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marcus silanus

Cannae and the Roman Republic

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From wikipedia....

 

Army

According to Polybius, Carthage relied heavily, though not exclusively, on foreign mercenaries,[7] especially in overseas warfare. The core of its army was from its own territory in Africa (ethnic Libyans and Numidians, as well as "Liby-Phoenicians"

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From wikipedia....

You know, when I asked for "textual, epigraphical or archaeological evidence", a wikipedia article is not what I had in mind. What we are looking for is evidence.

 

Naturally, there's nothing wrong with Wikipedia per se; in fact, the thesis that I have exposed is also there:

(from the article on Punic Military Forces):

"Ancient authors such as Polybius tend to stress the reliance of Carthage on foreign mercenaries. However, the term 'mercenary' is in fact a little misleading and does not fully represent the unique Carthaginian arrangement that equally recruited subjects of Punic-ruled areas and foreigners".

 

It's easy to verify that the vast majority of the so-called Carthaginian "mercenaries" came from Punic-ruled areas; in all likelihood they were levied, not hired.

 

It's also easy to check out armies based on bona fide mercenary units; just turn to their Greek neighbours, especially Syracuse.

 

The poisonous attitude from Polybius was particularly noteworthy because his homeland Megalopolis (and the Achaean League as a whole) were both great exporters and great consumers of mercenary labor; in fact, the famous Philopoemen, the national and personal hero of Polybius, was a notorious mercenary leader.

Edited by sylla

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The first book of Polybius (Loeb edition, available on the "Lacus Curtius" site) uses the english word "mercenaries" regarding Carthaginian troops at least four times (I.30, I 34, I.42, I.46), mentions Carthaginian "recruiting officers in Greece" (I.32) "Indian Elephant drivers" (I.40), "Celts and other mercenaries" (I.43). Book I.67 thru I.88 describes the revolt of the Carthaginian troops that took place after the end of the First Punic War, and attributes it to the revolt of mercenary troops viz: "Hired soldiers" (I.71) and "hired troops of various nationalities...Iberians, Celts, Ligurians, Belearic Islanders, Greek half-breeds...mostly Lybians" (I.71). Only the Lybians could have been under Carthaginian political dominance and be considered "levies" of some kind. The others could have had no motive but pay and booty.

 

Is "mercenary" a pejorative word in Polybius? - possibly. And it is probably true that in the Second Punic War, the Celts fought for revenge and booty as much as pay, many of the Iberians and Belearic Islanders were probably levies or allies from areas under Carthaginian control or influence, and many of the Numidians were from allied kingdoms. Might this reflect a change in the nature of Carthaginian state and army which having lost it's naval dominance had begun to rely more on the landowning classes in Africa and Spain (including the Barca family?) and less on the merchant class that had been dominant during the first war?

 

The comparison to Roman auxilia is apt, but much different from the socii.

Edited by Pompieus

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In the broadest sense a mercenary is someone engaged in paid military activity other than service of their nation. The modern word is used in translation but to all intents and purposes any warrior hired to fight falls within that term. As regards levies, that was never a point of contention, as you will see if you read the article I posted a link to. It makes no difference. Most of the troops available to Hannibal were raised for the war in one way or another - the term 'mercenary' in this context is a convenience, if somewhat innaccurately applied to some of his forces, but all his troops, regardless of origin, were hired for the campaign as opposed to being allocated from a non-existent Carthaginian state army.

 

This is the problem with the Carthaginians. They had little standing army, if any, and did not have the same martial qualities to their culture as demonstrated by the Romans. If Carthage needed an army, it needed to raise them with cash. The issue of levies should also be put in context, for it's unlikely these men would serve for long without reward, whereas the Roman troops had a strong 'patriotic' element to their endeavour.

 

This is somewhat ironic of course given how personal wealth was such a marker of status in Roman culture. However, such wealth was of course important only when greater wealth was available and exposed to public scrutiny in displays - which of course meant the upper classes. For the lower classes, at least those who could claim citizenship and thus be eligible to serve in the legions, service gave something of a symbolic stature.

 

For the men serving Hannibal, there are mixed motives. Certainly few cared specifically about Carthage itself, thus the prospect of fighting and and looting were instead primary motives for the men regardless of any political affiliations of their leaders. Don't underestimate the lure of violence as an end in itself. Ethics and morality in the ancient world were far more cutthroat than today, and many mediterranean cultures saw virtue in the warrior lifestyle.

