Hannibal Barca

[Spartan JKM]

The great struggle Hannibal engineered against the Roman republic was a titanic clash in military history, and set in motion the identity of the western Mediterranean, and then beyond, into the Hellenistic kingdoms.

 

From a certain (ie, Western) point of view, it was the first world war.

 

Rome's ultimate victory was a defining moment in her history. In a nutshell, Rome's victory was due to the Roman citizens; they had faced a threat as never before with toughness and determination and had stood strong, as the Roman federation of alliances had held firm; while Hannibal had depended on the allies running to his side, which were the most remote Roman allies, those in the south and Siciliy. For the rest of Roman history, the character of being Roman would be distilled in the histories of this seemingly desperate war against one hated, but brilliant man. The Second Punic War turned Rome from a regional power into an international empire.

 

".....the Romans were most to be feared when they stood in real danger.....Though they were now so overwhelmingly defeated (regarding Cannae), and their military reputation had been destroyed, yet, by the peculiar virtues of their constitution, and by wise counsel, they not only recovered their supremacy in Italy.....but in a few years made themselves masters of the world."

 

- Polybius

 

It was so close, though; by 209 B.C., 40% of the socii was unable to contribute to the Roman war effort. Hannibal's strategy of breaking up the Roman confederacy was bearing fruit, and if he had received more aid from the Carthaginian suffete to apply more pressure on Rome, things might have been different. Hannibal's work from 219 - 215 B.C. was extraordinary, and when it was needed, he had hoped for detachments to reach him from Iberia and Africa, which had already been proven tenable (Bomilcar landed in Locri in 214 B.C. with 4,000 Numidians). This is not a simple topic, but the Carthaginians seemed more interested in their ventures in Iberia than sending Hannibal reinforcements, which he needed badly by around 212 B.C. The sustenance he displayed for the next 10 years was remarkable, though he failed in his ultimate aim.

 

Hannibal and his father Hamilcar were probably correct that war with Rome was impending, as both sides were building up. Carthage would have no chance in a basic, protracted war against Rome in the 220s B.C.

 

Hannibal had a plan. It was as brilliant as it was audacious, and I feel he always knew in his heart it would be a gamble. But he saw the feasibility of it, and he was the best judge of his own wisdom, despite what pro-Roman critics opine. I'm sure you all know the plan I mean - his incredible strike into Italy is military history's classic example of 'attack is the best form of defence'. It must have seemed insane at the time! Even if he could reach northern Italy, he could not rely on support from the dwindled Carthaginian fleet and a fortified harbor, for Rome was now mistress of the sea. An invading army would surely be crushed between the network of Roman fortresses and the firmly consolidated confederacy. If need be, Rome could field 700,000 men and some 70,000 cavalry. In all, Carthage could barely muster about 1/7 of that. Hannibal knew he was not going to win a long war of positional attrition.

 

The Roman military system is what intrigued Hannibal, particularly the cavalry arm, which seemed to essentially to be soldiers trying to sit on horses. His horsemen were of the finest in the world at the time. This would figure very prominently in the war, from both sides. The Roman infantry, traditionally drawn up in 3 lines, relied on its weight and the strength of the group. It could advance with devastating force, or retire equally well. But it could not wheel easily and could be outflanked and surrounded by a more mobile army. This was all Hannibal's assessments, though. It had to be put to the test. Moreover, individual legionnaires, though trained and geared for war from youth, were not trained efficaciously to act seperately from the army's component parts; it must act as a whole. Perhaps Rome's greatest general ever, Publius C. Scipio, the Younger, later to be known as Africanus, would later remedy these liabilities, and implement sound strategic campaigns to defeat the Carthagininas in Iberia and Africa, culminating with the decisive defeat of Hannibal at Zama (or Margaron or Naraggara). But he did need a superior army and better positioning, something he did not ingeniously 'create', to vanquish the great Carthaginian in 202 B.C. He was already solidly placed in Africa when Hannibal, with a depleted army, arrived at Leptis Minor in 203 B.C., and too good a commander to not lose an advantage. This debtable topic can be discussed. I'll be glad to expound on it!

 

I don't want to be too narrative, as I would like the thread to cover specific topics, but I will write a little overview on one of the greatest field commanders of all time.

