Andrianople: Was The Legion Outdated Or...

[caldrail]

There is evidence that some units wore little armour toward the end - but might this be the cost of provision? The amount of money hanging around the late west was not huge.

[DecimusCaesar]

There is evidence that some units wore little armour toward the end - but might this be the cost of provision? The amount of money hanging around the late west was not huge.

 

The army at Adrianople was armoured I believe, as the weight of the armour increased the fatigue of the soldiers who had been quick marched to the battle site. One of the main reasons why the army at Adrianople was defeated was that they were pinned by the Gothic forces - either with infantry or cavalry - and were therefore unable to manouver. Ammianus Marcellinus says that the soldiers were so tightly packed they could not raise their sword arms. He also mentions that although the Gothic archers could not see the Romans throught the dust clouds and the smoke, they could shoot anywhere and still hit a Roman as each vexillatio was compressed together.

[Nikephoros Phokas]

Greetings,

 

I recommend reading the following if you wish to know more about the battle:

 

The Battle of Adrianople:A Reconsideration By TS Burns

 

Adrianople AD 378 The Goths crush Rome's legions (Campaign 84) by SC MacDowall (Osprey Publishing)

 

I can provide a copy of the first as a MS Word document. Burns has written several books and articles about the Goths and their interaction with the Roman Empire. MacDowall spent time searching for a likely location for the battle near the modern Turkish city of Edirne prior to writing his book.

 

Vegetius was indeed an "armchair general" as he had no known military experience unlike Ammianus Marcellinus who served as a staff officer before writing his history. It was common for people like Vegetius to demonstrate their writing skills by authoring a paper which would form part of their resume or cirriculum vitae.

 

The Roman military had a long history of employing "barbarians" and so the presence of some German soldiers at Adrianople would be normal. Remember that the vast majority of auxiliaries of the Imperial Roman military were non-citizens. Auxiliaries may have formed half or more of the army. The granting of citizenship to all residents in 212 AD blurred the distinction in the military so it is difficult to assess the foreign content after the 3rd Century.

 

Perry Gray

[Gladius Hispaniensis]

Ave

You know I too was under the impression (for a long time) that Adrianople was a victory of predominantly cavalry over infantry. Scholars are giving this point of view a second look now.

The panic the Roman skirmishers fell into must account as a major factor in the defeat and the charge of the Gothic cavalry was at this very fortuitous point in the battle. On the left the Roman cavalry advanced too far and created a wide gap between cavalry and infantry that Fritigern's troops exploited very well. This permitted encirclement of the cavalry and an attack against the left wing of the infantry.

The noise and dust played their parts too, but were less harmful to the barbarians because their laager served as a rallying point. After the Roman left was turned, Fritigern attacked his enemy in the rear. The Roman right was compressed into a tight ball, a perfect target for archers, and the rest, as they say, is history.

[Northern Neil]

In additon to the above points, Julian was using a similar army, against a similar foe, at Strasbourg, and scored a victory over the Allemanni and Franks. And this was only 18 years prior to Adrianople.

[Spartan JKM]

Great thread.

 

I think this connection with Adrianople to Medieval feudalism/chivalry seems, indeed, to be a myth. It seems, quite possibly, that Charles Oman and cavalry officers etc. of the 19th century were seduced by a tidy idea that a superiror style of horseman brought the Roman Empire down.

 

It may have been primarily with Charles Martel and his Franks who began encouraging cavalry to the degree that created and influenced European chivalry. Threats came from all directions upon their kingdom, and infantry, though effective in a set-piece battle if properly utilized, was too slow to deal with potential enemies from different directions. Cavalry is simply far more mobile, whether for raiding and/or repulsing raids. This doctrine, not a swift process, probably did not start with Adrianople. It came much later. The cavalry-cycle, heavy cavalry that could ride down infantry, can be claimed to have begun with the Carolingians some 500 years later; they were the first Europenas to substantially utilize the metal stirrup.