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The first book of Polybius (Loeb edition, available on the "Lacus Curtius" site) uses the english word "mercenaries" regarding Carthaginian troops at least four times (I.30, I 34, I.42, I.46), mentions Carthaginian "recruiting officers in Greece" (I.32) "Indian Elephant drivers" (I.40), "Celts and other mercenaries" (I.43). Book I.67 thru I.88 describes the revolt of the Carthaginian troops that took place after the end of the First Punic War, and attributes it to the revolt of mercenary troops viz: "Hired soldiers" (I.71) and "hired troops of various nationalities...Iberians, Celts, Ligurians, Belearic Islanders, Greek half-breeds...mostly Lybians" (I.71). Only the Lybians could have been under Carthaginian political dominance and be considered "levies" of some kind. The others could have had no motive but pay and booty.

 

Is "mercenary" a pejorative word in Polybius? - possibly. And it is probably true that in the Second Punic War, the Celts fought for revenge and booty as much as pay, many of the Iberians and Belearic Islanders were probably levies or allies from areas under Carthaginian control or influence, and many of the Numidians were from allied kingdoms. Might this reflect a change in the nature of Carthaginian state and army which having lost it's naval dominance had begun to rely more on the landowning classes in Africa and Spain (including the Barca family?) and less on the merchant class that had been dominant during the first war?

 

The comparison to Roman auxilia is apt, but much different from the socii.

You really made a thorough search and did get many interesting issues:

 

The soldiers of virtually all ancient armies, citizens' armies included (and naturally Romans too) fought offensive wars for pay and booty; hence, the criteria that define mercenaries must include the voluntary hiring concept, the self auctioning for the highest bid; we have many examples from Greece (eg, Philopoemen of Megalopolis) and other nationalities. "Mercenary" was used as a pejorative term not only (ironically) by Polybius, but also by almost any other pro-Roman source.

 

The "recruiting officers in Greece" (I.32) were mentioned as an extraordinary event for explaining the outcome of the first battle of Bagradas in Punic War I (255), attributing Regulus' defeat not to the "inferior" barbarian Punic army but to the contribution of the hellenic Xanthippus of Sparta, even if he was a "despised" mercenary; Polybius want us to believe that across 23 years of war the Carthaginians had no other significant non-naval victory.

 

We know there were some Greek mercenaries on the Punic side, like Sosylus of Sparta and Silenus of Caleacte; please note, however, that not a single Hellenic mercenary unit is mentioned by our available sources for the Carthaginian Army during the Punic Wars; they were clearly isolated cases, contrary to the extensive use made by the cities of Magna Graecia and Sicily, notoriously Syracuse.

 

Please note too that (unsurprisingly) such cities made essentially no use of Carthaginian subjects as soldiers, as it would have been extected if they were truly mercenaries; eg, the Syracusan used mercenary slingers from Rhodes, not from the closer Balearic Islands.

 

The Gaulish tribes mentioned (Ligurians, Boii, Insubres and so on) were clearly independent nations and occasional allies added exclusively to any of the three Punic armies that crossed their homeland, a hardly surprising fact given that they have been fierce Roman enemies far longer than the Punic themselves; there's no evidence that they were "hired" for serving out of Gaul or Italy.

 

All the other national groups mentioned by Polybius were Punic subjects when they served under Punic command, even the Celtiberians (who seemed to have been occasionally used as mercenaries by the western Greeks). Some of the Iberian tribes had been under Punic rule for centuries.

 

As you pointed out, I compared the so-called Punic "mercenaries" with the Roman auxilia, not with the Italian socii; One is tempted to guess if there was some kind of military service stratification for Punic or "Punicized" subjects from Cathage countryside and colonies, eg. Utica, Lepcis, Hippo, Maho, Cathago Nova, and so on. Again, we simply lack any relevant information for or against this idea and we may well never know; our available sources are evidently ignorant on the main issues about Carthage's politics, society and even military organization.

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In the broadest sense a mercenary is someone engaged in paid military activity other than service of their nation. The modern word is used in translation but to all intents and purposes any warrior hired to fight falls within that term. As regards levies, that was never a point of contention, as you will see if you read the article I posted a link to. It makes no difference. Most of the troops available to Hannibal were raised for the war in one way or another - the term 'mercenary' in this context is a convenience, if somewhat innaccurately applied to some of his forces, but all his troops, regardless of origin, were hired for the campaign as opposed to being allocated from a non-existent Carthaginian state army.

