[The Effectiveness Of The Roman Army]

Furius Venator,

 

Essentially, the Parthians exploited not only their advantage in terms of situation and available resources but also a potential flaw in the cohort system used by the Romans, in that it could be penetrated by continuous bombardment. How could such a strategy of attack be overcome? Is this an innate weakness in the structure of the Roman legion? The capture of Ctesiphon, the Parthian capital, by Septimius Severus seems to indicate otherwise.

 

 

caldrail,

 

While I agree with your assessment, and Josephus' observation, about fighting "by the book", I'm not sure that this was the absolute nature of the Roman army. I think the flexibility and relative maneuverability of the cohort system, and the innovativeness of the Roman military machine, attest to the importance of creativity in war. Remember: while the Romans may have fought in formation, a formation is only as strong as its soldiers. Rome relied heavily on the legionnaires in many aspects of the empire (construction and maintenance, for example); why not in combat as well? Undoubtedly, discipline and training were fundamental to the success of the Roman army, but the tenacity, skill, morale, and intelligence of the soldiers were, I believe, equally as crucial. This is basically what Caesar says in the passage I quoted.

[The Effectiveness Of The Roman Army]

caldrail,

 

I belive your assessment of cavalry is quite true. For instance, Caesar described in his account of the Gallic Wars how the Nervii (who will appear again later in this post), who did not use any mounted warriors, repelled cavalry:

...the Nervii, from early times, because they were weak in cavalry, (for not even at this time do they attend to it, but accomplish by their infantry whatever they can,) in order that they might the more easily obstruct the cavalry of their neighbors if they came upon them for the purpose of plundering, having cut young trees, and bent them, by means of their numerous branches [extending] on to the sides, and the quick-briars and thorns springing up between them, had made these hedges present a fortification like a wall, through which it was not only impossible to enter, but even to penetrate with the eye...

 

While I agree with many of your comments, I would like to raise one major objection. In his memoirs of his conquest of Gaul, Julius Caesar includes an episode against the Nervii, who were particularly fierce and brave warriors:

After he had made three days march through their territories, he discovered from some prisoners, that the river Sambre was not more than ten miles from his camp; that all the Nervii had stationed themselves on the other side of that river, and together with the Atrebates and the Veromandui, their neighbors, were there awaiting the arrival of the Romans; for they had persuaded both these nations to try the same fortune of war [as themselves]: that the forces of the Aduatuci were also expected by them, and were on their march; that they had put their women, and those who through age appeared useless for war, in a place to which there was no approach for an army, on account of the marshes.

 

Having learned these things, he sends forward scouts and centurions to choose a convenient place for the camp. And as a great many of the surrounding Belgae and other Gauls, following Caesar, marched with him; some of these, as was afterwards learned from the prisoners, having accurately observed, during those days, the army's method of marching, went by night to the Nervii, and informed them that a great number of baggage-trains passed between the several legions, and that there would be no difficulty, when the first legion had come into the camp, and the other legions were at a great distance, to attack that legion while under baggage, which being routed, and the baggage-train seized, it would come to pass that the other legions would not dare to stand their ground. It added weight also to the advice of those who reported that circumstance, that the Nervii, from early times, because they were weak in cavalry, (for not even at this time do they attend to it, but accomplish by their infantry whatever they can,) in order that they might the more easily obstruct the cavalry of their neighbors if they came upon them for the purpose of plundering, having cut young trees, and bent them, by means of their numerous branches [extending] on to the sides, and the quick-briars and thorns springing up between them, had made these hedges present a fortification like a wall, through which it was not only impossible to enter, but even to penetrate with the eye. Since [therefore] the march of our army would be obstructed by these things, the Nervii thought that the advice ought not to be neglected by them.

 

The nature of the ground which our men had chosen for the camp was this: A hill, declining evenly from the top, extending to the river Sambre, which we have mentioned above: from this river there arose a [second] hill of like ascent, on the other side and opposite to the former, and open for about 200 paces at the lower part; but in the upper part, woody, (so much so) that it was not easy to see through it into the interior. Within these woods the enemy kept themselves in concealment; a few troops of horse-soldiers appeared on the open ground, along the river. The depth of the river was about three feet.

 

Caesar, having sent his cavalry on before, followed close after them with all his forces; but the plan and order of the march was different from that which the Belgae had reported to the Nervii. For as he was approaching the enemy, Caesar, according to his custom, led on [as the van six legions unencumbered by baggage; behind them he had placed the baggage- trains of the whole army; then the two legions which had been last raised closed the rear, and were a guard for the baggage-train. Our horse, with the slingers and archers, having passed the river, commenced action with the cavalry of the enemy. While they from time to time betook themselves into the woods to their companions, and again made an assault out of the wood upon our men, who did not dare to follow them in their retreat further than the limit to which the plain and open parts extended, in the mean time the six legions which had arrived first, having measured out the work, began to fortify the camp. When the first part of the baggage train of our army was seen by those who lay hid in the woods, which had been agreed on among them as the time for commencing action, as soon as they had arranged their line of battle and formed their ranks within the woods, and had encouraged one another, they rushed out suddenly with all their forces and made an attack upon our horse. The latter being easily routed and thrown into confusion, the Nervii ran down to the river with such incredible speed that they seemed to be in the woods, the river, and close upon us almost at the same time. And with the same speed they hastened up the hill to our camp, and to those who were employed in the works.

