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marcus silanus

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Posts posted by marcus silanus

  1. This seems to be partly hewn into a rock face and built about. To be very contrived; if it is Spain, could it be a mine and one of the silver mines west of New Carthage? I'll have a go at Orongis although if it is, I've no idea how you got the image!

  2. Thanks, I wasn't aware that Sikyon had so much to offer. Will be included in the next Peloponnesian tour B)

     

    Marcus Silanus should take credit and post the next picture, though, I wouldn't have found it otherwise.

     

    The site mainly composes of a Roman bath (heavily restored in part) which hosts a museum, a theatre, the forum (not much left), a palestra and a temple (rather little left). The site is free to enter without any ticket. (The bath cost a few

  3. Agreed, but in Africa, he essentially established three separate units of his army... Mercenaries were in one unit, fresh recruits in another, while his veterans held the rear. There was likely to be far less communication and tactical conformity in his African army vs. the veteran army in Italy

    Agreed; the same well communicated veteran units from the Italian war plus plenty of not so well communicated mercenaries and fresh recruits in his own country against less Roman legionaries than those he was previously facing in the hostile Italy under the same commander three years before.

     

    If I didn't miss anything else, Massinissa and his Numidians seem to have been the main (if not the only) significant adverse new factor for the military equation at Zama.

     

    This is an interesting theme, as is your question, Sylla, regarding why Scipio did not attack Hannibal when Consul in 205BC. However, I was originally just looking for an opinion on the book "Hannibal's Last Battle". Would you be interested in putting a new topic in the Gloria Exercitas forum to develop these themes more fully? Specifically, why do we think Scipio did not attack Hannibal in Italy and which factors in his and Hannibal's tactics led to his victory at Zama?

  4. I wonder if any one has read or come across Hannibal's Last Battle (Pen & Sword) by Brian Todd Carey? The Punic Wars are a pet subject of mine and without pretending to be an academic, which I am not, I fear my

  5. It is perhaps not possible to establish who was THE greatest Roman figure. Who could deny that Cicero was a great Roman, as courageous in his advocacy as in he was in facing death? This is not a question than can be answered empirically however and the greatest Roman figure can only be clearly visible from a subjective point of view.

     

    This is not to say that individual cases should not be put forward vigorously, such as the various arguments in this thread, because this encourages productive debate and is after all I think, good fun, without excusing undue levity.

     

    My love of the history of Rome is that it provides us, in the modern age, with so many examples of greatness. This is a time of facile individualism, where the means of communication are considered superior to the communication and statesmanship is considered to be the effective use of a repetative campaign motto, rather than a political vision with the next generation in mind.

  6. Does anyone here supports Fabius Cunctator ? I don't know terribly much about him, but if I am correct, without him Hannibal might well have won a total victory. In which case we would probably never have heard about any of all those famous Romans that came after him. We might even be speaking completely different languages. Or am I giving him far too much credit ?

     

     

    Formosus

     

    This is an interesting point. I gave the opinion that had it not been for the victories of Scipio or his greatness, then it may have been the case that no stage would have existed for the great exploits of Marius, Caesar etc. etc.

     

    If it is valid to say that Fabius Maximus's tactics were key in Rome avoiding total defeat, then it would follow that Scipio would not have had the opportunity for greatness that he did. However, I can't find much to suggest that after his victory at Lake Trasimine that Hannibal intended to march directly on Rome. He was in need of time to recover, having diseased horses and tired, under-nourished men. Fabius succeeded in frustrating Hannibal but ultimately both were as disinclined as the other to engage in a decisive pitched battle at this time.

     

    It might be true that without Fabius's tactics Rome might have forced another disastrous encounter. His keeping an eye on Hannibal, monitoring and harrying him was unpopular with many in Rome including his Magister Equitem, Minucius. However, total defeat of Rome from Hannibal's point of view was in reducing her, or returning her to a minor regional power. Key to achieving this, amongst other things, was detaching her of her allies which he was never able to do to the extent that he expected.

     

    Further to this, when Rome returned to a policy of open warfare that led to the disaster at Cannae, she still recovered. Logically, it should follow that Rome would have recovered from another defeat prior to this, had she not been tethered by Fabius' caution.

     

    I think Fabius had greatness of stature and great strength of character in standing against the pressure to engage in a further ill conceived open battle. What he lacks is greatness in the significance of his deeds.