 

After his famous crossing, Hannibal descended into the Po basin with only 20,000 foot and 6,000 cavalry. But he knew from prior intelligence he could rely on some of the Gallic tribes for help, as they were recently aflame with Rome. Polybius tells us Hannibal began with 90,000 foot and 12,000 cavalry, after providing forces to strenghtem the defences of Africa and Iberia. A little more than 20,000 were relieved for logistical and security reasons. Hannibal faced some desertions and the Alpine crossing was certainly perilous, but he had no major engagements, though Polybius writes that the Catalonian subjugation was very 'severe'. But I doubt Hannibal's losses numbered as much as 55,000. He probably started with 70-80,000, still a large force for its day. We'll never know for sure. But that doesn't matter too much. Whatever the figures were and however they were composed, much can be admired for the stamina and recuperative powers of the survivors. But there was no time to rest; the campaign against Rome began immediately on the banks of the Ticinus and Trebbia Rivers. What is also significant is the measure of Hannibal's achievement in crossing the Alps; to this day it remains one of the most extraordinary and revered feats of military engineering and organization. It could not have been achieved without amazing inspired leadership.

 

Hannibal's successful arrival in Italy was a smashing strategic success; he totally threw the Roman war-plans completely awry and wrested any initiative away from them.

 

Despite Livy's roundabout claims, Hannibal was never defeated in Italy. He could never gain the headway required to defeat Rome, but his conduct in day-to-day operations was supreme, and his strategy to attempt a detachment of Rome's allies was the only viable one, thus any criticism he didn't 'adapt' to something new is erroneous (IMHO); it could have worked with unwavering help form his allies abroad. It never came. What happened to the Carthaginians in Iberia was beyond his control, as almost every Carthaginian reversal in the war was. He how to rapidly cut his losses and then retrieve a situation, as he did against Rufus Minucius in 217 B.C. He never allowed the enemy to pin him down for long, never squandered his men in useless engagements, and always could extricate his army intact from an inauspicious situation. He never attempted crudely to batter his way through a check or difficulty, and always kept his options open. He broke out of traps, and used varying types of harrassing tactics to whet an inexperienced enemy's appetite for battle.

 

"Hannibal was like a boxer faced by a heavier opponent; he feinted, weaved and dodged, and kept out of range - but his punch was devastating when he saw the chance."

 

-Professor John F. Lazenby

 

His victory at Cannae resonates beyond its own time, and is the textbook example of tactical perfection. It illustrated to the letter how a defensive use of a convex-turned-concave infantry deployment complimented by elastically hinged wings of cavalry could destroy a huge army by the very means of its own strength. I disagree with assessments stating that the Romans were 'stupid' and Hannibal got 'lucky'. Nonsense. I'll address this readily if anyone wishes.

 

Hannibal also excelled as a statesmen, personally bringing Carthage to a level of balanced prosperity and democracy with his brilliant reforms in the 190s B.C. He checked all the venality inthe government and relieved the citizens of the extra taxes that had been imposed on them for many previous years. The war endemnity to Rome could be paid in full 40 years early! But Rome refused, demanding a payment period.

 

Moreover, he was not enclosed in a single culture - he was as 'internaional' as any other great of antiquity. Apart form his early childhood, he spent only a few years in Carthage itself - the very years he ushered in its greatest prosperity. He was effected from his times with Iberian societies, the Celtic world, the cultures of southern Italy, and later the cities of the Hellenized East. He apparently spoke both Latin and Greek. But his feeling and identity as who he was and where he came from never wavered, as his loyalty to his Punic homeland never did. Possibly not until Hadrian did Rome produce a man who would combine both pietas (loyalty) and a sense of the universal. That is arguable.

 

All details of all the events etc. can come up amid the discussions. I'll be glad to address everything.

 

Hope we can have a good discussion(s). Hannibal was a man, and no man is infallible. Any other great commander could have made the mistakes and misjudgments he did. No matter how I spin it, he did fail in the end, and must be held accountable, at least for the most part, for Carthage's defeat.

Thanks, Spartan JKM

[Velociraptor]

Great topic Spartan. Wonderful scholarship on your part.