 

I have Stephen William's and Gerard Friell's (Friell is the archaelogical expert of the duo) Theodosius: The Empire at Bay; they state on Pg. 19,

 

"In terms of military history, it has been commonly assumed that the outcome of the battle demonstrated the superiority of cavalry over infantry; which lasted until the late middle ages and the development of more effective projectile weapons. In our view this is a flawed approach, arising from a misunderstanding of the battle itself and the nature of the opposing forces, which ignores the vast bulk of evidence to the contrary, both in the later fourth century and in other periods. Adrianople was an infantry battle, decided by a series of tactical moves and accidents, and was no different in its troop composition and maneuvering from most of the set-piece warfare of the day..."

 

As I see it, one primary reason the Battle of Adrianople was significant was because it irrevocably changed the conditions on which barbarians and Romans would deal with each other in the future, and Rome might have been sacked sooner if not for the diplomatic astuteness of Theodosius I; his offer to the vagabonding Goths in the Balkan regions of allied status (foederati) with Rome, while retaining their own sovereignty, proved very efficacious until his death in 395 A.D. There was something more appealing for many barbarian chieftains about leading their warriors to fight along the ranks of the Roman military system than merely leading their own federated mobs (somewhat) into battle against Romans. They were probably thinking along the lines of stature, such as gaining war ministries in the empire. Moreover, Theodosius paid them higher than the Roman troops (reputedly), and showed them greater consideration. Trained units were also transferred from Egypt to replenish Thedosius' ranks.

 

The result of the battle also seemed to signify the reality to the Eastern Empire's military that efficient cavalry must be adopted more fully. Part of Theodosius' foederati was perhaps 40,000 conscripted Gothic warriors, many being cavalry. This must have been instrumental in the vanquishing of Theodosius' rivals, Magnus Maximus and Eugenius by 394 A.D. Actually, Alaric was part of the campaign that crushed Eugenius.

 

Was the battle of Adrianople the advent of the cavalry cycle - the so-called tactical revolution in the relation between cavalry and infantry which would influence the period when heavy cavalry, typified by the Medieval knight, dominated the battlefields of Europe for another 1,000+ years?

 

Contrarily, was the battle simply a battle lost catastrophically by the emperor Valens because of his tactical and intelligence failures, combined with a swift tactical surprise from the Gothic horsemen? But remember, it wasn't an ambush akin to what Hannibal achieved at Trasimene, Scipio's 'Burning of the Camps' (night ambush), or the Teutoburger Wald. The clash at Adrianople was fought on an open plain.

 

Did the Gothic cavalry contemporaneously send the Roman horsemen into flight and aid their infantry in the destruction of their enemy? Or was it really a battle won by Gothic infantry over Roman infantry, who were already thrown into disorder (terribly tight-packing of their ranks) by the initial salvo of Gothic cavalry, who all left the field chasing Roman cavalry, thus being merely a preliminary supplement?

 

Some reputable modern sources state unequivically 'no' to the cavalry-cycle issue. I agree; this battle led to a Roman catastrophe due to faulty intelligence and tactical surprise from the Gothic cavalry. The arms and tactics employed were nothing new from both sides. This wasn't like Crecy of 1346.

 

I think, basically, both armies at Adrianople numbered between 15-20,000 men at most, with Valens having an edge in quality and quantity (slight edge in numbers). But Valens thought he was approaching an enemy force, primarily Fritigern's footmen housed in their wagonlaager (wagon-fort), composed of slightly more than 1/2 of what it actually was. Fritigern had sent for his allied horsemen, out foraging 'far away', and was 'begging' a truce with Valens, sending out envoys of 'low origin' initially, whom Valens refused to see. Valens wanted to be sent a suitable chieftain to execute a lasting treaty. Fritigern then sent a 'common' soldier as a herald, requesting that picked men of noble rank among the Romans be sent to him as hostages, and he would tolerate the anger felt by his warriors because of his virtual overture of peace. But, in actuality, he was purposely delaying, hoping that amid the pretended truce his cavalry might return. Valens approved, but may have been also buying time to deploy efficiently (Ammianus Marcellinus, our original main source, doesn't say this on the part of Valens). This makes sense, as the wagonlaager was, presumably, well situated and difficult to assault, and Valen's men were weary and the day was extremely hot. Perhaps the Romans could hav eset the wagonlaager ablaze. But they didn't.