 

This is the problem with the Carthaginians. They had little standing army, if any, and did not have the same martial qualities to their culture as demonstrated by the Romans. If Carthage needed an army, it needed to raise them with cash. The issue of levies should also be put in context, for it's unlikely these men would serve for long without reward, whereas the Roman troops had a strong 'patriotic' element to their endeavour.

 

This is somewhat ironic of course given how personal wealth was such a marker of status in Roman culture. However, such wealth was of course important only when greater wealth was available and exposed to public scrutiny in displays - which of course meant the upper classes. For the lower classes, at least those who could claim citizenship and thus be eligible to serve in the legions, service gave something of a symbolic stature.

 

For the men serving Hannibal, there are mixed motives. Certainly few cared specifically about Carthage itself, thus the prospect of fighting and and looting were instead primary motives for the men regardless of any political affiliations of their leaders. Don't underestimate the lure of violence as an end in itself. Ethics and morality in the ancient world were far more cutthroat than today, and many mediterranean cultures saw virtue in the warrior lifestyle.

The term 'mercenary' is in this context an explicit propagandistic and derogatory convenience from Polybius and other pro-Roman sources for depicting the Punic army as a whole that can't stand the slightest critical analysis.

 

I just can't imagine which source can be used to infer the feelings of the Punic soldiers for their metropolis.

 

The non-existence of a Carthaginian state army is simply nonsense; the outstanding performance of the Carthaginians at Punic War III speaks for itself. Such army was not raised by cash and certainly had no problem with its 'patriotic' element.

 

It's indeed ironic that the martial qualities of the Punic culture and soldiers are questioned in a thred dealing with Cannae.

 

Then, now and ever, actions speak louder than words:

Hired or levied, the contemporary Roman commanders were well aware of the impressive martial qualities shown by many Punic units, and they were only naturally eager to use such units side-by-side with their proud legions, irrespectively of their 'patriotic' element, their symbolic stature or plainly their primary motives; for example, Masinissa (yes, the same one that routed the Scipio brothers), the Numidian cavalry, the Ilergetes, the Balearic slingers and of course the elephant corps that served at Cynoscephalae and latter battles.

 

In fact, some of those units remained as the backbone of the Roman auxilia for centuries; Caesar was still using Numidian horsemen and Balearic slingers.

Edited by sylla

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"For it would be a strange or rather indeed impossible thing, that after meeting your enemies on equal terms in so many separate skirmishes and in most cases being victorious, now when you confront them by more than two to one you should be beaten".

Paullus battle exhortation (Polybius 3.109); Cannae minus two days. (July 31, 216 BC?)

 

Probably the most careful and informed estimation for Cannae's figures (at least that I'm aware of) came from Lazenby (Hannibal's War) Under his assumptions, the Punic army was facing a Roman force that almost doubled its size; however, Paullus in the Roman right was commanding some 2,400 Roman horsemen against one Hasdrubal (neither Barca nor Gisco) in the Punic left with something like 1500 Iberian and 5000 Gaulish cavalry, ie. a transitory but decisive advantage close to 3:1 for the Punic cavalry on the field next to the river; this last fact should have been unexpected for the Roman command, as the opposite was the Carthaginian open flank.

 

The speed of Hannibal's invasion has been frequently exaggerated; however, if any Punic action might be aptly compared with the Blitzkrieg, it was surely the charge of Hasdrubal's cavalry at this battle. Their time was running out because they couldn't be sure how much would the Gaulish-Iberian infantry be able to resist the stress of the Roman center advance without breaking in pieces. Additionally, Paullus was also commanding like one fourth of the Roman infantry. Even so, Paullus' cavalry was obliterated in the field before any other Roman unit could even intervene.

 

Polybius and Livy presented Paullus (a patrician and close relative of the Scipio family) as an able commander handicapped by the incompetence of Varro, the novus homo. In all likelihood, the situation was far more simple:

- after the Trebbia and Thrasymene massacres, presumably both his cavalry and his infantry were mostly composed by inexperienced legionaries prematurely recruited; most of the Roman and allied veterans would have been located under their regular (currently proconsular) commanders at the Roman center.

- the coordination of too many Roman men under so many commanders must have been inevitably delayed.