 

Caesar had every thing to do at one time: the standard to be displayed, which was the sign when it was necessary to run to arms; the signal to be given by the trumpet; the soldiers to be called off from the works; those who had proceeded some distance for the purpose of seeking materials for the rampart, to be summoned; the order of battle to be formed; the soldiers to be encouraged; the watchword to be given. A great part of these arrangements was prevented by the shortness of time and the sudden approach and charge of the enemy. Under these difficulties two things proved of advantage; [first] the skill and experience of the soldiers, because, having been trained by former engagements, they could suggest to themselves what ought to be done, as conveniently as receive information from others; and [secondly] that Caesar had forbidden his several lieutenants to depart from the works and their respective legions, before the camp was fortified. These, on account of the near approach and the speed of the enemy, did not then wait for any command from Caesar, but of themselves executed whatever appeared proper.

Thus, because of their own creativity and intelligence, the Roman soldiers were able to thwart a sudden and terrifying attack. I do not believe that creativity and discipline are opposite or conflicting: discipline does not suppress creativity. The discipline of the Roman army was undoubtedly essential for the execution of complicated formations such as the testudo during the confusion of combat. However, man is a thinking being, and the instincts and nature of humanity are not eliminated by military training and a life of discipline.

[The Effectiveness Of The Roman Army]

In the Battle Scenarios thread, I asked some of the following questions (others just arose in the process of debate):

1. It is generally accepted that the phalanx, while almost impenetrable in open field combat, is useless in rougher terrain. Are there any faults in the later Roman formations that could be exploited by warriors adapted to mountainous warfare, such as the Samnites?
   
2. How effective is cavalry in forested areas? Is cavalry support only useful on terrain that is level and that offers a great degree of visibility and room to manoeuvre?
   
3. As Arminius' success at Teutoburg Forest demonstrated, the Roman legion was quite to ambush. How could such slaughters be avoided?
   
4. Was the Roman heavy infantry (legionnaires) an effective unit in engaging heavy cavalry units, such as the cataphracts? If not, how could the landscape be exploited to shift the odds in favour of the Romans?
   
5. Could the strength of a Roman legion be limited by a dependence on discipline and formation?
   

Historians such as Vegetius in his Military Matters discussed numerous examples of formations:

VARIOUS FORMATIONS FOR BATTLE

 

An army may be drawn up for a general engagement in seven different formations. The first formation is an oblong square of a large front, of common use both in ancient and modern times, although not thought the best by various judges of the service, because an even and level plain of an extent sufficient to contain its front cannot always be found, and if there should be any irregularity or hollow in the line, it is often pierced in that part. Besides, an enemy superior in number may surround either your right or left wing, the consequence of which will be dangerous, unless you have a reserve ready to advance and sustain his attack. A general should make use of this disposition only when his forces are better and more numerous than the enemy's, it being thereby in his power to attack both the flanks and surround them on every side.

 

The second and best disposition is the oblique. For although your army consists of few troops, yet good and advantageously posted, it will greatly contribute to your obtaining the victory, notwithstanding the numbers and bravery of the enemy. It is as follows: as the armies are marching up to the attack, your left wing must be kept back at such a distance from the enemy's right as to be out of reach of their darts and arrows. Your right wing must advance obliquely upon the enemy's left, and begin the engagement. And you must endeavor with your best cavalry and infantry to surround the wing with which you are engaged, make it give way and fall upon the enemy in the rear. If they once give ground and the attack is properly seconded, you will undoubtedly gain the victory, while your left wing, which continued at a distance, will remain untouched. An army drawn up in this manner bears some resemblance to the letter A or a mason's level. If the enemy should be beforehand with you in this evolution, recourse must be had to the supernumerary horse and foot posted as a reserve in the rear, as I mentioned before. They must be ordered to support your left wing. This will enable you to make a vigorous resistance against the artifice of the enemy.

 

The third formation is like the second, but not so good, as it obliges you to begin the attack with your left wing on the enemy's right. The efforts of soldiers on the left are weak and imperfect from their exposed and defective situation in the line. I will explain this formation more clearly. Although your left wing should be much better than your right, yet it must be reinforced with some of the best horse and foot and ordered to commence the acnon with the enemy's right in order to disorder and surround it as expeditiously as possible. And the other part of your army, composed of the worst troops, should remain at such a distance from the enemy's left as not to be annoyed by their darts or in danger of being attacked sword in hand. In this oblique formation care must be taken to prevent the line being penetrated by the wedges of the enemy, and it is to be employed only when the enemy's right wing is weak and your greatest strength is on your left.