  7. A couple of unsettled questions:

    If Scipio was never defeated, why did he require five full years (210-206 BC) for expelling the Carthaginians from Hispania?

    If Hasdrubal Barca was so utterly defeated, how was he able to cross the Alps with so huge an Army in 207 BC?

    Why didn't Scipio attack Hannibal in Italy while he was a consul in 205 BC?

     

    And of course, Scipio died in exile after a rather dirty and turbulent political issue.

     

    Scipio did not land in Spain until late in the campaigning season of 210 and retired to winter quarters to train and gather intelligence. The position he faced was one where three widely dispersed Carthaginian armies, each as large as his own, could not plainly be engaged at once and if he engaged with one, he feared the intervention of the others. That is why the following year was taken with the campaign at New Carthage. The major campaign of 208 ended with Hasdrubal Barca's defeat at Baecula. 207 was a quiet year when an attempt to face Hasdrubal Gisgo in the far South was thwarted by his dispersing his army amongst the region's cities. Scipio could not remain in the area and suffer a supply problem and also allow opposition forces to grow strength around him. 206 saw the final battle at Illipa and given the circumstances, I don't think this period is lengthy for completely changing the fortunes of Rome on the Iberian peninsula.

     

    Scipio was cautious and it is perhaps fair to say that he was undefeated because of this, his attention to detail in gathering intelligence and building alliances with the Spanish tribes.

     

    On Hasdrubal Barca's defeat, this was not by any means a slaughter. His defensive position at Baecula positioned on a plateau with ravines on both flanks and a river in front, led Scipio to employ innovative tactics in attacking the Carthaginian flanks. However, Hasdrubal was able to withdraw the larger part of his army and baggage train. Scipio, still feared the arrival of Mago or Gisgo and did not pursue, instead allowing his men to plunder the Carthaginian camp.

     

    I am sure that most members realise that Polybius is both a major source of detail and was a standard bearer for the Scipiones. Having said that, Scipio's achievements are beyond doubt. The facts are that he did eject Carthaginian influence from Spain and he did ultimately defeat Hannibal. Had this not happened, Rome may well have taken a very different path. Greatness can be in deed, character, significance or any number of human attributes. Scipio's greatness was, in my view, most certainly in deed, and significance. He remains my greatest Roman figure.

  8. Had Publius Cornelius Scipio not gained control of Spain and ultimately defeated Hannibal, the evolution of Rome into the first world superpower may well have not happened. Hannibal's objective, by consensus, was to reduce Rome to a regional city state power, lacking influence beyond central Italy. If this had been the case, it would be rather pointless talking about the relative merits of Marius, Sulla, Caesar, Germanicus, Pompey or Trajan for example, because there would not have been an established Roman domain in which to develop greatness of deed and character.

     

    Scipio possessed all the Roman virtues and the forward thinking chracter of an Philehellene. He saved Rome from disaster and gained little reward. Scipio Africanus was to Rome, the same as the RAF to England in 1940 and surely deserves recognition.

  9. Thats a tough one. Like others here have already said; the out come would depend on many factors beyond unit gear and tactics alone. But my vote, would go to an Army of Phalanx over the Cohort's mobility in a war. My reasoning is the Phalanx unit was also armed with swords. the rear of a phalanx was the weak point but those men who were the back of the unit could turn and fight to hold the frontal formation against rout. If you had several Phalanx units they could form a square around missile units who had taken position on small hill for example and with enough supply, those missile units could stop any cohort or barbarian mobility. The Phalanx however was not limited still and needed heavy cavalry support in rough terrain or wood lands. The cohorts were a great fighting unit not just in mobility but in having darts to throw at an enemy before making contact thus reducing the Phalanx formations ability . But all in all I say the Phalanx wins...Just an opinion.

     

    The phalanx did not win. This is a fact and whether this was the result of the superiority of one system or the other, Roman manpower, the 'hydra' described by Cineas and Pyrrhus or leadership, it remains a fact that the legions prevailed in most cases. It is interesting, in my view, to toy with a few 'what ifs?' such as the possible outcome of an encounter with Alexander but the sum total of actual meetings between legions and phalanx based armies shoe one to be superior than the other.

