The Lex Gabinia, Security politics in the ancient world Options

[M. Porcius Cato]

Leaving aside any reference to the modern world (please), what exactly was the status of the lex Gabinia?

In an excellent article that should be of much interest in modern Romanophiles, Robert Harris has recently argued that the law contributed to the fall of the republic:

IN the autumn of 68 B.C. the world’s only military superpower was dealt a profound psychological blow by a daring terrorist attack on its very heart. Rome’s port at Ostia was set on fire, the consular war fleet destroyed, and two prominent senators, together with their bodyguards and staff, kidnapped.

...The perpetrators of this spectacular assault were not in the pay of any foreign power: no nation would have dared to attack Rome so provocatively. They were, rather, the disaffected of the earth: “The ruined men of all nations,” in the words of the great 19th-century German historian Theodor Mommsen, “a piratical state with a peculiar esprit de corps.”

[T]hese pirates were loosely organized, but able to spread a disproportionate amount of fear among citizens who had believed themselves immune from attack. To quote Mommsen again: “The Latin husbandman, the traveler on the Appian highway, the genteel bathing visitor at the terrestrial paradise of Baiae were no longer secure of their property or their life for a single moment.”

What was to be done? Over the preceding centuries, the Constitution of ancient Rome had developed an intricate series of checks and balances intended to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of a single individual. The consulship, elected annually, was jointly held by two men. Military commands were of limited duration and subject to regular renewal. Ordinary citizens were accustomed to a remarkable degree of liberty: the cry of “Civis Romanus sum” — “I am a Roman citizen” — was a guarantee of safety throughout the world.

But such was the panic that ensued after Ostia that the people were willing to compromise these rights. The greatest soldier in Rome, the 38-year-old Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (better known to posterity as Pompey the Great) arranged for a lieutenant of his, the tribune Aulus Gabinius, to rise in the Roman Forum and propose an astonishing new law.

“Pompey was to be given not only the supreme naval command but what amounted in fact to an absolute authority and uncontrolled power over everyone,” the Greek historian Plutarch wrote. “There were not many places in the Roman world that were not included within these limits.”

Pompey eventually received almost the entire contents of the Roman Treasury — 144 million sesterces — to pay for his “war on terror,” which included building a fleet of 500 ships and raising an army of 120,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. Such an accumulation of power was unprecedented, and there was literally a riot in the Senate when the bill was debated.

Nevertheless, at a tumultuous mass meeting in the center of Rome, Pompey’s opponents were cowed into submission, the Lex Gabinia passed (illegally), and he was given his power. In the end, once he put to sea, it took less than three months to sweep the pirates from the entire Mediterranean. Even allowing for Pompey’s genius as a military strategist, the suspicion arises that if the pirates could be defeated so swiftly, they could hardly have been such a grievous threat in the first place.

But it was too late to raise such questions. By the oldest trick in the political book — the whipping up of a panic, in which any dissenting voice could be dismissed as “soft” or even “traitorous” — powers had been ceded by the people that would never be returned. Pompey stayed in the Middle East for six years, establishing puppet regimes throughout the region, and turning himself into the richest man in the empire.
...
In truth, however, the Lex Gabinia was the beginning of the end of the Roman republic. It set a precedent. Less than a decade later, Julius Caesar — the only man, according to Plutarch, who spoke out in favor of Pompey’s special command during the Senate debate — was awarded similar, extended military sovereignty in Gaul. Previously, the state, through the Senate, largely had direction of its armed forces; now the armed forces began to assume direction of the state.

It also brought a flood of money into an electoral system that had been designed for a simpler, non-imperial era. Caesar, like Pompey, with all the resources of Gaul at his disposal, became immensely wealthy, and used his treasure to fund his own political faction. Henceforth, the result of elections was determined largely by which candidate had the most money to bribe the electorate. In 49 B.C., the system collapsed completely, Caesar crossed the Rubicon — and the rest, as they say, is ancient history.

