it was very hard. The minute he blinked there was a Roman army ready to take a city he captured, his supplies were too often lacking and even in cities that went to him there still was a high risk of the city being lost to the Romans from the inside. As that seemed to be a popular things then....

Now if both men had led the war against Rome along with the tag team brothers, Hasdrubal and Mago ... but yes we will never know.

Europe could have then been influenced by the punic language instead of Latin. lol

[P.Clodius]

I never liked that quote much. Even its very occurrence is questionable.

I like the quote but I agree with your argument. Hannibal was too weak to attack Rome directly. His army was an army of mobility, and Hannibal's experience with siege warfare was weak, just two I think (Saguntum and Nola).

[Guest_Scanderbeg_*]

I dont think it was as much that his army was mobile as much as the enviroment around him and the situation forced him to. He had no supply train coming from anywhere and should he stay in one location for too long he risked running out of food or being surrounded by a large Roman army. With that said, trying to take Rome would have been one of the worst ideas he could have tried.

[Guest_fdgh_*]

I am not intending to be a permanent member of this site, but your discussion has peaked my interest. I am a purveyor of Carthaginian history. What many fail to realize is that Hannibal probably had the strategic genius to pull off a siege of Rome and take the city, the only reason he didn't is because he lacked siege equipment. He had requested reinforcements from Carthage, which would include siege engines, but the anti-war party had taken control of Carthage in his absence. It was led mainly by Hanno the Great, who personally used his influence to keep from sending reinforcements to Hannibal. It probably stems from his personal rivalry with Hannibal's father Hamilcar in the Truceless War. So, due to largely his own personal blindness, Hanno the Great, leading the anti-war faction in Carthage, prevented reinforcements from reaching Hannibal, denying him the necessary siege-equipment to take Rome and destroy his sworn enemy, and the arch-enemy of Carthage. In essence, Hanno the Great was the greatest traitor to Carthage. For if Hannibal had sacked Rome, then I think there is little doubt that Carthage would never have been so ruthlessly destroyed in the Third Punic War, and it's ashes sown with salt.
So in regards to your comments, it is well known Hannibal had great strategic genius, and it is highly likely that if he had been supplied with his reinforcements, he could have taken Rome. You forget that much of southern Italy turned to his side at one point or antoher, and by cutting off Rome, he would be cutting Rome off from any of it's allies. Basically the only reason that the war was lost was because of Hanno the Great and his anti-war party and their refusal to reinforce Hannibal. Hanno the Great was nothing but a dirty traitor. Would Scipio Africanus's victories have meant anything if Rome had fallen? Carthage would be the undisputed master of the Mediterranean.

[Tobias]

That's a fascinating account. I have to confess i have read little on this area of Roman History, being more devoted to the Late Republic to Eastern Empire period, but that is a really interesting and detailed account. You've persuaded me to look more into Early Republican Rome Hamilcar

[Spurius]

...
So in regards to your comments, it is well known Hannibal had great strategic genius, and it is highly likely that if he had been supplied with his reinforcements, he could have taken Rome. You forget that much of southern Italy turned to his side at one point or antoher, and by cutting off Rome, he would be cutting Rome off from any of it's allies. Basically the only reason that the war was lost was because of Hanno the Great and his anti-war party and their refusal to reinforce Hannibal. Hanno the Great was nothing but a dirty traitor. Would Scipio Africanus's victories have meant anything if Rome had fallen? Carthage would be the undisputed master of the Mediterranean.

[snapback]14216[/snapback]

So what do others think? I tend to agree with fdgh here...Hannibal didn't fail, Carthage did.

I have two questions with a seige of Rome by Hannibal.
1)Was Hannibal really lacking engineers? There should have been ones available from the sympathetic southern cities. Materials available on site too. Was this a real problem?
2)Would sacking Rome been enough to stop Rome? I think that only the stone by stone destruction that Rome did to Carthage would work. Would Hannibal or Carthage carry out this destruction? I don't think so. Carthage would want any economy gain it could get from Rome after the defeat of Rome.

[jermus22]

Hi, everybody! Just joined the site and was excited to see you guys discussing the Punic Wars, Carthage, etc. Can't say I know a lot about Roman history in general, but the Punic Wars are a hobby of mine.

In regards to the question about Hannibal's ability to carry out a siege of Rome, from what I've read recently, he did have the equipment and tactical ability to conduct an operation of that scale. However, Hannibal's major obstacle didn't lie in equipment or technology, but rather in manpower. According to John Peddie's excellent book "Hannibal's War," Rome's walls measured some seven miles around, definitely making it extremely difficult for Hannibal's army (roughly 44,000 men after Cannae) to circumvallate or assault the entire city. The population of able-bodied men inside might possibly have outnumbered Hannibal's own army, and the Romans very likely could have raised an army as large as Hannibal's to oppose the besiegers. It's also important to note that when Hannibal attacked Saguntum in Spain, he probably had about 120,000 men in his army, many of whom were reliable veterans instead of questionable troops like the Gauls and Italians in his army after Cannae. Not to mention that the siege of Saguntum took eight months, and there were no Roman legions outside the city to oppose Hannibal.

It appears that Hannibal's grand strategy really involved drawing all of Rome's allies away from the Latin confederacy, while awaiting reinforcements from Africa (by sea) and Spain (Hasdrubal by land). His Italian allies proved fickle, his subordinate generals in Italy fared poorly when entrusted with their own armies, and Carthage failed to send adequate reinforcements by sea. Even his brother Hasdrubal was slow to arrive in Italy, due to his setbacks against Publius and Gnaeus Scipio. Even after defeating the two Scipios at the battles of Ilorca and Castulo in 211 BC, Hasdrubal failed to mobilize an army for Italy before Scipio Africanus arrived with his own troops and took Nova Carthago. By the time Hasdrubal did arrive, his army was a shadow of its former glory, having been defeated a year earlier at the battle of Baecula, and consisting largely of unreliable Gauls and Ligurians.

All the factors mentioned earlier (and others) caused the Carthaginian grand strategy to fail, even though Hannibal for his part did what was necessary.

This post might have been a little long, sorry. I'd really enjoy hearing some other takes on the subject. My theories might have some holes in them, and I always like hearing other opinions on this topic.

[jermus22]

BTW, I'm also up for any discussion about the Truceless War. I've taken a particular interest in that topic during the last two years, even making a trip last November to visit ruins and possible battleground sights in Tunisia.