 

As already mentioned, Fritigern also set the surrounding land afire, thus exposing further with time the Romans to such horrid conditions in the 'fiery summer', exhausting them by heat and thirst. Valens had already imposed a forced march on his men to get here. Hunger began to set in for the Romans, too.

 

Marcellinus tell us of Valens' emissary, one Richomeres,

 

"...As he was on his way to the enemy's rampart, the archers and targeteers, then under the command of one Bacurius of Hiberia and Cassio, had rushed forward too eagerly in hot attack, and were already engaged with their adversaries; and as their charge had been untimely, so their retreat was cowardly; and thus they gave an unfavorable omen to the beginning of the battle..."

 

This untimely action, perhaps one of insubordination, is believed to have been instigated by the right (we don't know for sure) Roman cavalry. Then, like a 'thunderbolt does near high mountains', the cavalry under Alatheus and Saphrax arrived, and threw themselves into the 'confusion'.

 

This is the Marcellinus' overview of the entire battle, Book 31.13 (Loeb Classic Library),

 

"All the Goths united, namely, the Theruingi under the command of King Fritigern, and the Greuthungi led by Alatheus and Saphrax, and engaged with the Romans in the open, routed their cavalry, and put to flight the infantry, thus left unprotected and crowded together, with enormous losses; Valens was killed, but his body could not be found."

 

'All the Goths united', with no specific mention of all of the Gothic cavalry leaving the field. Thus, in my opinion, the revised theory that this was a battle of mainly infantry over infantry is not incontrovertible. But Marcellinus' account does carry some gaps.

 

Right from the beginning, Marcellinus states,

 

"On every side armor and weapons clashed..."

 

A few sentences later,

 

"...the lines dashed together like beaked ships, pushing each other back and forth in turn..." (could infantry alone, of no more quantity, cause this?)

 

He then tells us that the left cavalry wing of the Romans, deserted by some of their comrades, was hard pressed by the enemy's numbers, crushed, and overwhelmed, the infantry now unsupported. Again, he does not say the Gothic cavalry left the field. But he doesn't say the stayed either. Gosh, I wish he had specified!

 

He continues,

 

"...Because of the clouds of dust the heavens could no longer be seen, and echoed with frightful cries. Hence the arrows whirling death from every side always found their mark with fatal effect...But when the barbarians, pouring forth in huge hordes, trampled down horse and man...no room for retreat..."

 

Now, I hope the 'picking and choosing' doesn't signify a taking out of context, but think it is plausible, though the word 'cavalry' doesn't come up from Marcellinus after the initial charge of the Gothic horsemen, that phrases such as, "On every side", and, "Because of the clouds of dust the heavens could no longer be seen", and, "arrows whirling death from every side", and, "barbarians, pouring forth (not 'out', as out of their wagon-fort), in huge hordes, trampling down horse and man", and, finally, "no room for retreat", can not mean only the Gothic infantry itself surrounded the Romans, which has been a major belief of the current appraisals of the battle (Thomas Burns and Stephen Williams, to name a couple). These beliefs have been accepted, and are very credible (I have skimed Williams' excellent Theodosius: The Empire at Bay) on many issues (IMHO). This is definitley not a black & white issue. Much of the Gothic cavalry vanquished the Roman horsemen with great celerity, mainly because of the element of surprise, but some seemingly swung inwards to aid in the envelopment of the body of infantry, already thrown into disarray. Men alone do not "trample down horse and man" (do they?).