 

The fourth formation is this: as your army is marching to the attack in order of battle and you come within four or five hundred paces of the enemy, both your wings must be ordered unexpectedly to quicken their pace and advance with celerity upon them. When they find themselves attacked on both wings at the same time, the sudden surprise may so disconcert them as to give you an easy victory. But although this method, if your troops are very resolute and expert, may ruin the enemy at once, yet it is hazardous. The general who attempts it is obliged to abandon and expose his center and to divide his army into three parts. If the enemy are not routed at the first charge, they have a fair opportunity of attacking the wings which are separated from each other and the center which is destitute of assistance.

 

The fifth formation resembles the fourth but with this addition: the light infantry and the archers are formed before the center to cover it from the attempts of the enemy. With this precaution the general may safely follow the above mentioned method and attack the enemy's left wing with his right, and their right with his left. If he puts them to flight, he gains an immediate victory, and if he fails of success his center is in no danger, being protected by the light infantry and archers.

 

The sixth formation is very good and almost like the second. It is used when the general cannot depend either on the number or courage of his troops. If made with judgment, notwithstanding his inferiority, he has often a good chance for victory. As your line approaches the enemy, advance your right wing against their left and begin the attack with your best cavalry and infantry. At the same time keep the rest of the army at a great distance from the enemy's right, extended in a direct line like a javelin. Thus if you can surround their left and attack it in flank and rear, you must inevitably defeat them. It is impossible for the enemy to draw off reinforcements from their right or from their center to sustain their left in this emergency, since the remaining part of your army is extended and at a great distance from them in the form of the letter L. It is a formation often used in an action on a march.

 

The seventh formation owes its advantages to the nature of the ground and will enable you to oppose an enemy with an army inferior both in numbers and goodness, provided one of your flanks can be covered either with an eminence, the sea, a river, a lake, a city, a morass or broken ground inaccessible to the enemy. The rest of the army must be formed, as usual, in a straight line and the unsecured flank must be protected by your light troops and all your cavalry. Sufficiently defended on one side by the nature of the ground and on the other by a double support of cavalry, you may then safely venture on action.

 

One excellent and general rule must be observed. If you intend to engage with your right wing only, it must be composed of your best troops. And the same method must be taken with respect to the left. Or if you intend to penetrate the enemy's line, the wedges which you form for that purpose before your center, must consist of the best disciplined soldiers. Victory in general is gained by a small number of men. Therefore the wisdom of a general appears in nothing more than in such choice of disposition of his men as is most consonant with reason and service.

 

Polybius argued for the dominance of the maniple formation over the phalanx in The Histories:

Why is it then that the Romans conquer? And what is it that brings disaster on those who employ the phalanx? Why, just because war is full of uncertainties both as to time and place; whereas there is but one time and one kind of ground in which a phalanx can fully work. If, then, there were anything to compel the enemy to accommodate himself to the time and place of the phalanx, when about to fight a general engagement, it would be but natural to expect that those who employed the phalanx would always carry off the victory. But if the enemy finds it possible, and even easy, to avoid its attack, what becomes of its formidable character? Again, no one denies that for its employment it is indispensable to have a country flat, bare, and without such impediments as ditches, cavities, depressions, steep banks, or beds of rivers: for all such obstacles are sufficient to hinder and dislocate this particular formation. And that it is, I may say, impossible, or at any rate exceedingly rare to find a piece of country of twenty stades, or sometimes of even greater extent, without any such obstacles, every one will also admit. However, let us suppose that such a district has been found. If the enemy decline to come down into it, but traverse the country sacking the towns and territories of the allies, what use will the phalanx be? For if it remains on the ground suited to itself, it will not only fail to benefit its friends, but will be incapable even of preserving itself; for the carriage of provisions will be easily stopped by the enemy, seeing that they are in undisputed possession of the country: while if it quits its proper ground, from the wish to strike a blow, it will be an easy prey to the enemy. Nay, if a general does descend into the plain, and yet does not risk his whole army upon one charge of the phalanx or upon one chance, but maneuvers for a time to avoid coming to close quarters in the engagement, it is easy to learn what will be the result from what the Romans are now actually doing.