It may be that the Roman republic was doomed in any case. But the disproportionate reaction to the raid on Ostia unquestionably hastened the process, weakening the restraints on military adventurism and corrupting the political process. It was to be more than 1,800 years before anything remotely comparable to Rome’s democracy — imperfect though it was — rose again.

The Lex Gabinia was a classic illustration of the law of unintended consequences: it fatally subverted the institution it was supposed to protect.

Is Harris right?

[Primus Pilus]

Is Harris right?

I vote a qualified no. There were special circumstances that had already set the precedent for special commands. Scipio in Hispania without proconsular imperium comes to mind immediately. The problem was not the law and/or the system itself, but the men who benefited from it.

My qualification is that the law itself was part of a chain of events that toppled the Republic, but with other individuals it may not have happened the way it did, or not at all. Again, in my opinion it was not the law, but the people.

[M. Porcius Cato]

I'm somewhat inclined to agree with PP's assessment.

The lex Gabinia was one of many imperia extra ordinem, including: Pompey's imperium in 82, his command of the armies in Italy and Spain in the 70s, Crassus' command against Spartacus in 72, Pompey's control of the grain supply in 57 (cura annonae), the quinquennial terms in Spain and Syria for Pompey and Crassus starting in 55 (the lex Trebonia), and obviously it was an imperia extra ordinem (the lex Vatinia) that made it possible for Caesar to conduct his Gallic adventures.

Nor were these special commands completely unprecedented. Privati--non-magistrates with imperium--had long served Rome. In the dark days of the Third Samnite War (in 295), four ex-consuls were granted imperia; proconsular imperium was granted to Scipio Africanus and M. Marcellus (neither being proper magistrates), and it was also as a private citizen that Marius obtained the Mithridatic command in 88. While they were not privati, Sp. Lucretius held special imperium in Liguria from 205-202, and Cn. Octavius commanded a fleet in the western Mediterranean from 205-201.

In addition to the extraordinary commands, there were also many lesser special commissions, some of which included imperia. Indeed, my own namesake Cato was forced to accept (with much protest) a special commission to secure the financial resources of Cyprus for the Roman treasury (Cic., De Domo, 22).

As far as I can tell, there are two ways of interpreting these extraordinary powers. The first view is the one that Harris proposes, and it one that has a long history--viz., that the extraordinary commands cleared the path to the principate by means of a successive weakening of the constitution. I don't think this view withstands scrutiny, either with respect to the lex Gabinia nor to its many precedents in the early and middle Republic.

The second view is that the long history of extraordinary commands shows just how flexible and adaptive the Roman constitution really was when faced with emergencies. This was exactly what Cicero had argued on behalf of the Manilian law, and it was consistent as well with Cato's argument in favor of the capital punishment for the Catiline conspirators--that is, if[b] the very existence of the republic is in danger, then there is no sense in worrying about minor laws--ALL laws will be nullified in the event that the republic is destroyed. Cato's argument, I think, provides a principled means for distinguishing between mere power grabs and true expediencies, and it is one that will also find some imperia extra ordinem wanting (especially the lex Vatinia).

Thus, I think the lex Gabinia was not the "beginning of the end" merely because it involved an assembly voting for special powers. In this, the Roman constitution was not being violated, the mos maiorum were not being tossed out; indeed, quite the opposite case can be made even from a strictly Catonian perspective.

That said, I continue to have several reservations about the lex Gabinia--it was passed over a tribune's veto; it simply provided Pompey with a blank check rather than giving him any guidance about what he couldn't do; and it obviously bank-rolled any number of rotten legates who would later go on to commit much mischief (such as Metellus Nepos). In these ways, I think Harris may be onto something, but not because of any constitutional issues with the imperia extra ordinem per se.

