jermus22

I would be interested to seem sources for the height information. Here's a passage from Theodore Ayrault Dodge's book "Hannibal" written in 1891 concerning Roman recruits (chapter IV, page 41): "Those physically wanting--generally not many among this plain and hearty people--were exempt. Small stature was not a grave objection. The burly Gauls laughed at the little Romans until they got to close quarters with them. The height was usually from five feet to five feet three inches. Men exceeding this height were not considered strong. Men under five feet were sooner accepted. . . . The following was the man wanted, according to Vegetius, and a pretty good man he was though the description belongs to a later period. 'The recruit must have sharp eyes, a head carried erect, broad breast, stout shoulders, big fists, long hands, not a big belly, of well proportioned growth, feet and soles less fleshy than muscular. If he has all this, no stress need be laid on the height, for it is far more important that the soldier should be strongly built than tall.'" I'm not sure how accurate Dodge is about the 5'0"-5'3" stature. Also wondering about the claims regarding 5'4" and 5'10".

The first campaign of Roman legions in Africa (during the First Punic War) was marked with great initial success before ending in terrible disaster. After defeating the Carthaginian navy at the battle of Ecnomus in 256 b.c., a Roman invasion fleet of allegedly 370 ships sailed for Africa. The original fleet consisted of 330 ships, and despite losing 24 in the battle, these had been replaced with 64 captured Carthaginian galleys from the battle (Polybius 1.28.10-14). Polybius (1.26.7-8) records that there were roughly 300 crew members and 120 marines per Roman ship when the battle began, a total of 138,600 men. We can't be sure how many men were in the fleet after the battle; perhaps quite a few marines were used to crew the captured ships or maybe crews were drawn from Roman allies in Sicily. Rome certainly had little trouble finding men for her crews and armies. The Roman fleet arrived at Cape Hermaia (now Cape Bon or Rass Adder) and began a siege of "the city called Aspis," which could very well have been modern Kelibia (the Roman Clupea). This city acted as a shield for the Carthaginian plantations on Cape Bon, and after its capture, the Romans were free to ravage the territory, seizing much of the land's produce as well as some 20,000 slaves. When news arrived from Rome for one of the consuls to return, leaving an adequate army to control the region, M. Atilius Regulus was chosen to stay with a force of 15,000 infantry, 500 cavalry, and 40 ships while his counterpart L. Manlius Vulso would return with the remaining fleet and army (Polybius 1.29.8-10). This small army would go on to campaign effectively for the next year in Africa, laying siege to the city of Adys and defeating a Carthaginian field army outside the city. The feats of Regulus' army at Adys are clearly exaggerated by historians like Orosius and Eutropius. The former claims, for example, that the Romans killed 17,000 men and captured a further 5,000 along with 18 elephants (Orosius 4.8.16) while Eutropius claims the same casualties except that 18,000 were killed (Eutropius 2.21.3). Orosius continues by claiming that the Romans secured the surrender of a further 82 towns (Eutropius claimed 74) before seizing the town of Tunis, some ten miles from Carthage. After the seizure of Tunes, failed negotiation attempts commenced and the Carthaginians turned the command of their remaining army to a Spartan mercenary named Xanthippos. He led out an army of 12,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and 100 elephants to fight the Romans (Polybius 1.32.9), and Regulus gladly accepted the challenge. In a bloody battle, the Romans were soundly defeated, losing all but 2,000 men who escaped to Aspis (Polybius 34.8-10?). Regulus was captured, but a Roman fleet did manage to recover the men at Aspis (although a storm practically annihilated the fleet during its return voyage). With all of this being said, one wonders whether such an army as small as Regulus' could have accomplished the victories credited to it. They managed to successfully capture to cities (Adys and Tunis) while defeating an army outside of Adys, and they still were large enough to confidently meet another Carthaginian army before being defeated. Could an army of less than 16,000 men have managed such a campaign? Both Eutropius (2.21.4) and Orosius (4.9.3), along with Appian (Lib. 3), claim that Regulus had 30,000 men when facing Xanthippos. Although all three historians are by no means trustworthy sources like Polybius, one must question whether Polybius failed to make mention of reinforcements before the battle. Or is it possible that his numbers of 15,000 infantry and 500 cavalry at the beginning of the campaign actually were the numbers present at the beginning of the battle with Xanthippos? Please discuss and offer suggestions. This problem has puzzled me for some time. I am extremely indebted to J. F. Lazenby's The First Punic War for all information used in this report. In some portions of this post I have practically followed Lazenby verbatim from chapters 6 & 7 of his book. I just wanted to clarify that issue so no one would assume I was trying to plagiarize. If anyone is interested in the book, it was published in 1996 by Stanford University Press (Originating publisher: UCL Press Limited, London) and can be found on any number of websites.