 

For no speculation is any longer required to test the accuracy of what I am now saying: that can be done by referring to accomplished facts. The Romans do not, then, attempt to extend their front to equal that of a phalanx, and then charge directly upon it with their whole force: but some of their divisions are kept in reserve, while others join battle with the enemy at close quarters. Now, whether the phalanx in its charge drives its opponents from their ground, or is itself driven back, in either case its peculiar order is dislocated; for whether in following the retiring, or flying from the advancing enemy, they quit the rest of their forces: and when this takes place, the enemy's reserves can occupy the space thus left, and the ground which the phalanx had just before been holding, and so no longer charge them face to face, but fall upon them on their flank and rear. If, then, it is easy to take precautions against the opportunities and peculiar advantages of the phalanx, but impossible to do so in the case of its disadvantages, must it not follow that in practice the difference between these two systems is enormous? Of course, those generals who employ the phalanx must march over ground of every description, must pitch camps, occupy points of advantage, besiege, and be besieged, and meet with unexpected appearances of the enemy: for all these are part and parcel of war, and have an important and sometimes decisive influence on the ultimate victory. And in all these cases the Macedonian phalanx is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to handle, because the men cannot act either in squads or separately.

 

The Roman order on the other hand is flexible: for every Roman, once armed and on the field, is equally well-equipped for every place, time, or appearance of the enemy. He is, moreover, quite ready and needs to make no change, whether he is required to fight in the main body, or in a detachment, or in a single maniple, or even by himself. Therefore, as the individual members of the Roman force are so much more serviceable, their plans are also much more often attended by success than those of others.

 

But how can we ignore the major defeats suffered by the Romans in discussing the effectiveness of the army's organization and tactics?

[Battle Scenarios]

Germanicus,

 

I'll try that. One new topic coming up.

 

Thanks.

[Roman Siegecraft]

An important question to consider: is siegecraft integral to laying a successful siege? A siege is as much about isolation as it is about utter destruction; look at Caesar's triumph at Alesia. By simply enclosing Alesia in a wall and by eliminating the ability of Vercingetorix and the 80,000 men in the fortress to resupply their resources, Caesar was able to achieve first a moral victory. Then, because of the discipline and engineering capabilities of his soldiers, a physical victory even against what seemed to be insurmountable odds. If I read his accounts correctly, he did not have any siege artillery or any advanced siegecraft.

 

I think the art of the siege, particularly in relation to the development of more powerful siege weapons, really advanced with the appearance of castles in Europe during the Medieval Era, for instance the trebuchet. Nevertheless, the onager is a specific example of Roman siegecraft.

 

A site about Roman artillery, with seemingly valid credentials, is on the University of North Carolina server.

 

To answer the original question, I think the advantage shifted to the "barbarian" tribes, such as the Visigoths who sacked Rome in 410 AD under Alaric, with the collapse of the army and the subsequent inability of the legions to defend the Roman frontiers. Simply, the Romans became too decadent and were no longer willing to serve in the military. Thus, the Roman army relied on the support of mercenaries. Furthermore, as the Huns pushed into Europe, they created a mass migration of Germanic tribes throughout Europe. How could the deteriorating Roman army cope with the influx of displaced Germans? They could not. Even if the Visigoths did not possess siegecraft, by overcoming the Roman legions, they really already achieved success. A defenseless city will fall to any siege once starvation and disease begins to ravage the population.

 

From: http://penelope.uchicago.edu/~grout/encycl...anism/sack.html

The Sack of Rome

 

"My voice sticks in my throat; and, as I dictate, sobs choke my utterance. The City which had taken the whole world was itself taken."

 

Jerome, Letter CXXVII (To Principia)

 

Just before his death in AD 395, Theodosius I divided the empire into east and west, to be ruled by his two sons. Honorius was only ten years old at the time, and the west was governed in his stead by Flavius Stilicho, his guardian and commander (magister militum) of the army. The two halves of the empire were in contention, a situation exploited by Alaric, whose Visigoths had been used as allies (foederati) but now, with the death of Theodosius, renounced their allegiance and rose in revolt. Alaric was able to negotiate the command of the army in Illyricum but there later was resistence to this concession, and he was obliged to abandon the Balkans. In AD 401, Alaric invaded Italy and beseiged Honorius in Milan. Twice defeated by Stilicho but spared each time, Alaric were forced to retreat. Instead, he was persuaded by Stilicho to join in a campaign to wrest Illyricum away from the east. But the scheme was abandoned when the usurper Constantine III revolted in Britain in AD 407 and Arcadius unexpectedly died the next year.

 

Alaric demanded compensation, which Honorius, safe in the capital at Ravenna, refused to pay. Stilicho was executed in AD 408 and Alaric marched on Rome. Zosimus, who provides the only account of these events, records what happened (5.40).

 

"When Alaric heard that the people were trained and ready to fight, he said that thicker grass was easier to mow than thinner and laughed broadly at the ambassadors, but when they turned to discuss peace he used expressions excessive even for an arrogant barbarian: he declared that he would not give up the siege unless he got all the gold and silver in the city, as well as all movable property and the barbarian slaves. When one of the ambassadors asked what he would leave for the citizens if he took these, he replied: 'Their lives.'"