[Horatius]

Are not your earlier cites all legitimate uses of the imperia extra ordinem though Cato? ( I don't know just guessing) Is Harris just pointing out that this was a case of fear-mongering and manipulation leading to a reaction far in excess of what was needed ? That's what I get out of it at least that this was the first time for such a disproportionate response. He says earlier that "Military commands were of limited duration and subject to regular renewal." This seems to be an open ended granting of powers that went far beyond the original intention and scope. If so is it without precedent then?

This post has been edited by Horatius: Oct 3 2006, 06:49 PM

[Primus Pilus]

This seems to be an open ended granting of powers that went far beyond the original intention and scope. If so is it without precedent then?

Scipio's imperium in Hispania was rather open ended as well. His continuation of the war into Africa sparked intense opposition in the Senate, but this was mainly on grounds of Hannibal's continued presence in Italy and various notions of humility vs. ambition. Appian asserts that one of the reasons Scipio was elected in the first place was because of his boast that he could conquer Africa and Carthage as well, though Appian may clearly be embellishing in hindsight.

Appian 'War in Spain' 18

Accordingly a day was fixed for choosing a general for Spain. When nobody offered himself the alarm was greatly augmented, and a gloomy silence took possession of the assembly. Finally [Publius] Cornelius Scipio, son of that Publius Cornelius who had lost his life in Spain, still a very young man (for he was only twenty-four years of age), but reputed to be discreet and high-minded, advanced and made an impressive discourse concerning his father and his uncle, and after lamenting their fate said that he was the only member of the family left to be the avenger of them and of his country. He spoke copiously and vehemently, like one possessed, promising to subdue not only Spain, but Africa and Carthage in addition. To many this seemed like youthful boasting, but he revived the spirits of the people (for those who are cast down are cheered by promises), and was chosen general for Spain in the expectation that he would do something worthy of his high spirit.

[Horatius]

Well as I see it the Scipio case was different because Rome was in a very real war for it's very survival. Scipio won the war and pulled Hannibal from Italy in the process. As Harris points out the 'pirate' threat " took less than three months" to defeat. Yet "Pompey stayed in the Middle East for six years" with 500 ships and 120.000 men gobbling up regions like a pac-man apparently. This had nothing to do with the long vanquished pirates but enriched Pompey and gave him immense power. Where there any attempts to call home the legions at this time because the original mandate was complete or was this all a scheme from the beginning to plunder the mid-east? I kind of agree with Harris that this was some watershed event unlike anything before. I think the Romans of the time recognised this also. As Harris says "Previously, the state, through the Senate, largely had direction of its armed forces; now the armed forces began to assume direction of the state."

[Primus Pilus]

As Harris says "Previously, the state, through the Senate, largely had direction of its armed forces; now the armed forces began to assume direction of the state."

I agree that Pompey's command went beyond probably even what his supporters had wished for, but I disagree that this is the first instance of such a thing. Perhaps it is larger in scope than previous examples, but the notion by Harris completely disregards the commands of Marius and Sulla who both used their armies for personal political gain.

Sulla also was given a fairly open objective in his command against Mithridates, but the antics of Marius and Cinna back in Rome forced him to come home early. Who knows what he may have done otherwise.

[M. Porcius Cato]

Wait a second, what makes you think that the lex Gabinia gave Pompey unlimited power in the Mediterranean? That's not what the ancient sources claim, and it's not suggested by the evidence in toto.

According to Velleius Paterculus, Pompey's power was only equal to that of the provincial governors--not greater than theirs. Second, when Metellus resisted Pompey's interference, Pompey desisted. Third, when Pompey later obtained control over the grain supply in 57, he required a second law, suggesting that his imperium here wasn't covered by the lex Gabinia itself. If Pompey had had unlimited power indefinitely, then he wouldn't have needed a second law.

There's some room for debate about the scope of Pompey's authority under the lex Gabinia, but I don't think the ancient sources support the interpretation that Pompey was some sort of Neptune in perpetuity.

