Hannibal Barca

[Spartan JKM]

I don't completely understand the specificity of your comment Imperator Mazellius. It was clearly derogatory upon Hannibal though. The fact that he finally lost in no way militates against his genius.

 

Hannibal attempted only once in his career at an all-out siege, on a substantial scale, of a city - Saguntum in 219 B.C., at which there no standing armies of close proximity that could have shut him in, which was the case in Italy. Saguntum does not rank with Tyre or Alesia as an example of the higher art of siegery in antiquity, but the successful taking of the Iberian stronghold clearly illustrated an understanding of what needed to be done - he set up lines of circumvallation, surrounded by numerous towers with battering rams, and assaulted the wall on which ground allowed for the best possible chance. The siege was no child's play, as the city, a mile or so from the sea (a Roman landing would not have gone unnoticed), lay on a naked rock, some 400 ft. or so above the plain. The Saguntines threw up a furiously determined and able resistence, making good use of the falarica, a kind of huge javelin smeared with tar (or pitch?) and sulphur, then launched from a catapult of some type. The tip alone of this terribly effective weapon was 3 ft. long. Silius Italicus offers an engrossing account of the falarica. After some 8 months, not much longer than it took Alexander to take Tyre in his brilliant amphibious-style siege of the island-city in 332 B.C., Saguntum fell.

 

He probably could have taken the cities in Italy after Cannae by long sieges; he certainly could have built all the equipment needed during the winter months. Lack of timber would not have been a problem. Livy does mention vineae (mantlets) in his account of Hannibal's assault on Casilinum in 216 B.C., a huge wooden tower in the attack on Cumae in 215 B.C., and machinationes in the attack on Tareentum's citadel (which he never took) in 213 - 212 B.C. Besides, he won over plenty of communities, such as Arpi, Salapia, Herdonia, Nuceria, Acerrae, Casilinum, Compsa, and others by either diplomacy, treachery, or starvation. He explained they would be autonomous from Carthaginian tribute if they broke from Rome, but who can blame them for being suspicious of Carthage's motives with a victory in the war. Remember, fellow posters, Hannibal knew full well that sieges were liable to be drawn out over months with the besieging, or sieging, army settled in, and this would curtail his freedom to maneuver. His strength lay in movement, his supreme generalship, and his superior cavalry, and his adroit marches and counter-marches throughout the years following Cannae at will were the best way to break Rome's bonds with her allies, not by taking their cities by extreme force. Remember, he was trying to gain the appeasement of peoples who had been under the hegemony of Rome for a long time beforehand. B.H. Liddell Hart wrote of Scipio's "political sagacity" of releasing Iberian prisoners after Baecula and Ilipa - but that is exactly what Hannibal was doing in Italy! The Iberian natives were much more wavering and easier to win over than the Italians under the Roman confederation. The cities he could not take he simply rode awy from when he realized they wouldn't budge. Remember, his policy depended most on diplomacy, and the fact that he always had the clear vision to realize that his ultimate victory lay in this very diplomacy, despite his dazzling military victories, is commendable that his hatred of 'inveterate' of Rome, as emphasized by Polybius, was not pathological.

 

Moreover, if his goal was to siege cities considerably, Hannibal could not count on recieving all the heavy catapults, huge bows (ballistae), towers, battering rams, and other devices needed to attack and scale walls from Carthage because he didn't have control of the sea. He also lacked the manpower, as was not the case at Saguntum. But, again, he didn't come to Italy to siege cities; sure, if he could have successfuly taken Naples, a supremely important strategic port on the Tyrrhenian Sea some 320 miles form Carthage itself, making 'friends' with them would not be important. But, yes, in this case, lack of a siege-train and more men worked against him. The fact that he targeted naples so quickly after Cannae, and defeated their cavalry in a skirmish, showed that he fully did not underestimate the importance of seapower, as some critics suggest.