 

The siege of the city was lifted only after five thousand pounds of gold, thirty thousand pounds of silver, four thousand silken tunics, three thousand scarlet-dyed hides, and three thousand pounds of pepper had been paid. Statues were stripped of their decorations and, when that was not enough, those of gold and silver melted down.

 

When further negotiations regarding a homeland for the Goths broke down, Rome again was besieged and, this time, sacked, the fathers of the church seeking to explain such a catastrophe. The date was the twenty-fourth of August, AD 410.

 

Alaric died that same year. Two years later, his kinsman Athaulf led the Visigoths into southwestern Gaul, where, in AD 418, Honorius was obliged to recognize their kingdom at Toulouse. The Vandals and other Germanic tribes who had crossed over the frozen Rhine on the last day of AD 406 now were in Spain under their leader, Genseric. Honorius permitted them to stay, as well, although there was little he could have done otherwise. In AD 423 Honorius died and eventually was succeeded by Valentinian III, who was still a child at the time. The Vandals crossed into North Africa, defeated the Romans there, and, in AD 439, conquered Carthage, which Genseric made his capital. In AD 451, Attila and the Huns, who already had become so powerful that they were paid an annual tribute by Rome, invaded Gaul, in alliance with the Vandals. They were defeated at the Battle of Ch

[Battle Scenarios]

Gaius,

 

No apologies necessary. I did not feel attacked; I just felt I had to clarify the purpose of this topic. I had hoped for the scenario to change each time someone responded with their strategy (or at least more often), rather than continuously debating one battle. Otherwise, like Germanicus said, the thread would start to go "round in circles". I thought that this thread would allow for a more lively, creative discussion about the effectiveness of the Roman legions in different settings because often historians like Vegetius neglect to mention the effects of environment on combat. I thought it was an area that was lacking in discussion and analysis.

 

For instance, here are the questions I often found myself asking as I researched the history of Roman warfare:

1. It is generally accepted that the phalanx, while almost impenetrable in open field combat, is useless in rougher terrain. Are there any faults in the later Roman formations that could be exploited by warriors adapted to mountainous warfare, such as the Samnites?
   
2. How effective is cavalry in forested areas? Is cavalry support only useful on terrain that is level and that offers a great degree of visiblity and room to maneuver?
   
3. As Arminius' success at Teutoburg Forest demonstrated, the Roman legion was quite to ambush. How could such slaughters be avoided?
   
4. Was the Roman heavy infantry (legionnaires) an effective unit in engaging heavy cavalry units, such as the cataphracts? If not, how could the landscape be exploited to shift the odds in favour of the Romans?
   

[Battle Scenarios]

Germanicus,

 

You are right: much of the discussion on this thread is pure speculation of "armchair generals". However, my purpose in making this thread was not to create another "what if" discussion, but rather to have intelligent debates on the best battlefield strategies and formations as employed by the Romans throughout the history of the Republic and Empire.

 

So, if you want, this could easily become a more academic thread in which specific examples of battles are listed and analyzed and in which we examine the testimony of Roman historians, such as Vegetius in Military Matters:

 

VARIOUS FORMATIONS FOR BATTLE

 

An army may be drawn up for a general engagement in seven different formations. The first formation is an oblong square of a large front, of common use both in ancient and modern times, although not thought the best by various judges of the service, because an even and level plain of an extent sufficient to contain its front cannot always be found, and if there should be any irregularity or hollow in the line, it is often pierced in that part. Besides, an enemy superior in number may surround either your right or left wing, the consequence of which will be dangerous, unless you have a reserve ready to advance and sustain his attack. A general should make use of this disposition only when his forces are better and more numerous than the enemy's, it being thereby in his power to attack both the flanks and surround them on every side.

 

The second and best disposition is the oblique. For although your army consists of few troops, yet good and advantageously posted, it will greatly contribute to your obtaining the victory, notwithstanding the numbers and bravery of the enemy. It is as follows: as the armies are marching up to the attack, your left wing must be kept back at such a distance from the enemy's right as to be out of reach of their darts and arrows. Your right wing must advance obliquely upon the enemy's left, and begin the engagement. And you must endeavor with your best cavalry and infantry to surround the wing with which you are engaged, make it give way and fall upon the enemy in the rear. If they once give ground and the attack is properly seconded, you will undoubtedly gain the victory, while your left wing, which continued at a distance, will remain untouched. An army drawn up in this manner bears some resemblance to the letter A or a mason's level. If the enemy should be beforehand with you in this evolution, recourse must be had to the supernumerary horse and foot posted as a reserve in the rear, as I mentioned before. They must be ordered to support your left wing. This will enable you to make a vigorous resistance against the artifice of the enemy.