 

I always found it intriguing that despite Hannibal's genius, his incorporation of Gallics and Numidians etc. into his army to 'liberate' the peoples of Italy from the Romans yoke. Why would these people, under an alliance of strong bonds of nationhood, leave their Roman masters for people who had been pillaging Italy for many years before and 'barbarians' from Africa? No question though - he came very close.

 

Great tpoic. I'd like to go over a lot.

[Primus Pilus]

Great topic Spartan. Wonderful scholarship on your part.

 

I always found it intriguing that despite Hannibal's genius, his incorporation of Gallics and Numidians etc. into his army to 'liberate' the peoples of Italy from the Romans yoke. Why would these people, under an alliance of strong bonds of nationhood, leave their Roman masters for people who had been pillaging Italy for many years before and 'barbarians' from Africa? No question though - he came very close.

 

Great tpoic. I'd like to go over a lot.

14473[/snapback]

 

Because in some respects the perception that the Italians were treated the same way by the Romans was very real. It was not so many year prior to Hannibal's invasion that the Italians (and Greeks for that matter) fought desperately against the Romans and its understandable that Hannibal believed the war could be won by testing their loyalty. However, what he failed to realized was that in the generations that passed since the Italian conquests, the Italian people began to see themselves as a part of Rome, and that they embraced the culture that was brought to them. They longed to be an even larger part of the Roman world, and their recurring enmity with Rome over the following centuries did not come from a desire to be free, but to be even more closely tied.

 

That's why Hannibal's plan was destined to fail from the start.

[jermus22]

Good posts, Primus Pilus. What amazes me about Hannibal's achievements is that he didn't have any major desertions or organizational breakdowns during his time as a general. Certainly other Carthaginian generals had far less success in the field. In campaigns against the Greeks in Sicily during the 5th and 4th centuries BC, Carthaginian generals with numerically superior armies were defeated time and again by the Greek phalanx. And even when one of their generals managed to capture nearly all of Sicily and put Syracuse under siege, his campaign failed because his troops failed to maintain sanitary conditions and discipline within the camp. Having so many men from different cultures and backgrounds (many of them true barbarians, like the Gauls and some Libyans and Iberians) made it difficult to maintain a universal standard for hygiene, cleanliness, and organization in the camps, and language barrier itself only compounded the problem.

 

Events of the first Punic War continued to illustrate the problems with the Carthaginian system. After the Agrigentum campaign of 262, some 4,000 Celts tried to desert, leading to their general (Hamilcar, not Hannibal's father) betraying them into a Roman ambush. Later, at the siege of Lilybaeum in 250 or 249, more Celts attempted to desert, and if I remember correctly, some Greek mercenaries tried the same thing. Even Hamilcar Barca's army in Sicily (247-241) gave him considerable trouble. 1/3 of his Celtic contingent deserted, and he had to make lavish promises to keep some of the other men loyal to his cause (although these promises may have been based on the condition of victory). Even though Hamilcar's army didn't lose in the field, the naval defeat at Aegates led to the army being returned to Carthage without the spoils of victory. Delays in pay let to a revolt, but even after Carthage agreed to pay, they still insisted on more than their compensation.

 

Other than one instance of a few hundred (I think it was 272) Numidians and Iberians deserting, I personally have never read any other accounts of Hannibal's men disputing their pay and/or deserting in his sixteen years in Italy. It is quite a testament his abilities as a leader of men to inspire the devotion and courage of such diverse groups as the Carthaginians, Greeks, Numidians, Libyans, Liby-Phoenicians, Iberians, and Gauls, not to mention the various Latins and Italians who would later make up the majority of his army.

[Velociraptor]

Yes, I think Hannibal viewed the Roman alliance similar to that of his own country, which grounded subjects down with heavy tribute. He thought he could finish the growing Roman empire by stirring a revolt among her allies, as the Truceless War had almost ruined Carthage by revolting mercenaries a few decades earlier.

 

I think his aim of detaching the Latin peoples of central Italy in Latium etc. was doomed from the start, but his overall operational aim of encircling Italy from around the Mediterranean was not far-fetched at all. Syracuse revolted and Macedon was allied with him. The less-reconciled Greeks joined him in southern Italy, and if it seemed his chances of winning the war increased, more of them would have probably done so. The Romans simply were more aggressive in closing those doors than Carthage and Philip of Macedon were to exploit them. Many people in Italy had to reckon who was probably going to win the war, and thier allegiances maybe were aimed at this, and not complete loyalty to Rome. What Spartan JKM mentined about the 12 colonies is very significant: Rome was clearly being strained. I doubt, however, Hannibal was joined by many cities solely because they believed in his cause. Terror and force played a part.