 

Our Roman sources vividly transmitted us the futile courage of the defeated party; Paullus may have been wounded by a slinger from the very beginning; unable to properly respond, the Roman cavalry had to fight Hasdrubal's charge as infantry; finally, Paullus' cavalry collapsed so quickly, that when Hasdrubal encircled the Roman rear and attacked the other wing (the allied cavalry under the direct command of Varro) many of them thought it was a treasonous maneuver from the Numidian cavalry they were facing, ie, the Punic right wing (Livy 22.48).

 

Varro eventually fled with just 50 horsemen, leaving his infantry surrounded; it may be reasonably inferred that most of the 200 Punic cavalry casualties reported by Polybius came from the Numidian wing.

 

A MAP OF THE BATTLE AT LIVIUS.ORG

Edited by sylla

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The term 'mercenary' is in this context an explicit propagandistic and derogatory convenience from Polybius and other pro-Roman sources for depicting the Punic army as a whole that can't stand the slightest critical analysis.

No, it isn't. You seem to see the term 'mercenary' in a very particular light. Mercenaries vary - they always have - from highly skilled professionals like Xanthippus to scumbags who want a quick sheckel. You also seem to see the Carthaginian army as something intrinsically worthy and thus find reasons to depict it as such. I notice your own evidence for your standpoint is rather scant - One could just as easily claim your own view is propagandist. As for analysis, there is no way of determining the exact composition of Hannibals army nor for that matter the exact motivation for the troops joining him. Your reliance on ploitics might be applicable to the leaders of the various groups under his command, but it might not.

 

The Romans themselves drew attention to the "Wages of War". One inescapable facet of ancient warfare is the profit gleaned from it. Unlike today, where warfare is a costly venture, the booty and slaves obtained by conquest far outweighed the costs involved. Cash was therefore a singularly important motive for fighting. It isn't hard to imagine that many of the Carthaginian leaders were also so motivated - history has provided more than enough examples and the same motives provide the impetus to the private military industry, a sector of economic growth since WW2.

 

I just can't imagine which source can be used to infer the feelings of the Punic soldiers for their metropolis. The non-existence of a Carthaginian state army is simply nonsense; the outstanding performance of the Carthaginians at Punic War III speaks for itself. Such army was not raised by cash and certainly had no problem with its 'patriotic' element.

A little lateral thinking might help you Scylla. Human beings aren't fundamentally different from today. In any case, you seem to regarding ancient armies in a modern light. The pyramidical national armies of today didn't exist back then. Even the Romans, with a passion for organisation, did not create such armies until the late empire. Until the reorganisations of Constantine, a legion was an army, and during the Punic Wars, the Consuls each led a legion into battle - a 'consular' army. That the Romans needed more troops was down to circumstance - a matter of expedience. Ordinarily such numbers of troops was neither required nor desirable.

 

The armies of the ancient world were not generally organised into regiments of a coherent force. They were collections of associated contigents, nominally independent of each other, but serving a particular war leader. Politics and leadership were essential parts of ancient warfare before the general reached the enemy. He needed to ensure his troops turned up. Sometimes this is provided by a common cause. The problem here is that personal motives often become more important to the individual than the group, and indeed, money is one root cause for this, and, as I have already noted, one of the primary motives for ancient warfare.

 

Carthage did not maintain vast numbers of troops. They simply had no reason to do so. They therefore had no national army as we understand it. Once the hostilities began, troops were raised from allies and the marketplace as needed (or as possible? Not everyone wanted to fight at any one time, and notice that although contingents of punic allies answered the call to arms, the allies themselves remained as quiet as possible). Appian reinforces this point.

 

Having collected a large army of Celtiberians, Africans, and other nationalities, and put the command of Spain in the hands of his brother Hasdrubal, he crossed over the Pyrenesees mountains into the country of the Celts, which is now called Gaul, with 90,000 foot, 12,000 horse, and 37 elephants. He passed through the country of the Gauls, conciliating some with money and some by persuasion, and overcoming others by force.

Appian's History of Rome: The Hannibalic War

 

Having collected a large army? Now understand what that means. He didn't pop down to the nearest barracks and ask the senior commander to come out and play. Hannibal was voted as general in view of his work in Spain, which netted Carthage considerable wealth in terms of precious metals and local economies. He was able to offer financial incentive to attract the 'mercenaries' to his side. Indeed, some have noted the loss of the Spanish silver mines was one reason for Hannibals campaign drawing to a close. In short, Hannibal hired on anyone who was interested in fighting for money. Such an occupation was common in those times.