 

The third formation is like the second, but not so good, as it obliges you to begin the attack with your left wing on the enemy's right. The efforts of soldiers on the left are weak and imperfect from their exposed and defective situation in the line. I will explain this formation more clearly. Although your left wing should be much better than your right, yet it must be reinforced with some of the best horse and foot and ordered to commence the acnon with the enemy's right in order to disorder and surround it as expeditiously as possible. And the other part of your army, composed of the worst troops, should remain at such a distance from the enemy's left as not to be annoyed by their darts or in danger of being attacked sword in hand. In this oblique formation care must be taken to prevent the line being penetrated by the wedges of the enemy, and it is to be employed only when the enemy's right wing is weak and your greatest strength is on your left.

 

The fourth formation is this: as your army is marching to the attack in order of battle and you come within four or five hundred paces of the enemy, both your wings must be ordered unexpectedly to quicken their pace and advance with celerity upon them. When they find themselves attacked on both wings at the same time, the sudden surprise may so disconcert them as to give you an easy victory. But although this method, if your troops are very resolute and expert, may ruin the enemy at once, yet it is hazardous. The general who attempts it is obliged to abandon and expose his center and to divide his army into three parts. If the enemy are not routed at the first charge, they have a fair opportunity of attacking the wings which are separated from each other and the center which is destitute of assistance.

 

The fifth formation resembles the fourth but with this addition: the light infantry and the archers are formed before the center to cover it from the attempts of the enemy. With this precaution the general may safely follow the above mentioned method and attack the enemy's left wing with his right, and their right with his left. If he puts them to flight, he gains an immediate victory, and if he fails of success his center is in no danger, being protected by the light infantry and archers.

 

The sixth formation is very good and almost like the second. It is used when the general cannot depend either on the number or courage of his troops. If made with judgment, notwithstanding his inferiority, he has often a good chance for victory. As your line approaches the enemy, advance your right wing against their left and begin the attack with your best cavalry and infantry. At the same time keep the rest of the army at a great distance from the enemy's right, extended in a direct line like a javelin. Thus if you can surround their left and attack it in flank and rear, you must inevitably defeat them. It is impossible for the enemy to draw off reinforcements from their right or from their center to sustain their left in this emergency, since the remaining part of your army is extended and at a great distance from them in the form of the letter L. It is a formation often used in an action on a march.

 

The seventh formation owes its advantages to the nature of the ground and will enable you to oppose an enemy with an army inferior both in numbers and goodness, provided one of your flanks can be covered either with an eminence, the sea, a river, a lake, a city, a morass or broken ground inaccessible to the enemy. The rest of the army must be formed, as usual, in a straight line and the unsecured flank must be protected by your light troops and all your cavalry. Sufficiently defended on one side by the nature of the ground and on the other by a double support of cavalry, you may then safely venture on action.

 

One excellent and general rule must be observed. If you intend to engage with your right wing only, it must be composed of your best troops. And the same method must be taken with respect to the left. Or if you intend to penetrate the enemy's line, the wedges which you form for that purpose before your center, must consist of the best disciplined soldiers. Victory in general is gained by a small number of men. Therefore the wisdom of a general appears in nothing more than in such choice of disposition of his men as is most consonant with reason and service.

 

However, an academic discussion loses the human factor and it loses touch with reality, as it tends to ignore the effects of the location and environment of the battle.

[Battle Scenarios]

I doubt tyhe legion of that era is flexible enough to divide as you suggest.

 

Other than Scipio at Ilipa, can anyone recall fancy tactics employed by the legions? I can't (though that's not to say there aren't any).

 

Whilst the later legions were quite flexible in their formations, that seems to have been used to aid reinforcement of the line and so on rather than fancy flanking.

 

Form them up and leave them to it generally worked very well for the Romans, attempts to tinker (eg Cannae possibly) generally didn't work out too well. The better Roman commanders used their reserves well, the superb ones (eg Caesar at Pharsalus) used there reserves in unexpected ways. But Roman infantry could be trusted to break almost any foe in head on collision (Hannibals centre was destroyed in each of his victories). To my mind, it's the poor Samnites who need to do something clever (like laying down their arms and pleading for terms- I'm prepared to be generous...)

 

Hannibal's centre was destroyed in his victories, such as at Cannae, with the purpose of trapping the Romans. Yes, the legions were able to completely destroy Hannibal's infantry head on, but by doing so, they effectively defeated themsleves by exposing their flanks and rear to attack. If the legions were more flexible - if a commander employed the more flexible maniple system rather than the rigid phalanx formation, the Romans would have experienced greater success on the battlefield at this time in history.

 

The use of a more adaptable formation is exactly what I am proposing for this situation. The phalanx and its powerful frontal assaults are perfectly adapted for open field warfare but are utterly useless in valleys or mountainous regions.