It's interesting we're discussing the makeup of the Carthaginian phalanx. I have a personal theory regarding the issue. It's clear from history that the Carthaginians, Liby-Phoenicians, and Libyans were all treated differently in Africa, so perhaps it's safe to assume that at least until the Second Punic War, they were also treated differently in the field. Perhaps the first phalanx in any Carthaginian army consisted of the Carthaginian citizens at the Battle of the Crimesus River in Sicily (342 BC?). They probably used a hoplite phalanx, and although they fared poorly, they probably continued to keep them at home as a national guard of sorts. Libyans up to this point had been allowed to fight in their native style as medium to lightly armed infantry with javelins, spears, and bucklers covered in animal hide. However, based on the initial success of the phalanx at the battle, the Carthaginians realized the advantages of employing mercenaries in a similar manner to fight the Greeks in Sicily. After all, the failure of the phalanx had been due more to a lack of support from the other contingents in the army. The Carthaginians probably realized the advantages of hiring Libyans cheaply and training them into a phalanx. Lower quality equipment could be manufactured and supplied at Carthage, thus boosting business within the city while saving money that would have been spent on Greek phalangites. So, in this manner Libyans served in Carthaginian armies abroad while Carthaginians remained at home as a sort of national guard with the best arms and training. When Xanthippus the Spartan arrived in 255 BC, he probably had the Carthaginian phalanx re-organized into the Macedonian style while the Libyans continued as hoplites. After the First Punic War, the Carthaginian phalanx continued to see action, this time against Libyan hoplites and mercenary contingents in the Truceless War. Social upheaval and revolution accompanied this war (check out Polybius' account, particularly his reference to the ejection of Hanno the Great and the citizens' selection of his replacement). After the war, perhaps more Liby-Phoenicians and Carthaginians from the lower classes joined the ranks of the hoplite phalanx, along with many Libyans in an attempt to mend relationships between these peoples. My guess is that after several years of campaigning in Spain, Hamilcar Barca saw the advantage of re-equipping his hoplites with more Iberian weapons like the falcata and scutari shield while retaining their overhand thrusting spear. This enabled them to retain the compactness and overall strength of a phalanx while occasionally adopting more tactical manoeuvreability and capability in swordplay(like the Iberians and Roman maniples). Who knows, maybe Hamilcar had already begun incorporating Iberian weaponry into his Libyan ranks while in Sicily. Regardless, this seems highly likely since his son Hannibal would employ his Libyans in tactical manouevres which required more speed and flexibility than the traditional hoplite and Macedonian phalanxes. Livy notes at the Battle of Cannae that Hannibal's Libyans were "more wearied by slaughter than by fighting" which suggests sword play rather than the steady plodding of a Macedonian phalanx equipped with sarissas. And at Zama, the final stubborn resistance of his last line even when outflanked does not seem to parallel the same vulnerability of Philip's Macedonians at Cynocephalae only five years later. Anyway, that's my theory. Would like to hear some thoughts/criticisms of it.

Although there were only four major land battles in the First Punic War, much of Rome's early success at sea came from the corvus, which essentially turned sea battles into land ones. By allowing the legionaires to come to grips with the Carthaginian levies and mercenaries in hand-to-hand combat, the Romans were able to gain a distinct advantage in naval conflicts. BTW, I read in an abridged version of Lew Wallace's "Ben Hur" an interesting description of the Roman use of the gladius. Not sure if it's accurate, but the paragraph described how the Romans primarily used it for thrusting at the face and chest rather than taking broad sweeps and cuts like the Gauls did. The Romans also apparently hid behind the scutum and even used it to drive their opponents back. I wonder if this might explain the Romans' success in fighting. Any thoughts/info on this?