[Horatius]

Wait a second, what makes you think that the lex Gabinia gave Pompey unlimited power in the Mediterranean? That's not what the ancient sources claim

"whereby there was granted to him, not only the government of the seas as admiral, but, in direct words, sole and irresponsible sovereignty over all men. For the decree gave him absolute power and authority in all the seas within the pillars of Hercules, and in the adjacent mainland for the space of four hundred furlongs from the sea. Now there were but few regions in the Roman empire out of that compass; and the greatest of the nations and most powerful of the kings were included in the limit. Moreover, by this decree he had a power of selecting fifteen lieutenants out of the senate, and of assigning to each his province in charge" -Plutarch http://classics.mit.edu/Plutarch/pompey.html at least Plutarch seems to think so, did this mean he actually appointed the governers? The Lex Manilia in 66BC gave him even greater power. He marched from modern day Georgia to Judea, setting up provinces and puppet states along the way. Until he finally returned to Rome in 61BC and demobilised the legions, he was no Ceaser after all, You can see how Ceaser might have used this model though. Without the riches and expansion Pompey brought to Rome and the happy ending,would Ceaser have been able to 'get away with it'? Now obviously Harris is using all this to make a very modern political point but is he just ignoring or distorting history to do so? "The Lex Gabinia was a classic illustration of the law of unintended consequences: it fatally subverted the institution it was supposed to protect." Harris says I think he has a point.

This post has been edited by Horatius: Oct 4 2006, 03:30 PM

[M. Porcius Cato]

Yes, it's true that Plutarch contradicts Paterculus' account (I'm very glad you brought that up), but I think it's easier to understand the resolution of the conflict between Pompey and Marcellus if we assume that Paterculus (who was closer to events anyway, wasn't he?) was correct and Plutarch incorrect.

Also, I agree whole-heartedly with Harris' bottom-line: that the lex Gabinia demonstrates the law of unintended consequences. I'd just like to nail down what those consequences were.

[Horatius]

To quote one of my favorite posters ( MPC ) "I don't think the Romans were always quite so cavalier about conquest as has been suggested. Recall that Roman religious law (the ius fetiale) forbade Romans from embarking on wars of aggression solely to gain new territory." http://www.unrv.com/forum/index.php?showtopic=2630# . It certainly looks like Pompey's little adventure was mostly just an excuse to plunder and aquire new lands based on the flimsiest of provacations. In the sheer scale of it I can't see any precedants. There was much opposition to it though in the beginning. In fact it was a very near thing. In the end it turned out wonderful for Rome and Pompey .If it would have been limited would Caeser have been able to do essentially the same thing ? There was much opposition to the Gallic wars also. You have the example of Pompey and the wealth it brought and no power grab from Pompey afterwards though. So did this tip the scales and allow Caeser to destroy the Republic? that's the consequence I see.

[M. Porcius Cato]

That's a good argument Horatius. Essentially, you're not disputing whether the imperia extra ordinem was harmful per se, but you are arguing that the lex Gabinia was too open-ended in the powers it gave Pompey, thereby allowing him to engorge himself on the wealth of the east and thereby disrupt internal Roman politics in a way that previous extraordinary powers had not enabled. Is that a fair summary?

[Horatius]

Yes, since it turned out so succesful in Pompey's case it had the effect of stifiling opposition to it being done again. Of course when you give that kind of power to the wrong man at the wrong time then the consequences will be disastrous for a republic. It's just a matter of time until that happens. I think maybe that is what Harris is saying.

[M. Porcius Cato]

But the imperia extra ordinem had been applied successfully in at least a half dozen previous cases. So what made the lex Gabinia special wasn't that it had been successful for the first time but that it was used as a launch pad for a string of unauthorized 'settlements' in the East.

[Julia Cæsaris Fi...]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't Pompey's Mediterranean command different from Caesar's? I was under the impression Caesar's Gallic command was two seperate proconsular commands with a five year term on each. He didn't have the degree of independance that Pompey did--which makes it all the more surprising that he exceeded his authority and waged aggressive warfare.