 

In The Histories, Polybius describes the difference between the Roman Maniple and the Macedonian Phalanx, which essentially becomes the difference between a flexible and an inflexible strategy of attack:

Why is it then that the Romans conquer? And what is it that brings disaster on those who employ the phalanx? Why, just because war is full of uncertainties both as to time and place; whereas there is but one time and one kind of ground in which a phalanx can fully work. If, then, there were anything to compel the enemy to accommodate himself to the time and place of the phalanx, when about to fight a general engagement, it would be but natural to expect that those who employed the phalanx would always carry off the victory. But if the enemy finds it possible, and even easy, to avoid its attack, what becomes of its formidable character? Again, no one denies that for its employment it is indispensable to have a country flat, bare, and without such impediments as ditches, cavities, depressions, steep banks, or beds of rivers: for all such obstacles are sufficient to hinder and dislocate this particular formation. And that it is, I may say, impossible, or at any rate exceedingly rare to find a piece of country of twenty stades, or sometimes of even greater extent, without any such obstacles, every one will also admit. However, let us suppose that such a district has been found. If the enemy decline to come down into it, but traverse the country sacking the towns and territories of the allies, what use will the phalanx be? For if it remains on the ground suited to itself, it will not only fail to benefit its friends, but will be incapable even of preserving itself; for the carriage of provisions will be easily stopped by the enemy, seeing that they are in undisputed possession of the country: while if it quits its proper ground, from the wish to strike a blow, it will be an easy prey to the enemy. Nay, if a general does descend into the plain, and yet does not risk his whole army upon one charge of the phalanx or upon one chance, but maneuvers for a time to avoid coming to close quarters in the engagement, it is easy to learn what will be the result from what the Romans are now actually doing.

 

For no speculation is any longer required to test the accuracy of what I am now saying: that can be done by referring to accomplished facts. The Romans do not, then, attempt to extend their front to equal that of a phalanx, and then charge directly upon it with their whole force: but some of their divisions are kept in reserve, while others join battle with the enemy at close quarters. Now, whether the phalanx in its charge drives its opponents from their ground, or is itself driven back, in either case its peculiar order is dislocated; for whether in following the retiring, or flying from the advancing enemy, they quit the rest of their forces: and when this takes place, the enemy's reserves can occupy the space thus left, and the ground which the phalanx had just before been holding, and so no longer charge them face to face, but fall upon them on their flank and rear. If, then, it is easy to take precautions against the opportunities and peculiar advantages of the phalanx, but impossible to do so in the case of its disadvantages, must it not follow that in practice the difference between these two systems is enormous? Of course, those generals who employ the phalanx must march over ground of every description, must pitch camps, occupy points of advantage, besiege, and be besieged, and meet with unexpected appearances of the enemy: for all these are part and parcel of war, and have an important and sometimes decisive influence on the ultimate victory. And in all these cases the Macedonian phalanx is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to handle, because the men cannot act either in squads or separately.

 

The Roman order on the other hand is flexible: for every Roman, once armed and on the field, is equally well-equipped for every place, time, or appearance of the enemy. He is, moreover, quite ready and needs to make no change, whether he is required to fight in the main body, or in a detachment, or in a single maniple, or even by himself. Therefore, as the individual members of the Roman force are so much more serviceable, their plans are also much more often attended by success than those of others.

 

Thus, if I commanded a Roman legion, I would pursue a more open, "fancy" tactic: remember, the Romans adopted the maniple formation during warfare with other Italic tribes - including the Gauls and the Samnites.

[Battle Scenarios]

Gaius,

 

I did like your thinking, so I expanded on it. Formations similar to the one used at Marathon have been used successfully so many times throughout history, such as at the Battle of Cannae.

 

 

Germanicus,

 

If you did attack my divided forces with your entire army, that would be a good strategy. However, you would expose your flank to attack by the other two Roman forces. Another however: these forces would be storming uphill. So your strategy might work, unless I was able to intercept your forces towards the bottom of the hill, striking with all three units - that is what I would try to do. Gaius Octavius' strategy of surrounding the hill could work as an effective counter but the Samnites still have the advantage of height.

[Battle Scenarios]

Remember, there are cavalry as well. Perhaps the best option would be to use the hills to outflank the Samnites with a combination of cavalry and infantry. Considering the tenacity and ferocity of the Samnites, perhaps a full frontal charge would not be as effective. If I were the commander, I would use the classic tactic used by the Greeks at the Battle of Marathon: by placing the weakest soldiers at the centre of the formation, the Greeks were able to draw the Persians into the midst of their army and attack them from the flanks. In between the hills, a similar strategy could work; by placing soldiers on the hill, the number of soldiers in the field is reduced, and therefore, the centre of the formation is weaker. As the Samnites and Romans clash, the larger Samnite force would gradually drive the Romans backward. This would expose the Samnite flanks to cavalry and infantry attacks from the hill.