 

I read once something like, "Hannibal transcended the traditional ability of the soldiers who fought for him". If so, this says a lot for Scipio Africanus, who had abetter army at Zama, but a smaller one against green troops in the first 2 lines under this very incredible general who could get the most out of troops.

[Marcus_Aurelius]

He was probably the greatest genius in warfare but he didn't understand that the Italian allies of Rome wouldn't join him because Carthage as a state didn't respect very much the rights of the non-citizen human being.They just couldn't expect at much from the Carthaginian government so they respected their alliances with Rome which granted citizenship to many Italians.This particular thing determined not to join Hannibal's anti-Rome confederation.

[Marcus_Aurelius]

Also if he had succeded in defeating Rome I personally think he would have become a Carthaginian Julius Caesar.His greatest mistakes at Zama was to think Scipio was a general similar to Varo and not to do anything about the Roman much superior cavalry(in numbers).He tried the same tactic he used at Cannae but due to the fact his cavalry couldn't secure the flanks he was defeated.What is amazing to me is the fact that if he had conquered the Italian peninsula he would have been much more popular than Alexander,but the laws of our world would have been more brutal.His fate was quite close to Napoleon's.He won most of the battles against Rome but was finally betaen by an extraordinary general(Scipio,Wellington)

[Velociraptor]

He was probably the greatest genius in warfare

 

Well, definitely one of them.

 

I disagree though about Zama. Hannibal's tactics were subtle, and not intended to encircle and destroy. His use of 3 lines, each acting independently, did much to wear down Scipio's army. It's possible Hannibal used his cavalry to draw away the superior Numidian/Roman horse, thus making the main battle an infantry one. Some say it was the scattered elephants that did most damage upon Hannibal's own cavalry, but their riders had weapons to kill them, so this might not be true. Scipio organized and re-formed very well, but it was the discipline and better morale of the Romans that came through. I think the key to the battle was the handling of the elephants and the superior cavalry.

 

I certainly agree if Hannibal had succeeded, even with Rome dominant much later down the road (delaying her realm over the Western world), he would be held in higher esteem than other greats like Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar. I don't think they were any better as raw military geniuses.

[roman wargamer]

it is my 2nd readings and my first comment.

 

the thread should be more expanded into a short article, or book in the future.

you are gifted in writing Spartan JKM.

 

here is my simple comparizon.

USA and the Spain War

 

Rome = is the modern USA

600 senator

40,000 family

35 tribe/ state = 50 state

150,000 active soldier = million active soldier, most modern

150,000 reserve = comparative reserve

500,000 reactive = more possible reactive

 

Rome could easily produce a Counsular Legionary Army

from the confederation of the 35 Tribe / State members

each Senator will be require only to give 100 to 200 manpower.

 

Hannibal do not have any of this.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Hannibal = Spain

1 family

few tribe/ Chartage

40,000 active soldier

40,000 reseve

40,000 reactive

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

it is like the US war against Iraq.

 

the ENDs have long been known to the US / Rome senate from the beginning.

 

it will cost them, but they know they will Win it, and very Sure of it.

 

rad

=====

[Tobias]

That's a very interesting breakdown of the article. It certainly does simplify things.

One notices these days that the Iraq war has little coverage in the press (at least in Australia), but the things that do come to light are that America is not making much headway. Although they have the advantage of numbers, technology and plenty of money, how do you know they won't do as Hannibal did, and pull out of the country they are invading? The roles are reversed in this comparison; it is Carthage invading the the Roman Republic, and America invading Iraq. It's hard to know if America holds that moral advantage that 9/11 gave them, whereas the Romans certainly had a moral advantage; they were defending their country from invasion (if you can call the tactics adopted to be defense) when Hannibal was wandering around southern italy.

All i'm saying is that although it seems that Rome was bound to win, as America seems bound to win, one shouldn't fall into the trap of saying that Rome and America were in the same position.

That argument was perhaps a little irrelevant however, so i'll just stop now.

