Hannibal's Last Battle

[marcus silanus]

I wonder if any one has read or come across Hannibal's Last Battle (Pen & Sword) by Brian Todd Carey? The Punic Wars are a pet subject of mine and without pretending to be an academic, which I am not, I fear my

[WotWotius]

How do I get hold of a copy of Mommsen for instance?

 

Easy: This is the edition I used for my dissertation. If you do not feel like shelling out

[sylla]

Zama was hardly Hannibal Barca's "last battle"; he fought against Rome and/or Roman allies for no less than two decades more, under either Antiochus III or Prusias I of Bithynia; his last recorded victory (by Nepos and Frontinus) was against the fleet of Eumenes II of Pergamon, reportedly by throwing pots full of poisonous snakes onto his ships.

 

Regarding Zama, the most notoriously ignored issue must be that most historians utterly ignore or diminish the outstanding contribution not only of Massinissa, but of the Numidian cavalry, army and resources as a whole; from where I am, that was the main (virtually the only) additional factor that might have explained why Scipio attacked Hannibal in 202 BC in Africa and not in 205 BC in Italy as a consul.

[Primus Pilus]

Regarding Zama, the most notoriously ignored issue must be that most historians utterly ignore or diminish the outstanding contribution not only of Massinissa, but of the Numidian cavalry, army and resources as a whole; from where I am, that was the main (virtually the only) additional factor that might have explained why Scipio attacked Hannibal in 202 BC in Africa and not in 205 BC in Italy as a consul.

 

That, and the nature of Hannibal's army in Africa vs. Italy (ie heavy reliance on fresh recruits/mercenaries in Africa and the lack of time for coordination vs. veteran "professionals" in Italy)

[sylla]

Regarding Zama, the most notoriously ignored issue must be that most historians utterly ignore or diminish the outstanding contribution not only of Massinissa, but of the Numidian cavalry, army and resources as a whole; from where I am, that was the main (virtually the only) additional factor that might have explained why Scipio attacked Hannibal in 202 BC in Africa and not in 205 BC in Italy as a consul.

 

That, and the nature of Hannibal's army in Africa vs. Italy (ie heavy reliance on fresh recruits/mercenaries in Africa and the lack of time for coordination vs. veteran "professionals" in Italy)

No, because the veteran "professionals" from the war in Italy were evacuated to Africa; hence, Hannibal had at his disposition in Africa (202 BC ) both such veterans and the fresh recruits/mercenaries, a far bigger army than in Italy (205 BC).

 

Besides, not all African Carthaginian troops were necessarily rookies; surely some of them (for example, many of Syphax

Edited June 5, 2009 by sylla

[Primus Pilus]

Regarding Zama, the most notoriously ignored issue must be that most historians utterly ignore or diminish the outstanding contribution not only of Massinissa, but of the Numidian cavalry, army and resources as a whole; from where I am, that was the main (virtually the only) additional factor that might have explained why Scipio attacked Hannibal in 202 BC in Africa and not in 205 BC in Italy as a consul.

 

That, and the nature of Hannibal's army in Africa vs. Italy (ie heavy reliance on fresh recruits/mercenaries in Africa and the lack of time for coordination vs. veteran "professionals" in Italy)

No, because the veteran "professionals" from the war in Italy were evacuated to Africa; hence, Hannibal had at his disposition in Africa (202 BC ) both such veterans and the fresh recruits/mercenaries, a far bigger army than in Italy (205 BC).

 

Besides, not all African Carthaginian troops were necessarily rookies; surely some of them (for example, many of Syphax

[sylla]

Agreed, but in Africa, he essentially established three separate units of his army... Mercenaries were in one unit, fresh recruits in another, while his veterans held the rear. There was likely to be far less communication and tactical conformity in his African army vs. the veteran army in Italy

Agreed; the same well communicated veteran units from the Italian war plus plenty of not so well communicated mercenaries and fresh recruits in his own country against less Roman legionaries than those he was previously facing in the hostile Italy under the same commander three years before.

 

If I didn't miss anything else, Massinissa and his Numidians seem to have been the main (if not the only) significant adverse new factor for the military equation at Zama.

[marcus silanus]

Agreed, but in Africa, he essentially established three separate units of his army... Mercenaries were in one unit, fresh recruits in another, while his veterans held the rear. There was likely to be far less communication and tactical conformity in his African army vs. the veteran army in Italy

Agreed; the same well communicated veteran units from the Italian war plus plenty of not so well communicated mercenaries and fresh recruits in his own country against less Roman legionaries than those he was previously facing in the hostile Italy under the same commander three years before.

 

If I didn't miss anything else, Massinissa and his Numidians seem to have been the main (if not the only) significant adverse new factor for the military equation at Zama.

 

This is an interesting theme, as is your question, Sylla, regarding why Scipio did not attack Hannibal when Consul in 205BC. However, I was originally just looking for an opinion on the book "Hannibal's Last Battle". Would you be interested in putting a new topic in the Gloria Exercitas forum to develop these themes more fully? Specifically, why do we think Scipio did not attack Hannibal in Italy and which factors in his and Hannibal's tactics led to his victory at Zama?

[Primus Pilus]

Agreed, but in Africa, he essentially established three separate units of his army... Mercenaries were in one unit, fresh recruits in another, while his veterans held the rear. There was likely to be far less communication and tactical conformity in his African army vs. the veteran army in Italy

Agreed; the same well communicated veteran units from the Italian war plus plenty of not so well communicated mercenaries and fresh recruits in his own country against less Roman legionaries than those he was previously facing in the hostile Italy under the same commander three years before.

 

If I didn't miss anything else, Massinissa and his Numidians seem to have been the main (if not the only) significant adverse new factor for the military equation at Zama.