 

He surely must have been dismayed when Rome wouldn't even discuss terms after Cannae, but the justification to his continuing of his original policy of breaking apart the Roman federation in the South (his pleas fell on deaf ears amongst the more centralized allies of Rome) was precisely that much of southern Italy began to come over to him. He would create strongholds, still defeat the Romans in battles, lay ambushes, and hold the ports of Tarentum (not the citadel), Thurii, Croton, Caulon, Metapontum, and Locri - all southern ports pointing at Carthage and Greece. I really don't view this as 'wandering'. His base at Mt. Tifata was very secure and centralized, and his alliance with Capua reflects his policy of not at all being far-fetched. After Cannae, and his alliance with Philip V of Macedon, his grand strategy entailed the encirclement and isolation of Italy, which now depended as much on his allies as his work in southern Italy beyond his own campaign. The Gallic peoples joined with him were in even more open revolt following the ambush and destruction of the lone consular army in northern Italy under Lucius Postumius within days of Cannae. Hasdrubal Barca was mobilized in Catalonia in 215 B.C. Syracuse, after the death of Rome's long time friend King Hiero, defected from the Roman alliance, and swayed towards joining Carthage's cause in this great struggle. It was not a certainty that Philip V's direct plans included landing his forces in southern Italy, but at least Hannibal and Philip V, who wanted to further his hegemony in Hellas, could divert Roman forces, thus relieving the activities of the other contemporaneously: Rome's pre-occupation with Hannibal in Italy would ameliorate his situation in Illyria, while Hannibal could count on Roman forces being diverted to Greece, particularly those of her navy, which would dissipate her naval presence surrounding Sicily and southern Italy. If a Macedonian army could have landed in southern Italy, from perhaps Apollonia, Oricum, or Lissus, all within approx. 100 miles form Italy's Adriatic coast and not garrisoned substantially by Roman forces at the time of the alliance, a mass desertion in southern Italy amongst the Greek peoples would be a near-certainty. It was plain bad luck for Hannibal that a Roman squadron intercepted the correspondence between he and Philip V, thus they assiduously and swiftly went to work in Greece, using their Aetolian allies to play the Greeks of each other, checking Philip V.

Hasdrubal's linkage with Hannibal in 215 - 214 B.C. would have been probably too much pressure for Rome at the time, and Iberia would have collapsed for them with the certain changing of feeling of all the wavering and even pro-Roman tribes there. Gnaeus Scipio stopped Hasdrubal at Dertosa (Ibera) on the Ebro. This was huge for Rome! Reinforcements prepared for Hannibal went to Iberia instead becuase of this setback. It was also bad misfortune for Hannibal that Hasdrubal's dispatched messengers, who rode much the length of Italy in 207 B.C., were picked up by the Romans before they could get to him. The messengers carried Hasdrubal's written location and plans to join his brother.

If Bomilcar and Hanno had not been so paltry in Sicily, in contrast to the conduct of Epicydes and Muttines, the Romans might not have won Sicily. Off Cape Pachynon (souht -eastern tip of Sicily), Bomilcar, with some 130 warships and 700 supply ships for Syracuse (hopefully), sailed away rather than face the numerically inferior fleet of Otacilius. Livy implied, "he lost his nerves". Bad blow for Hannibal and Carthage.

The Cisalpine Gallic tribes presented a very strange situation during these decisive years. That they they didn't want to provoke a Roman reaction once Hannibal left their territories is understandable, especially as many joined him on his crusade south. But after their smashing defeat of Postumius, and the clear state of now Roman vulnerability, they didn't follow up their victory. Their pressure form the North would have greatly relieved Hannibal. However, all the tribes of Liguria and Iberia etc. were certainly shacky allies at best, for both sides.

 

I realize this is hypothetical, but the defeat of Rome, after her refusal to come to the conference table after Cannae, necessitated beyond the resources of Hannibal and his Italian allies, with southern Italy positioned for a rendezvous for the forces of Carthage, Macedon, the Cisalpine Gauls, and Hasdrubal from Iberia. We cannot blame others if they didn't share his ambitious criterion, but they were on his side. To his misfortune, and with plenty of credit to Rome's resolve and sensible dispositions at opportune times, only 4,000 men ever reached him, when Bomilcar easily sailed into Locri in 215 B.C. Carthage, in all, dispatched nearly 80,000 men and 44 elephants throughout the war. More could have reached him. All hindsight and conjectural, of course.

 

Food for thought.

 

Thanks Spartan JKM

[Guest Artful Warrior]

Everyone who analyzes the second punic war automatically discounts the possibility of Hannibal making an amphibious assault. Why is that? Okay, so the Romans had a more powerful navy at this point. But both Bomilcar (in 216) and Mago (in 205) landed on Italian soil with substantial armies against little to no resistance.