 

Perhaps I am being too academic, and ancient accounts can suffer from 'static' with the translations down the timelines. One of the eminent and panoramic works of Roman history, especially of this period, says this of the battle of Adrianople,

 

"On the 9th of August 378 A.D., a day which has deserved to be marked among the most inauspicious of the Roman Calender, the emperor Valens, leaving under a strong guard his baggage and military treasure, marched from Hadrianople to attack the Goths, who were encamped about 12 miles from the city....The event of the battle of Hadrianople, so fatal to Valens and to the empire, may be described in a few words: the Roman cavalry fled; the infantry was abandoned, surrounded, and cut to pieces. The most skillful evolutions, the finest courage, are scarcely sufficient to extricate a body of foot encompassed on an open plain by superior numbers of horse..."

 

-Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. III, Ch. XXVI.

 

Gibbon did could not make scientific extrapolations from examining the field etc., and certain sources he used have been declared advanced since his time (he wrote his masterpiece throughout the 1770s-1780s ), but he drew from the same sources our contemporaries do. Actually, he is constantly used for a source. Another is Theodor Mommsen, whose famed work I don't have with me.

 

Thanks, Spartan JKM

Edited May 17, 2007 by Spartan JKM

[Divi Filius]

For those who are interested, I just wrote a small comparison of Adrianople and Marathon for my war and warfare class(this guy has been killing me, nearly 4 6-10 page papers in about a 10 day period) . Its nothing special, since I had to do it quite fast, but for those who are interested. I started with the theme of dignitas, but quickly abandoned and will edit

it before I hand it in tomorrow:

 

Comparison between the battle of Marathon and battle of Adrianople

The ancient world relied heavily on the idea of image and honor, a thing the Romans bundled up in the word dignitas. An attack on an entities dignitas was a cause for war and a proper punishment as a form of reprisal. In the year 480 B.C. and 378 A.D. the rulers Xerxes, Achaemenid King of Kings, and Flavius Iulius Valens, Roman Emperor of the East, respectively, were faced with such a situation. The two autocrats needed to squash an enemy that could very well endanger their hegemony while at the same time do so in a way that could convey dignitas. The Persian King of Kings needed to squash the miniscule Greek peninsula if he was to assert his power in the region and tame the Ionian Greeks, while the Roman Emperor Valens needed to squash the pernicious Goths in order to restore order in the Balkans and to reassert Roman power after a number of embarrassing defeats. In both occasions the campaigns were disastrous for the larger power; both empires would later see their hegemony collapse by the same forces that defeated them at Marathon and Adrianople.

 

In 378 A.D. Emperor Valens stood with a force of about 15,000-20,000 men (Macdowall 59) and faced an army which he believed was no more then 10,000 (Marcellinus 31.12), although in fact far larger since the scouts failed to take into account the cavalry, which was away at the time. Valens

Edited May 18, 2007 by Divi Filius

[caldrail]

I think this connection with Adrianople to Medieval feudalism/chivalry seems, indeed, to be a myth. It seems, quite possibly, that Charles Oman and cavalry officers etc. of the 19th century were seduced by a tidy idea that a superiror style of horseman brought the Roman Empire down.

I doubt the horsemen alone brought down the empire given that roman cavalry was evolving toward the end too, but certainly the increasing use of horses in battle and in some cases the development of heavier cavalry for shock value affected the flow of battle. I notice though that these heavy cavalry are quoted as having 'little endurance' in battle, both because of the extra weight of arms/armour but also because the added protection left them tempted to continue melee when it it would have been wiser to withdraw and regroup, thus they fought longer pitched fights.

 

It may have been primarily with Charles Martel and his Franks who began encouraging cavalry to the degree that created and influenced European chivalry.

Be careful here because medieval chivalry was largely a romantic ideal. Most early knights were nasty beggars both in politics and war. In terms of the warrior class, it was going to develop that way in any case. Warrior societies whose function depend on an elite class tend to become more sophisticated and held back by ritual over time.