     

    The darts that you refer to - plumbatae - were not a part of legionary weaponry until the late third century AD long after any encounter with a phalanx based adversary.

  10. ....so after more then two years since i posted, any one else an idea why the germans say Amor and the english Cupid?

     

    This is something of an aside, but the Cathar heretics of southern France used the name Amor for the pure spirit of love, the material and earthly part of their beliefs being represented by Rex Mundi - plainly King of the World.

  11. I would it depends on what era of Roman soldier you are talking about. Marian/Caesar era, I would say the Cohort would have won. The Roman legion was structured down to the common foot soldier. The phalanx had structure, but not that far down. With the cohort having an elastic quality as someone mentioned, I think a section of the cohort could have easily outflanked the phalanx on the weaker right side. Remember, the phalanx needs to act and think as one. You couldn't have guys flipping that sarissa backwards while some pointed forward. The whole formation would fall apart. The Roman pilum could harass the Macedonians from the front while the smaller unit broke off and harassed the flank. Hands down, the cohort would win. It has speed, mobility, and adaptability. The phalanx relied heavily on the heavy cavalry. That is what made it so destructive. It was literally a moving wall of sharp points. It worked primarily off of the anvil/hammer principle. In essence, it only had one direction; forward. Cohort, hands down!

    As it was, the Macedonian phalanges were utterly defeated by pre-Marian legions.

    Sylla is quite right to point out this fact that I think has become well estyablished on this thread. From the First Macedonian War onwards it is an empirical fact that the legions were superior. This being fact, I think, is why the more recent posts were, in referring to earlier encounters with, for example Pyrrhus, trying to establish the relative merits of the legion against the phalanx in it's near prime just post Alexander.

  12. To address the inflexibility of the phalanx in this context: I think (and I stand to be corrected) that the Macedonian formations at the time of DogsHead (cos I can't spell Cyconcephale or however it goes) and the other later battles had lengthened the the sarissa to ludicrous extremes. Admitedly, it wasn't ludicrous when facing other phalanxes because size mattered.

     

    But I think that Philip and Alexander's formations were much different - the old combined arms approach and the "hammer and anvil." In later times, the phalanx evolved into the primary weapon, something it wasn't in earlier days. I'm preaching to the converted here - but the Alexandrian phalanx held the enemy in place whilst the cavalry administered coup de grace. That wasn't the case at the time of Cyconcephalae.

     

    If Alex had gone west instead of east, we'd all be speaking Anglo-Hellenic or something. For Romanophiles, it hurts to admit, but I can't see an early legion matching Alexander and his chums in anyway shape or form.

     

    It's the best debate in Ancient History, this. And a never ending one - there must be a thousand posts on this board alone about it *lol*

     

    Cheers

     

    Russ

    Thought I'd help you out with that name :

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cynoscephalae

     

    I think it was Alexander's plan to come West after he'd conquered the East.

     

    Formosus

     

     

    I will always stand and be corrected and it seems that my comment was ill informed. It is, I realise now, a widely held belief that Alexander did plan to conquer the arab tribes and move west, certainly against Carthage and Sicily.

     

    May I refine my statement and say that I still don't think that he would have moved specifically against Rome and that he did not view her as anything more than one of many western powers and cultures.

     

    Thanks Formosus for the correction.

  13. To address the inflexibility of the phalanx in this context: I think (and I stand to be corrected) that the Macedonian formations at the time of DogsHead (cos I can't spell Cyconcephale or however it goes) and the other later battles had lengthened the the sarissa to ludicrous extremes. Admitedly, it wasn't ludicrous when facing other phalanxes because size mattered.

     

    But I think that Philip and Alexander's formations were much different - the old combined arms approach and the "hammer and anvil." In later times, the phalanx evolved into the primary weapon, something it wasn't in earlier days. I'm preaching to the converted here - but the Alexandrian phalanx held the enemy in place whilst the cavalry administered coup de grace. That wasn't the case at the time of Cyconcephalae.

     

    If Alex had gone west instead of east, we'd all be speaking Anglo-Hellenic or something. For Romanophiles, it hurts to admit, but I can't see an early legion matching Alexander and his chums in anyway shape or form.