[Battle Scenarios]

Try this: one poster posts a fictional battle scenario, including details about troops, landscape, time of day, location, enemy, and era. The next poster describes how he/she would command the Roman soldiers in battle, and, after responding, creates a new confrontation.

 

I thought this would be a great idea to test and gain knowledge about battle tactics and the Roman army throughout Roman history.

 

Let's begin with a fairly easy one.

 

It is the fourth century BC, and a Roman legion, with a cavalry force of 300 men, has encountered an equally sized Samnite contingent on a flat field flanked by hills covered with a light forest. It is early morning, the field is still damp with dew, and the sun is rising. The Samnites are approaching from the east, with the sun at the backs; you and your legion are facing the sun. The location is in territory between the two nations, therefore giving no one combatant any advantage in terms of support. What would you do?

 

Enjoy,

 

Legionnaire

[Fat Gladiators]

Hi,

 

I think the idea of a "fat" or "thick" gladiator is mostly the product of stereotypical views of Europeans. People of the modern age generally associate martial arts with the Asian world, believing, astoundingly, that Europeans created no indigenous martial arts. Finesse, skill, technique, and mastery are associated with the Orient; brute strength and even incompetence or ignorace are associated with the West. This statement comes from experience: people are just completely unaware of European martial arts and the skill of knights, legionnaires, or gladiators. The pinnacle of the warriors is seen as the samurai, the ninja (which, in fact, is a creation of ancient Japanese theatre), or the shaolin monk. Thus, in order for Europeans to have been successful in combat, people believe, they must have been strong and fat, able to deliver powerful blows with dull, heavy swords and other weapons and able to receive harmful strikes without suffering much damage. This is absolutely ridiculous.

 

The idea that gladiators had high fat percentages strikes me, again, as preposterous. Barley is quite low in fat, relatively high in proteins, and, as a wheat product, high in carbohydrates. Therefore, barley is an excellent component of an athlete's diet. Furthermore, gladiators trained, exercised, and performed continuously: the strains of fighting would undoubtedly contribute to incredible fitness among the athletes. In summary, the notion of a fat gladiator is myth.

 

Thanks,

 

Steve

 

 

Additional Information

 

Nutritional Analysis of Barley

Serving Size: 1 cup cooked pearly barley

Calories - 193

Protein - 3.5 grams

Fat - 0.7 gram

Cholesterol - 0

Carbohydrate - 44.3 grams

Dietary Fiber - 9 grams

Calcium - 17 mg

Iron - 2 mg

Magnesium - 35 mg

Phosphorus - 85 mg

Potassium - 145 mg

Sodium - 5 mg

Zinc - 1.2 mg

Niacin - 3.2 mg

Folic Acid - 26mcg

 

Images of Gladiators: Note the muscle tone

[Unarmed Combat Training]

Hi. I've finally returned after a year's absense. Thanks for all the replies.

 

I have continued to research this topic - unarmed combat training and techniques in Ancient Rome - and I found interesting information and websites.

 

In Italy, there is organization called Ars Dimicandi (www.arsdimicandi.net), which specializes in experimental archaeology for the purpose of recreating the combat arts, training, and ideas of Ancient Rome (unarmed, gladiators, and legions). The unarmed arts practised at the institue are Pugilatus (boxing), Luctatio (wrestling), and Pancratium (essentially the same as modern mixed martial arts). Undoubtedly, like in Ancient Greece, these arts were taught and practised not only for their obvious martial benefits but also their physical and fitness benefits.

 

Thank you for your interest,

 

Legionnaire

[Unarmed Combat Training]

Hello,

 

I am a new "recruit" to this website, having recently joined because of my great interest in Roman history, particularly in relation to the military.

 

My concise personal biography aside, I have always wondered: did the legionnaires of the Roman military receive any distinct unarmed combat training, or was practise in such fighting techniques limited to combative sports, similar to those at the gymnasiums or public bath houses? Personally, I believe that, as they were highly trained soldiers in a professional army that was needed by the Roman government to conquer and occupy the known Western world, the Roman legionnaires were undoubtedly highly capable in unarmed combat skills.

 

In order for you to fully understand the question, I think some things need to be clarified or defined, particularly the phrase "unarmed combat skills" - by this, I am not referring only to wrestling or boxing, but also disarm techniques or principles that could be used to effectively neutralize an armed enemy. Before, however, you assume perhaps that this applies only to the battlefield (on which an unarmed, isolated Roman soldier would be quickly slaughtered), consider the known historical fact that Rome had well-established secret service organizations (the Frumentarii, founded by Emperor Hadrian, for instance). Additionally, it is highly possible that the Roman military included units that specialized in guerilla warfare, as a means of disabling the enemy before engaging them with the legions.

 

Overall, I think it would be interesting to read both historical evidence of Roman "special forces" units and the unarmed combats training they received as well as some of your opinions about whether or not these contingents and these martial arts existed.

 

Sincerely,

 

Legionnaire