 

The cavalry-cycle, heavy cavalry that could ride down infantry, can be claimed to have begun with the Carolingians some 500 years later; they were the first Europenas to substantially utilize the metal stirrup.

No, I don't see it that way. Persian cataphracts had been the prototype of heavy cavalry for two centuries before Adrianople. Hadrian had experimented with them, and Constantius made them part of the legions, although I freely admit the tactical use and expertise of these early knights left something to be desired.

 

"In terms of military history, it has been commonly assumed that the outcome of the battle demonstrated the superiority of cavalry over infantry; which lasted until the late middle ages and the development of more effective projectile weapons. In our view this is a flawed approach, arising from a misunderstanding of the battle itself and the nature of the opposing forces, which ignores the vast bulk of evidence to the contrary, both in the later fourth century and in other periods. Adrianople was an infantry battle, decided by a series of tactical moves and accidents, and was no different in its troop composition and maneuvering from most of the set-piece warfare of the day..."

Gothic armies were different from roman ones. Goths were warriors regardless of whether they rode horses or walked around the battlefield - they were effectively interchangeable. Its also noted that the goths were weighed down with equipment. In this case it seems to have served them well.

 

The result of the battle also seemed to signify the reality to the Eastern Empire's military that efficient cavalry must be adopted more fully. Part of Theodosius' foederati was perhaps 40,000 conscripted Gothic warriors, many being cavalry. This must have been instrumental in the vanquishing of Theodosius' rivals, Magnus Maximus and Eugenius by 394 A.D. Actually, Alaric was part of the campaign that crushed Eugenius.

I agree absolutely. Theodosius couldn't ignore the gothic success, and better that they fought for you.

 

Was the battle of Adrianople the advent of the cavalry cycle - the so-called tactical revolution in the relation between cavalry and infantry which would influence the period when heavy cavalry, typified by the Medieval knight, dominated the battlefields of Europe for another 1,000+ years?

No, the development began much earlier (and elsewhere), but perhaps you could view Adrianople as a milestone in cavalry evolution.

 

Did the Gothic cavalry contemporaneously send the Roman horsemen into flight and aid their infantry in the destruction of their enemy? Or was it really a battle won by Gothic infantry over Roman infantry, who were already thrown into disorder (terribly tight-packing of their ranks) by the initial salvo of Gothic cavalry, who all left the field chasing Roman cavalry, thus being merely a preliminary supplement?

The gothic cavalry were very effective in this battle, and given they could continue to fight in the same way as their infantry if unhorsed, they had a certain edge in flexibility. The predominance of missile weapons in gothic hands cannot be underestimated. They could make repeated passes at infantry and whittle down their morale and coherence with little effort before closing in with the melee.

[Spartan JKM]

Very elucidating caldrail. Thank you.

No, I don't see it that way. Persian cataphracts had been the prototype of heavy cavalry for two centuries before Adrianople. Hadrian had experimented with them, and Constantius made them part of the legions, although I freely admit the tactical use and expertise of these early knights left something to be desired.

Indeed; forgive my brevity, but I was thinking of the tactical concept of stirrups allowing for the full momentum of a horse behind a lance. 'Heavy cavalry', before the 7th century or so in Europe or Asia (Near and Middle East) couldn't deliver the shock the likes of the Carolingians could; the energy transfer from the horse to knight to lance was enabled primarily by the coupling of the stirrup. It connected the horse's 1,000 pounds and 40-mile-per-hour speed to the end of the couched lance, held under-arm, by way of the knight. This massive momentum was used much like a tank to take down massed foot troops or mounted warriors. The entire major social system, it seems - the feudal system - evolved around this simple mechanical device. This triggered debates, however, as scholars argued that it couldn't be that simple.