 

On the other hand, Hannibal lost about 40% of his army on his crossing the alps and I don't see that the Romans were all that surprised at his crossing either. Scipio, who had been looking for him in Spain returned to Rome and Roman armies were already getting ready to intercept him on his arrival. Hannibal's crossing did make the men who crossed with him loyal to him, but at the cost of losing 40%? If Hannibal had crossed over from Spain in ships and landed in Liguria (close to where he came out of the alps and where Mago eventually landed), would there be a substantial difference in his fighting power and chances for success? Sure, "Hannibal's landing at Liguria" doesn't have the same ring to it, but in my opinion, it could have changed the outcome of the war. It has always seemed to me that people ignore or dismiss the naval side of the issue too easily.

[Pertinax]

Perhaps Hannibal's difficulty was the utter implacability and intrasigence of the Romans. This does not mean that I suggest he was weak or defective in strategy or action. If we recall the fate of the Samnites after the "passing under the yoke" humiliation ,we seem to see in Rome a totally implacable attitude to warfare (perhaps an echo of assyria?) . Why wage war other than to utterly destroy an enemy-witness the implacable annihilation of enemies,cattle and pet animals in defeated cities( look at the fate of not very threatening Corinth)If defeated do not surrender whilst you have any means to fight with in any way possible ,even if lives are consumed on a huge scale .If an ally doesnt seem to keen ,kick them where it hurts-Rhodes for example.

It seems the Roman mindset was perhaps something not entirely comprehended by others the utter conviction of their superiority as a Republic and as "citizens".

[Felix Marcellus]

Everyone who analyzes the second punic war automatically discounts the possibility of Hannibal making an amphibious assault. Why is that? Okay, so the Romans had a more powerful navy at this point. But both Bomilcar (in 216) and Mago (in 205) landed on Italian soil with substantial armies against little to no resistance.

 

On the other hand, Hannibal lost about 40% of his army on his crossing the alps and I don't see that the Romans were all that surprised at his crossing either. Scipio, who had been looking for him in Spain returned to Rome and Roman armies were already getting ready to intercept him on his arrival. Hannibal's crossing did make the men who crossed with him loyal to him, but at the cost of losing 40%? If Hannibal had crossed over from Spain in ships and landed in Liguria (close to where he came out of the alps and where Mago eventually landed), would there be a substantial difference in his fighting power and chances for success? Sure, "Hannibal's landing at Liguria" doesn't have the same ring to it, but in my opinion, it could have changed the outcome of the war. It has always seemed to me that people ignore or dismiss the naval side of the issue too easily.

 

 

Hannibal chose the Alps for the element of surprise. A large fleet would've more likely been identified. Hannibal also likely had the intent of picking up a large contingency of allied fighters during his march through the southern Gaul, which he did.

 

Also, marching through Gaul over the Alps gave him the opportunity to secure LOC's to Spain from where he knew he would be able to acquire supplies mostly unhindered as he was not at the time challenged in Spain. Had he chosen to support his own invasion from sea, his sea LOC's would've been constantly interdicted and he'd have fared far worse logistically than he was with land based LOC's.

 

When he started out this was a land oriented mission. He knew the Roman maritime capability far exceeded his. Bomilcar's and Mago's landings in Italy were no doubt calculated gambles. They paid off. It would've been a managable disaster had they not been able to land. Had his initial invasion been interdicted at sea it would been a warstopping event. He wouldn't have recovered from that. Even if he won such a naval battle on the way to landing in Italy, no doubt he'd have lost a comparable number to what he lost crossing the Alps.

 

Who knows. But if you put yourself in his shoes in 218BC, no way does any commander with no Naval "Umph" choose to invade Rome by sea. He made the right choice tactically and logistically.

 

 

For fun, what would you all do different if you were suddenly zapped back in time into Hannibal's shoes? Invade? Wait until you built up a Navy than challenge Rome on the seas? Be content to dominate Spain and maybe later on takes southwestern Gaul or more? Follow Hannibal's course, yet invest more time in developing an engineer corps for sieges? Turn on Carthage and ensure you had all the support back home that you needed? Or at the very least had your primary rival family the Hannos clapped in irons or placed in stocks or crucified... and then went after Rome? What would you do?