 

Hired or levied, the contemporary Roman commanders were well aware of the impressive martial qualities shown by many Punic units

Agreed. The ancient world was a violent place and a man with a sword was as good as any other. The 'superbly trained legionary' had yet to emerge from the Marian Reforms a century or so after, and for the Romans, training mostly amounted to experience in the hastatii. The fact that punic troops were capable does not imply high standards of military expertise in the manner we expect today. They were fighting on level terms with men no better trained or experienced than themselves on average.

 

...and they were only naturally eager to use such units side-by-side with their proud legions, irrespectively of their 'patriotic' element, their symbolic stature or plainly their primary motives; for example, Masinissa (yes, the same one that routed the Scipio brothers), the Numidian cavalry, the Ilergetes, the Balearic slingers and of course the elephant corps that served at Cynoscephalae and latter battles.

Again you imply a regimental air to these troops. Not so. Fighting was a common endeavour in those times (have human beings changed at all?) and the troops mentioned excelled for particular skills. They were not rounded soldiers, cross trained in many disciplines. They were men willing or ordered to fight who happened to be relatively good at something. Perhaps the incorrect image of Roman invincilbility is distorting the image of Carthaginian capability?

 

In fact, some of those units remained as the backbone of the Roman auxilia for centuries; Caesar was still using Numidian horsemen and Balearic slingers.

So what? The Romans were useless at many of those things, because their own native populations hadn't the experience of it. So they employed people who did. Auxillaries were after all official liveried mercenaries. They weren't Roman citizens. The same arguement applies to the aggregation of such troop types under the banner of Carthage. They hired those troops because they were good at one thing or another. Football teams for instance hire individuals because they might be good goal scorers, not because they're good at everything connected with football.

 

If you wish to analyse ancient armies you need to do so objectively, and avoid modern connatations of pyramidical organisation, training, esprit-de-corps, nationalism, training, and discipline. In short, throw away the romantic image of ordered ranks marching across the sand. War is a gritty business then as now, and one driven by cash. Inferring motives to punic troops isn't as hard as you think. It's a matter of human behaviour and circumstance which the ancient authors have kindly portrayed. The only problem I see is that you want an elegant intellectual answer. There isn't one. Greed, aggression, and hatred. Works every time.

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An specific thread on Classical world mercenaries may be eventually required:

The term 'mercenary' is in this context an explicit propagandistic and derogatory convenience from Polybius and other pro-Roman sources for depicting the Punic army as a whole that can't stand the slightest critical analysis.

No, it isn't. You seem to see the term 'mercenary' in a very particular light.

It seems you may really think so for not reading carefully Polybius' Book 6, the lavish panegyric on the Roman constitution; its conclusion is one of the most outstanding examples of bigotry ever written, even after checking on Hitler's and Stalin's speeches::

- "But at the time when they entered on the Hannibalic War, the Carthaginian constitution had degenerated";

- "by so much had Carthage already begun to decline";

- "Consequently the multitude at Carthage had already acquired the chief voice in deliberations; while at Rome the senate still retained this; and hence, as in one case the masses deliberated and in the other the most eminent men";

- "the Carthaginians entirely neglect their infantry, though they do pay some slight attention to their cavalry";

- "The reason of this is that the troops they employ are foreign and mercenary, whereas those of the Romans are natives of the soil and citizens"

-

Edited by sylla

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The term 'mercenary' is in this context an explicit propagandistic and derogatory convenience from Polybius and other pro-Roman sources for depicting the Punic army as a whole that can't stand the slightest critical analysis.

 

Maybe Polybius did use the term "mercenary" in a propagandistic and derogatory manner, however, when I first used this I did not. Truth be told I am not even sure how the conversation deviated from discussing the make-up of the Roman and Punic army.

 

Fact still remains, and you're welcome to correct me if I am wrong, that Carthage did not have a large standing army during the first and the second Punic War: the sources suggest that Carthage relied on allied and 'mercenary' troops and as far as I know there are no other sources that suggest otherwise.

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Truth be told I am not even sure how the conversation deviated from discussing the make-up of the Roman and Punic army.
Neither do I.
Fact still remains, and you're welcome to correct me if I am wrong, that Carthage did not have a large standing army during the first and the second Punic War: the sources suggest that Carthage relied on allied and 'mercenary' troops and as far as I know there are no other sources that suggest otherwise.
No problem with the allies (ie, Gauls).