 

The Parthian and Sassanid (and Byzantine?) 'heavy cavalry' were noted as such due to their armor, both on horse and man; basically, to deliver 'hammer blows', they needed to be supported by horse-archers, akin to what you were describing about the missile weaponry of the Goths at Adrianople. Egyptian Mamelukes defeated the Mongols in part because of superior heavy cavalry.

 

Of course, this subject is very debatable and potentially comprehensive.

 

Thanks, Spartan JKM

Edited May 18, 2007 by Spartan JKM

[sonic]

Very elucidating caldrail. Thank you.

No, I don't see it that way. Persian cataphracts had been the prototype of heavy cavalry for two centuries before Adrianople. Hadrian had experimented with them, and Constantius made them part of the legions, although I freely admit the tactical use and expertise of these early knights left something to be desired.

Indeed; forgive my brevity, but I was thinking of the tactical concept of stirrups allowing for the full momentum of a horse behind a lance. 'Heavy cavalry', before the 7th century or so in Europe or Asia (Near and Middle East) couldn't deliver the shock the likes of the Carolingians could; the energy transfer from the horse to knight to lance was enabled primarily by the coupling of the stirrup. It connected the horse's 1,000 pounds and 40-mile-per-hour speed to the end of the couched lance, held under-arm, by way of the knight. This massive momentum was used much like a tank to take down massed foot troops or mounted warriors. The entire major social system, it seems - the feudal system - evolved around this simple mechanical device. This triggered debates, however, as scholars argued that it couldn't be that simple.

 

As many modern historians and experimental archaeologists have pointed out recently, the stirrup actually has little effect on many aspects of cavalry warfare. The main use of the stirrup, even by modern riders, is not to maintain their balance but to mount hteir horse in the first place.

 

Even in medieval chivalry, although the stirrup was used to gain a little more purchase on the horse to enable a slihtly more powerful thrust, the main stabilising force was the saddle. It was the design of the saddle and the straps fastening it to the horse that gave the medieval knight his power: not the stirrups.

 

In Roman times, it's now been shown that to actually dismount you have to want to dismount, as otherwise you are held firmly in place by the four horns that are placed on either side of the hip/upper leg.

 

As a final clincher, although the tirrup was available for a long time after the Avars came West, it remained of little importance up until the turn of the millenium. A very slow adoption for an item of 'such vital importance to medieval warfare'.

[Spartan JKM]

I think that's a very good point, sonic.

 

Obviously, people could ride and fight on horses just fine before the stirrup. I think it enabled people to learn to maneuver on horses quicker than before. The Romans did develop good horned saddles by the 4th century, and they apparently used spurs. One book titled The Roman Cavalry, by one Karen Dixon, states on Pg.110,

 

"...Throughout the whole of the Imperial period the Roman cavalryman, be he on horse or camel, was provided with a secure seat from which to fight. The lack of stirrups for most of the period under study is neither there nor there. The importance of the stirrup has been over-emphazised, as the Roman cavalryman was perfectly able to engage in shock combat with spear and sword without them. Indeed it has been asserted that the main initial impact of the stirrup was to reduce fatigue on long distance rides..."

 

However, it is quite a debate that the stirrup is 'overrated', depending on the degree of the importance of it being claimed.

 

It definitely gave the horsmen greater stability, regardless how 'natural' one was growing up on a horse. The basic tactics of mounted warfare were certainly affected, as mounted warrior supported by stirrups was less likely to fall off while fighting, and they could satnd while mounted. They could deliver blows with his weapon that more fully employed the weight and momentum of himself and the horse. If the saddle solely allowed for that, Persians, Macedonians, and every other bridled cavalrymen, I would think, would have used their thrusting weapon under-handed.

 

Peculiarly, the invention of the stirrup occurred relatively late in history, considering the fact that horses were domesticated around, what, 4,000 B.C.?