     

    It's the best debate in Ancient History, this. And a never ending one - there must be a thousand posts on this board alone about it *lol*

     

    Cheers

     

    Russ

     

    I think that it's agreed within this and other comments that the phalanx that faced the legions at Cynocaphalae, Magnesia, Pydna and later was the somewhat clumsy block, prone to losing cohesion and without the cavalry support of earlier times. Indeed, if Alexander had turned west, he would have encountered either the last vestiges of the Roman hoplite phalanx that always lacked the essential degree of cavalry support, or the first incarnations of the manipular system copied - almost certainly according to most - from the Samnites. Either way, as you say, things would be markedly different.

     

    However there is a little irony in this 'what if?' scenario! Alexander would never have turned west. The perception of Rome by the Hellenic East was of a state that was virtuous in her constitution but bordering on barbarian. They did not consider her worthy of attention until the defeat of Pyrrhus by which time Roman manipular tactics had developed to the point where they could defeat a highly developed Hellenic army based on Phalanx with cavalry and indeed elephant support. Roman losses in the two battles that preceded the final victory were huge but so were those of Pyrrhus.

     

    A question worth asking is that if Pyrrhus, noted for being impulsive and not seeing things through, had shared the ternacity of his Roman opponents, could he have won through? If he had been able to withstand the losses, were his tactics still superior to those of Rome?

  14. Phalanx against phalanx would rarely render a decisive military result.
    Oh? Why? Do you imagine two opposing phalanxes 'pushing pikes' in a sort of military rugby scrum?

    In fact, most combats from the endless Diadochi Wars were macedonian inter-phalanges battles.

     

    Yes indeed they were and the mirror image tactics led to some of the successor generals developing exotic weapons to break the deadlock. Further to this, the break up of Alexander's empire diluted the resources available to each kingdom and by the time that we get to the Macedonian and Syrian wars, the forces deployed lacked the balance and cutting edge at the disposal of Philip II and Alexander.

     

    For the phalanx to really work, as pressure was applied to the enemy centre, a lightening attack by cavalry would carry the day. Alexander's ratio of infantry to cavalry was six to one. By the late third or early second century the ratio at best was ten to one in the successor kingdoms. The phalanx therefore, was increasingly relied upon in Hellenic deployments and so the forces encountered at, for example, Pydna and Magnesia, were far clumsier than those in the Pyrrhic wars. The shortcomings of the phalanx, as it was increasingly deprived of cavalry support were ever more exposed. It was by this time tactically out of context, rather like going to work as a carpenter with a hammer, a vice and no saw.

  15. Hey Everyone,

    I was wondering if anyone could give me a few pointers on what to focus on in planning an essay. The question is as follows:

    Describe the main stages in the growth of Rome from a small city state c.509BC into a great empire c.AD14.

     

    So as you can see there are a lot of sources for this period however I'm unsure as to where i should start. I was planning on focusing on the campaigns that lead to territorial expansion for Rome. So I was planning on mentioning the following wars in my essay. The Latin Wars, The Samnite Wars (all three), The First and Second Punic Wars, The Macedonian Wars (all three), The Mithridatic Wars, Caesars campaigns in Gaul and Britain, Octavian war against Antony and Cleopatra, Campaign against the Cantabri 26-19BC, Alpine Campaigns 25-8BC, African Campaigns 25BC and the Illyrian Campaigns 6-9AD. Basically I would like to know what i should include, exclude or add to the list of thing I should address... any input would be much appreciated. As I'm really at a loss as to where I should start as it quite a broad question at least for someone with my limited experience! Thanks in advance!!!

     

     

     

    AEGYPTUS

     

     

     

    P.S. Sorry if I posted this in the wrong place. Just really need some advice!

     

    I would include the Pyrrhic War. This was the first point at which Rome had been tested by a modern Hellenic army and a general of great repute. Whereas previously, Rome was thought of as insignificant and even barbarous by the Greeks, the victory against Pyrrhus put her on to the world stage as well as all but completing her control of Italy south of the Po. The Pyrrhic War was the proving ground of the legions and the first major test of Roman ternacity.

  16. To what extent does everyone feel, were the circumstances that ended the First Punic War, the direct cause of the second conflict? With the mix of loss of territory, reparations, rise of personality cult etc. the parallels with WW1 to WW2 are fairly irresistable and I hope that it is permissable to draw upon them. However, the subject is deep and gripping enough in isolation if the feeling is that the comparisons should be avoided.

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