 

You have undoubtedly already read my point and it stands; there's no evidence as far as I know that the Punic non-citizen troops (ie Africans, Lybians and Iberians) were really soldiers-for-hire, ie bona fide mercenaries.

 

With the possible exception of some Celtiberian tribes, there's no evidence that any of them were regularly hired for fighting out of the Punic empire, not even the famous Balearic slingers; when Syracuse required to hire slingers, they had to go as far as Rhodes.

 

They were all Punic subjects (ie, not foreigners) and there's no reason to doubt they were levied by Carthage as any other regular army.

 

In fact, at least during the Punic Wars, there's no evidence that Carthage had any true foreign mercenary units from beyond their own borders (ie, Greeks or Thracians) as was indeed the case for Syracuse and many other contemporary Greek cities.

 

Conversely, no one of those Greek cities hired subjects from within their borders (why would they?; it's just absurd!): they simply levied such subjects as required.

 

Even worse: Polybius and Livy simply called the very same groups "mercenaries" when they fought under Punic command and "allies" or "auxiliaries" when they fought under Roman command (ie, Masinissa, Syphax and their Numidians).

 

Polybius and other pro-Roman sources in all likelihood simply stated that fact as a deliberate chauvinistic hostile propaganda (please read the extract from Book 6 in my previous post).

 

You're more than welcome to provide any textual or archaeological evidence that supports the purported hired nature of the Punic non-citizen soldiers.

 

BTW, the fact that something is written in our sources doesn't mean that we cannot critically analyze it, within its historical context.

Edited by sylla

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Truth be told I am not even sure how the conversation deviated from discussing the make-up of the Roman and Punic army.
Neither do I.
Fact still remains, and you're welcome to correct me if I am wrong, that Carthage did not have a large standing army during the first and the second Punic War: the sources suggest that Carthage relied on allied and 'mercenary' troops and as far as I know there are no other sources that suggest otherwise.
No problem with the allies (ie, Gauls).

 

You're more than welcome to provide any textual or archaeological evidence that supports the purported hired nature of the Punic non-citizen soldiers.

 

 

That seems to be the problem here my friend. You are yet to provide any "textual or archaeological" evidence that supports your argument that the Punic forces were 'levied' troops rather than 'hired' mercenaries. We have enough evidence to suggest there were hired troops in the Carthaginian army, refer to the Mercenary War.

 

The war began as a dispute over the payment of money owed the mercenaries between the mercenary armies who fought the First Punic War on Carthage's behalf, and a destitute Carthage, which had lost most of its wealth due to the indemnities imposed by Rome as part of the peace treaty. The dispute grew until the mercenaries seized Tunis by force of arms, and directly threatened Carthage, which then capitulated to the mercenaries demands. The conflict would have ended there, had not two of the mercenary commanders, Spendius and Mathos, persuaded the Libyan conscripts in the army to accept their leadership, and then convinced them that Carthage would exact vengeance for their part in the revolt once the foreign mercenaries were paid and sent home. They also persuaded the combined mercenary armies to revolt against Carthage, and various Libyan towns and cities to back the revolt. What had been a hotly contested "labour dispute" exploded into a full-scale revolt.

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercenary_War

Edited by Anakin

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That seems to be the problem here my friend. You are yet to provide any "textual or archaeological" evidence that supports your argument that the Punic forces were 'levied' troops rather than 'hired' mercenaries. We have enough evidence to suggest there were hired troops in the Carthaginian army, refer to the Mercenary War.

 

The war began as a dispute over the payment of money owed the mercenaries between the mercenary armies who fought the First Punic War on Carthage's behalf, and a destitute Carthage, which had lost most of its wealth due to the indemnities imposed by Rome as part of the peace treaty. The dispute grew until the mercenaries seized Tunis by force of arms, and directly threatened Carthage, which then capitulated to the mercenaries demands. The conflict would have ended there, had not two of the mercenary commanders, Spendius and Mathos, persuaded the Libyan conscripts in the army to accept their leadership, and then convinced them that Carthage would exact vengeance for their part in the revolt once the foreign mercenaries were paid and sent home. They also persuaded the combined mercenary armies to revolt against Carthage, and various Libyan towns and cities to back the revolt. What had been a hotly contested "labour dispute" exploded into a full-scale revolt.