 

Great stuff, Spartan JKM

[caldrail]

"...Throughout the whole of the Imperial period the Roman cavalryman, be he on horse or camel, was provided with a secure seat from which to fight. The lack of stirrups for most of the period under study is neither there nor there. The importance of the stirrup has been over-emphazised, as the Roman cavalryman was perfectly able to engage in shock combat with spear and sword without them. Indeed it has been asserted that the main initial impact of the stirrup was to reduce fatigue on long distance rides..."

Personally I agree wholeheartedly. For the stirrup to be effective in 'shock' value it requires that the rider braces himself rigid. This would cause injury to the rider on impact because the full force of the blow transmits backwards too. In any case the human body is ill suited to bracing itself in that manner.

 

It definitely gave the horsmen greater stability, regardless how 'natural' one was growing up on a horse. The basic tactics of mounted warfare were certainly affected, as mounted warrior supported by stirrups was less likely to fall off while fighting, and they could satnd while mounted. They could deliver blows with his weapon that more fully employed the weight and momentum of himself and the horse. If the saddle solely allowed for that, Persians, Macedonians, and every other bridled cavalrymen, I would think, would have used their thrusting weapon under-handed.

The roman saddle is especially well suited to allowing weight and momentum to carry through, given the four humps that the rider sat between. Re-enactors tells us that these saddles are very effective and easily allow the rider to maintain his balance on the horse, although as I've mentioned elsewhere I suspect its a little easier to be unhorses without a stirrup to brace yourself against. I'm not sure of the value of standing with stirrups other than looking over a hedge I suppose, but there's nothing in combat that benefits from this. Its the saddle that transforms the momentum of the blow, not the stirrup. Notice the high backed medieval type for use with lances. If a blow is delivered with great energy the result is a backward force on the rider, who should then slide off the horse backward without friction or saddle to keep him there. The stiruup does nothing to assist, and might possibly trap the riders foot and cause him to be dragged behind the horse and even trampled by the back legs.

 

Peculiarly, the invention of the stirrup occurred relatively late in history, considering the fact that horses were domesticated around, what, 4,000 B.C.?

Not really. Its perfectly possible to ride a horse bareback without them, which was the usual method for earlier cultures who first domesticated the horse. I doubt many of them would have considered the stirrup necessary since vaulting onto a horse is traditionally a sign of skill/manhood amongst riders.

[Leguleius]

Interesting article on Hadrianople here by Peter Heather:

 

http://blog.oup.com/2007/07/rome/

[ASCLEPIADES]

Interesting article on Hadrianople here by Peter Heather:

 

http://blog.oup.com/2007/07/rome/

Salve et Gratiam Habeo, L.

Interesting article indeed; and as the webpages are intrinsically ephemeral, and this particular article is open for sharing, I will take the liberty of uploading it:

 

The Battle of Hadrianople

July 11, 2007 | Peter Heather.

(teacher at Worchester College, University of Oxford and author of The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians).

 

On August 9th 376, Valens, Emperor of the Roman east, gave battle to a mixed force dominated by Goths on a plain some 8 hours march north of the city of Hadrianople: modern Edirne in European Turkey. The result was catastrophe. By nightfall the emperor and two-thirds of his army, the pick of the eastern army, lay dead on the battlefield. Valens

[Gaius Octavius]

Sun Tsu and Macchiavelli both claim that battles are determined before they are engaged.

 

If my memory serves, the Romans had been forced to allow the Goths to enter the province as peaceful farmers, and such, long before the battle. Initially, they were unarmed or disarmed. The Roman government mistreated them, and they commenced to arm themselves with the aid of their compatriots from across the border. This was the initial and fatal error of the Romans.

 

I think that the Western Emperor had never intended to come to the aid of the East, and kept prolonging his arrival. Perhaps Valens had so concluded.

 

A few questions:

 

How many spears did the cavalryman carry? How, and when were the spears used? Once engaged, was the spear the weapon of choice, or was it the sword and the trampling of horses?

Edited October 24, 2007 by Gaius Octavius