[Tobias]

Great article as well Spartan JKM, that was very enlightening.

[Spartan JKM]

Appreciation all around everyone. Thank you for the comments.

 

There is so much I would like to say - but no hurry!!

 

I do agree with Primus Pilus; indeed, Hannibal's strategic aim that the core of Rome's federation - the peoples of Latium, Sabine, and most of Campania - would defect in masse upon his arrival was doomed from the beginning. I also agree with you Velociraptor; this misconception of his was borne from the belief that the Roman alliance system was similar to that of Carthage.

 

However, the complex amalgam of of Latins, Italians, Samnites, and Greeks etc. by no means gave this federated system the appearance of togetherness, thus it is completely understandable why he determined it could be broken.

 

Moreover, the Roman alliance was not without its divisions, and perhaps not as solid as it appeared. Nigel Bagnall, who wrote a judicious account titled The Punic Wars, wrote of the Italian peoples outside of the heart of the confederacy,

 

"Hannibal's revolutionary appeal had aroused the aspirations of the people's party, aspirations which the aristocrats in Rome vigorously countered by calling upon their peers in the allied cities to unite against the subversive threat they represented."

 

Food for thought.

 

It appears the valuable stronghold of Nola was going to open its gates to Hannibal in 215 B.C., as the lower classes were beginning be sympathetic (or plain fear) with his cause against Rome. The stout intervention of the upper class under Marcus Marcellus repulsed Hannibal for the 1st of 3 times here. Hannibal would wind up going after bigger game at Tarentum. As they entrenched themselves more vigilantly against Hannibal, things began to fare better for the Romans. Livy would write,

 

".....for not to be defeated by Hannibal was a more difficult thing than it was later to defeat him". (Book XXIX.16)

 

However, they would suffer badly twice at Heronea against him, not to mention beforehand in Lucania (Marcus Centenius), and Marcellus and his reconnaisance party were fatally ambushed in 208 B.C.

 

Thanks, Spartan JKM

[Velociraptor]

The Romans also benefited from Bona Fortuna when they intercepted the correspondences between Hannibal and Philip V, and Hannibal and Hasdrubal. I guess we can only criticize in retrospect, but it was not wise of Hasdrubal to write down his plans to hook up with Hannibal, and not simply commit the plans to the memories of the 6 messengers who rode all the way down Italy, only to be caught around Tarentum. But they certainly would have been tortured for the information. Fortune definitely did not favor Hannibal in many circumstances.

[Hamilcar Barca]

According to Polybius, Hannibal remained undefeated on the battlefield until Zama. Livy tells another story, but even then he occasionally hints that his sources may well have trumped up minor skirmishes and draws to make the appear as Roman victories. In any case, Zama was like no battle fought in Italy. The Carthaginian mercinary army which crossed the Alps and won the great battles of Trebia, Trasimenae and Cannae was without doubt, the finest Punic army ever raised and commanded by the most competent generals that Carthage ever produced. I'm not just talking about Hannibal here. Hasdrubal and Marharbal - his cavalry commanders played vital roles in all the major battles and proved to be loyal, diligent and efficient in virtually all their endeavours. It was after all Hasdrubals devastating Cavalry charge that sent the Roman right wing to rout and thus allowed the encirclment of the Roman infantry masses at Cannae.

 

More so, Hannibal only ever let himself get drawn into battles when he was absolutely sure of himself. This worked fine for him in Italy but when Scipio invaded North Africa, Hannibal was forced to take action, whether or not he believed he had an effective plan was irrelevant, Carthage's survival was at stake, he had to do something. If Hannibal had been faced with that same battle taking place in Italy, I can almost guarantee he would have avoided it, why? The Punic army of 202BC was ill-trained, inexperienced and the various units and contingents within it were completely out of sync with one another. At Zama, the fate of the battle almost entirely rested on the infantry - Hannibal arranged his infantry in three lines: the first consisted of the Ligurian, Balearic and Gallic infantry who had made up Mago

[Imperator Marzullius]

The great struggle Hannibal engineered against the Roman republic was a titanic clash in military history, and set in motion the identity of the western Mediterranean, and then beyond, into the Hellenistic kingdoms.

 

Yeah, that's why he lost. He couldn't even siege a city, so he just wandered the countryside.