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercenary_War

No problem at all, my friend. My evidence has been extensively commented in my previous post. My source? Mostly Polybius.

 

Thanks for the reference; but we don't have to rely on Wikipaedia when we can check on the primary source itself: Polybius 1, 65-88; actually, any other available account on this war (ie, Livy, Diodorus and Appian) came essentially from him.

As you can see, your argumentation is circular to begin with; it's not an independent source's statement but our same old Scipione client with the same old chauvinistic agenda on the intrinsic superiority of the Romans over the Punics.

 

Nevertheless, Polybius was a notable historian and we can't ignore his account, no matter how biased it might have been.

Writing almost a century after the facts, he called this conflict both Mercenary and Libyan war, and there was a reason for the last name; most of the rebels were Libyans and Numidians, ie local population.

 

In fact, the massive rebellion of the local civil population is also described, both urban and rural (a little strange, considering that the "mercenaries" were supposedly so alien that they weren't even able to fluently communicate among themselves, isn't it?).

Even more strange; the families of the "mercenaries" are described as hostages from the Carthaginians.

Don't you find it a little atypical that the mercenaries travelled with their families to serve as hostages when they were hired?

Unsurprisingly, that doesn't seem to be the case for the true mercenaries (ie, Greek) elsewhere.

 

That the delayed payment contributed to detonate the rebellion is neither a big surprise nor enough evidence for the mercenary condition of the rebels; it has been a contributory factor too all along History for countless rebellions of indisputedly citizen soldiers in many countries, Rome included.

 

An enlightening passage (73,1): "the Carthaginians ... next busied themselves with enrolling mercenaries and arming the citizens of military age".

That is, any levied soldier that was not a citizen was automatically considered a "mercenary" by Polybius.

 

Admittedly, there's evidence of some true mercenaries, especially Gauls and Campanians. Polybius gave us no hint of their relative number; that's not critical for our argument.

I don't dispute Carthage used mercenaries more than once, as almost any other nation of the era.

I dispute Polybius' statement that almost all the Punic army was formed by soldiers-for-hire, which was pivotal for his supremacist agenda.

 

Textual evidence? Polybius himself: Carthage would have been the only Classical power that hired exclusively (or almost exclusively) his own subjects as mercenaries entirely for domestic consumption, instead of simply levying them as essentially any other country in History.

A special consideration for the Libyan syndicate?

 

If that's not enough, you can additionally consider that the Romans stopped calling "mercenaries" those same soldiers and units just by coming under Roman command; they were now "auxiliaries".

 

Anything else? Oh, yes; the hostages... Many ancient (and modern!) countries pragmatically used their own soldier's families as hostages. Why would a hired soldier require such additional incentive? Even more important; how would you control your soldiers' families if they were not your subjects? A family travel from Gaul or Campania? Highly unlikely.

Edited by sylla

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An enlightening passage (73,1): "the Carthaginians ... next busied themselves with enrolling mercenaries and arming the citizens of military age".

That is, any levied soldier that was not a citizen was automatically considered a "mercenary" by Polybius.

 

No. He considered foreign levies as 'mercenaries', which would have been a prevailing view of many people at the time. The fact these men came from territories that Carthage had influence over is neither here nor there. The fact is Carthage did not have a large enough body of citizens to raise a home army of sufficient size required for the campaign against Rome, nor did they wish to in order to avoid the catastrophic economic effects of casualties.

 

If that's not enough, you can additionally consider that the Romans stopped calling "mercenaries" those same soldiers and units just by coming under Roman command; they were now "auxiliaries".

A latin name. So what? They were still liveried mercenaries, foreigners fighting for Rome, and only after completion of service contracts were they offered citizenship as a reward.

 

Don't you find it a little atypical that the mercenaries travelled with their families to serve as hostages when they were hired?

Unsurprisingly, that doesn't seem to be the case for the true mercenaries (ie, Greek) elsewhere.

Thats because you're applying a strict definition of what a mercenary is. Mercenaries, as I've told you before, might be military professionals or simply thugs with swords. In any case, if they made an arrangement that hostages would be provided as part of their contract, then that's what they did. Or was it a custom of the people involved?

 

Why would a hired soldier require such additional incentive?

Because people sometimes take the money and run. Soldiers at this time weren't paid a weekly paycheck. They were given lump sums when convenient or by arrangement.

Edited by caldrail

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