Good posts, Primus Pilus. What amazes me about Hannibal's achievements is that he didn't have any major desertions or organizational breakdowns during his time as a general. Certainly other Carthaginian generals had far less success in the field. In campaigns against the Greeks in Sicily during the 5th and 4th centuries BC, Carthaginian generals with numerically superior armies were defeated time and again by the Greek phalanx. And even when one of their generals managed to capture nearly all of Sicily and put Syracuse under siege, his campaign failed because his troops failed to maintain sanitary conditions and discipline within the camp. Having so many men from different cultures and backgrounds (many of them true barbarians, like the Gauls and some Libyans and Iberians) made it difficult to maintain a universal standard for hygiene, cleanliness, and organization in the camps, and language barrier itself only compounded the problem. Events of the first Punic War continued to illustrate the problems with the Carthaginian system. After the Agrigentum campaign of 262, some 4,000 Celts tried to desert, leading to their general (Hamilcar, not Hannibal's father) betraying them into a Roman ambush. Later, at the siege of Lilybaeum in 250 or 249, more Celts attempted to desert, and if I remember correctly, some Greek mercenaries tried the same thing. Even Hamilcar Barca's army in Sicily (247-241) gave him considerable trouble. 1/3 of his Celtic contingent deserted, and he had to make lavish promises to keep some of the other men loyal to his cause (although these promises may have been based on the condition of victory). Even though Hamilcar's army didn't lose in the field, the naval defeat at Aegates led to the army being returned to Carthage without the spoils of victory. Delays in pay let to a revolt, but even after Carthage agreed to pay, they still insisted on more than their compensation. Other than one instance of a few hundred (I think it was 272) Numidians and Iberians deserting, I personally have never read any other accounts of Hannibal's men disputing their pay and/or deserting in his sixteen years in Italy. It is quite a testament his abilities as a leader of men to inspire the devotion and courage of such diverse groups as the Carthaginians, Greeks, Numidians, Libyans, Liby-Phoenicians, Iberians, and Gauls, not to mention the various Latins and Italians who would later make up the majority of his army.

BTW, I'm also up for any discussion about the Truceless War. I've taken a particular interest in that topic during the last two years, even making a trip last November to visit ruins and possible battleground sights in Tunisia.

Hi, everybody! Just joined the site and was excited to see you guys discussing the Punic Wars, Carthage, etc. Can't say I know a lot about Roman history in general, but the Punic Wars are a hobby of mine. In regards to the question about Hannibal's ability to carry out a siege of Rome, from what I've read recently, he did have the equipment and tactical ability to conduct an operation of that scale. However, Hannibal's major obstacle didn't lie in equipment or technology, but rather in manpower. According to John Peddie's excellent book "Hannibal's War," Rome's walls measured some seven miles around, definitely making it extremely difficult for Hannibal's army (roughly 44,000 men after Cannae) to circumvallate or assault the entire city. The population of able-bodied men inside might possibly have outnumbered Hannibal's own army, and the Romans very likely could have raised an army as large as Hannibal's to oppose the besiegers. It's also important to note that when Hannibal attacked Saguntum in Spain, he probably had about 120,000 men in his army, many of whom were reliable veterans instead of questionable troops like the Gauls and Italians in his army after Cannae. Not to mention that the siege of Saguntum took eight months, and there were no Roman legions outside the city to oppose Hannibal. It appears that Hannibal's grand strategy really involved drawing all of Rome's allies away from the Latin confederacy, while awaiting reinforcements from Africa (by sea) and Spain (Hasdrubal by land). His Italian allies proved fickle, his subordinate generals in Italy fared poorly when entrusted with their own armies, and Carthage failed to send adequate reinforcements by sea. Even his brother Hasdrubal was slow to arrive in Italy, due to his setbacks against Publius and Gnaeus Scipio. Even after defeating the two Scipios at the battles of Ilorca and Castulo in 211 BC, Hasdrubal failed to mobilize an army for Italy before Scipio Africanus arrived with his own troops and took Nova Carthago. By the time Hasdrubal did arrive, his army was a shadow of its former glory, having been defeated a year earlier at the battle of Baecula, and consisting largely of unreliable Gauls and Ligurians. All the factors mentioned earlier (and others) caused the Carthaginian grand strategy to fail, even though Hannibal for his part did what was necessary. This post might have been a little long, sorry. I'd really enjoy hearing some other takes on the subject. My theories might have some holes in them, and I always like hearing other opinions on this topic.