This is an interesting theme, as is your question, Sylla, regarding why Scipio did not attack Hannibal when Consul in 205BC. However, I was originally just looking for an opinion on the book "Hannibal's Last Battle". Would you be interested in putting a new topic in the Gloria Exercitas forum to develop these themes more fully? Specifically, why do we think Scipio did not attack Hannibal in Italy and which factors in his and Hannibal's tactics led to his victory at Zama?

 

One could say risk vs. reward, or simply that Scipio didn't need to engage Hannibal in Italy. Hannibal's army was virtually out of gas as it relates to an sustained offensive campaign, but was still formidable on the defensive. By taking the fight to Africa, Scipio could achieve the glory of removing Hannibal from Italy without direct confrontation, while adding the possible bonus of Carthaginian conquest. But of course, all that aside, the specter of politics was also ever present.

[Artimi]

 

Hannibal and Scipio have always been of interest to me. I thought I could watch this re-enactment of the battle of Zama. Nope,, I couldnt stand to see the elephants killed (yes I know this was only a movie). I would not have been a good Roman or Carthaginian soldier.

 

Just a thought, after watching some of the BBC snippets at youtube.

 

If Scipio would have taken on Hannibal in Italy, would that have been considered a defensive move? He would be defending the Roman entity as such. The Roman tactic or strategy (sorry, my military knowledge is not up to snuff) up to this point was one of defense.

 

But taking on Hannibal in Africa was a decidedly aggressive move, one of attack. Attack rather than defense was considered more 'the Roman Way'. This was Rome causing Hannibal to react.

Edited July 5, 2009 by Artimi

[marcus silanus]

 

Hannibal and Scipio have always been of interest to me. I thought I could watch this re-enactment of the battle of Zama. Nope,, I couldnt stand to see the elephants killed (yes I know this was only a movie). I would not have been a good Roman or Carthaginian soldier.

 

Just a thought, after watching some of the BBC snippets at youtube.

 

If Scipio would have taken on Hannibal in Italy, would that have been considered a defensive move? He would be defending the Roman entity as such. The Roman tactic or strategy (sorry, my military knowledge is not up to snuff) up to this point was one of defense.

 

But taking on Hannibal in Africa was a decidedly aggressive move, one of attack. Attack rather than defense was considered more 'the Roman Way'. This was Rome causing Hannibal to react.

 

Scipio had decided that landing in Africa via Sicily, was the best way in reaching a final victory over Carthage, almost certain that this would draw Hannibal after him. He was, however, bitterly opposed by Fabius Maximus who saw this strategy as somewhat devious and therefore un-Roman. The old 'delayer' was now in favour of a direct attack on Hannibal in southern Italy and concerned himself with the prospects for Licinius once left alone to deal with Hannibal.

 

Scipio's response was that enough destruction had befallen Italy during the fourteen years of Hannibal's presence and he would now take this misfortune to his homeland. He recognised that Hannibal's army was certainly past its best and Licinius was more than capable of dealing with it if the occasion arose.

 

Scipio's plan was aggressive and, in my view, was correct for the circumstances of the time. However, although Carthaginian forces were still highly capable, I don't quite think that had he taken the Fabian line and remained to attack in Italy, that at this stage it would have been a defensive move. Fabius somewhat contradicts himself by stating that Hannibal is still formidable and how he might march on Rome after defeating a lone army under Licinius and later stating that he was "boxed in" in Bruttium and was therefore weak and ripe for the taking.

[sylla]

If Scipio would have taken on Hannibal in Italy, would that have been considered a defensive move? He would be defending the Roman entity as such. The Roman tactic or strategy (sorry, my military knowledge is not up to snuff) up to this point was one of defense.

But taking on Hannibal in Africa was a decidedly aggressive move, one of attack. Attack rather than defense was considered more 'the Roman Way'. This was Rome causing Hannibal to react

Scipio had decided that landing in Africa via Sicily, was the best way in reaching a final victory over Carthage, almost certain that this would draw Hannibal after him. He was, however, bitterly opposed by Fabius Maximus who saw this strategy as somewhat devious and therefore un-Roman. The old 'delayer' was now in favour of a direct attack on Hannibal in southern Italy and concerned himself with the prospects for Licinius once left alone to deal with Hannibal.

Scipio's response was that enough destruction had befallen Italy during the fourteen years of Hannibal's presence and he would now take this misfortune to his homeland. He recognised that Hannibal's army was certainly past its best and Licinius was more than capable of dealing with it if the occasion arose.

Scipio's plan was aggressive and, in my view, was correct for the circumstances of the time. However, although Carthaginian forces were still highly capable, I don't quite think that had he taken the Fabian line and remained to attack in Italy, that at this stage it would have been a defensive move. Fabius somewhat contradicts himself by stating that Hannibal is still formidable and how he might march on Rome after defeating a lone army under Licinius and later stating that he was "boxed in" in Bruttium and was therefore weak and ripe for the taking.

If we are to believe indeed in Livy (Book 28), PP was absolutely right in his last option:

By taking the fight to Africa, Scipio could achieve the glory of removing Hannibal from Italy without direct confrontation, while adding the possible bonus of Carthaginian conquest. But of course, all that aside, the specter of politics was also ever present.

Bingo:

A great portion of Book 28 is a long synopsis of what must have been a long rhetorical competition across weeks or months, presented as two brilliant literary speeches with the evident influence of Thucydides and even Homer.

Let us check some eloquent and self-explanatory pearls from both speeches:

 

First, the eloquent thesis ("This speech of Fabius, so appropriate to the circumstances under which it was delivered, and backed up by the weight of his character and his long-established reputation for prudence, produced a great effect upon most of those present, especially upon the seniors"):

-

Edited July 16, 2009 by sylla