barca
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Posts posted by barca
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No they couldn't, not against a legionary. You see, the hoplon was absolutely horrible for sword combat and the kopis was inferior to gladius, also it was too short to be really effective slashing sword.
How was the hoplon inferior to the scutum? Round shields were also used by the Saxons and Vikings, who used swords effectively (when they weren't swinging their battle axes).
Below is a fairly detailed account of the Gladius, with comparisons to the xiphos and kopis. It appears that one of the reasons why the Gladius became so widespread was its ease of manufacture. The xiphos was capable of cutting and thrusting effectively against bronze armor.
http://www.myarmoury.com/feature_ironempire.html
What kind of sword did the phalangites use at Cynoscephalae? Whatever it was, it wasn't very effective against the Romans.
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One thing we can thank Mithridates for is the quote Vedi veni veci. If it weren't for him, Farnacles would never of been born and Caesar wouldn't of had anyone to annhilate at Zela in 47BC, thus never imparting that brilliant one liner upon us/QUOTE] .
Caesars quote shouid also be taken in perspective, He was not immune from the "Alexander envy" that characterized many of the Hellenistic despots. One of his memorable quotes goes something like this 'Do you think,' said he, 'I have not just cause to weep, when I consider that Alexander at my age had conquered so many nations, and I have all this time done nothing that is memorable?'-Plutarch
What better way of dealing with the inferiority complex than by denigrating Alexander's exploits. By pointing out how easy it was for him to vanquish an eastern foe, he was questioning the credibility of all those who claimed themselves as "the great". whether they were Pompey, Mithridates, Antiochus, or even Alexander. Essentially he was proclaiming himself as a cut above the rest when he said "i came, I saw, I conquered" He was fortunate in that he never had to face the Parthians.
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The later Hellenistic foes (especially the Makedonians) became increasingly lacking in cavalry, and as a result had to rely nearly completely on the phalanx as an offensive force much as their ancestors of centuries before had done (also as a result of this, the phalangites came to be armed more like the hoplites of old). They became very different from the diverse, more cavalry-focused Greek armies of the early Hellenistic period.
I've heard that explanation before. There is more to it than that.
The Macedonians at Pydna and Cynoscephae are examples of what you are talking about. But what about the battle of Magnesia? Here the Hellenistic army had an overwhelming superiority in cavalry and it didn't seem to help them. One could probably say the same thing about the "hellenistic" armies of Mthridates. They too had superiority in cavalry, but were easily beaten by Sulla.
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I doubt the large part of Hannibal's army adopted the legion tactics except for the few "ex"-roman allies that did go over to his side. When speaking of Hannibal's maneuverability it is generally assumed ( by me certainly) to be reffering to Hannibal's superioity in cavalry. The Numidians being the best cavalry available anywhere at the time. If you examine the confrontation between the carthaginians and romans at Illipa where cavalry didn't play a great role, the flexibilty of the legionary system clearly checkmates the carthaginians.
Hannibals maneuverability was certainly enhanced by his superiority in cavalry, especially when you consider that the Roman legions were not very strong in cavalry. At the battle of Cannae they played a significant role in driving off the Roman cavalry and sealing off the trap. A more important task was carried out by the African infantry, which advanced in columns on the flanks, and the suddenly turned inwards on the advancing Romans. This clearly showed better mobility of Hannibals infantry-- not the one-dimensional approach of the phalanx at Pydna or Cynoscephalae. Could this maneuver be carried ou by a phalnx formation? If it is well trained, I would say yes. The Swiss routinely advanced their pike formations in columns. Contrary to popular belief, it is possible for a phalanx to maintain its hedge of pikes in more than one direction.
I doubt that the Numidians were the best cavalry available anywhere in their time.
They had light armor and they carried a javelin, making them most effective as skirmishers. They neither had the severe shock effect of heavy cavalry nor the range of horse-archers. Alexander's companion cavalry made short work of Persian javelin-throwing cavalry. The shock effect of the heavy Macedonian cavalry with their 13 ft. Xystons was too much for them. There were many other heavy cavalry (cataphracts) at that time. Even the Scythians had a certain percentage of their cavalry armed as heavy lancers.
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[The Manipular Legion evolve? No, I'd said later Roman victories had more to do with the ebbing of Greek tactical science.
Do you care to elaborate on that? Are you saying that the later Macedonian Phalanxes were different than the ones that were led by Pyrrhus? How much science did Pyrrhus use? His cavalry was not able to make a difference--it was neutralized by the Roman cavalry, and the Romans were certainly not renowned for their cavalry. He had to rely on elephants to tip the balance. as you know, elephants not always reliable, since they can turn againts their own army when they lose control. He did OK with them on the first two battles, but they really turned against him on the third one.
Pyrrhus did not have to face legonaires that were armed with the Gladius. It is unlikely that the Romans used the Gladius prior to the Second Punic War. Polybius description of the use of the Gladius by Romans agaist Macedonians suggests that it was a key factor in their victories.
Hmm, doubtful Xanthippus would've ushered in hoplite tactics. By this time, Sparta had certainly made the transition to a phalangite-based phalanx, so if indeed he was a Spartan, he would likely have used phalangites anyway.
Are you sure about that? I find it difficult to find to find detailed information on the later Spartan military. If you have any definitive sources, please let me know.
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The Legion versus Phalanx debate always uses the example of the legion against the Macedonian phalanx. Little if any attention is given to Legion versus Hoplite Phalanx.
In the war against Pyrrhus they were pretty evenly matched. The legions subsequently evoved so that they won easily at Cynoscephale, Pydna, and Magnesia, Once the llegionaires got past the hedge of spears and got in close, the Macedonian phalanx didn't stand a chance.
The Macedonian phalangites were hindered by the long two-handed Sarissa: they could only carry a very small shield, they had lighter armor, and carried an inferior sword.
These hoplites of a traditionan pre-Macedonian phalanx were much different. They carried a shorter one-handed spear. They could therefore carry the larger Hoplon shield. It appears that they also had heavier armor and greaves. Their traditional hoplite sword ws 2ft long and was good for both cutting and thrusting. Some carried the Kopis, a heavy slashing sword. They were certainly able to take care of themselves at close quarters.
During the 2nd Punic War, the Carthaginians hired a Spartan Mercenary to train their troops. He put together a phalanx that easily defeated the Roman legions at the Battle of Tunis. Polybius does not go into detail about the makeup of this particular phalanx, but I would assume that it was the Hoplite-style phalanx.
It is not clear what formations were used by Hannibals troops. Many believe that his African infantry fought in traditional phalanx formation. Others have suggested that his formations had to be more like a legion--how else could his armies have been so maneuverable?
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The battle of Adrianople (378 AD) is generally regarde as the critical evnet in the fall of the Roman Empire in the West. Yet the Goths were in no position to march on Rome or even Constantinople after their victory. It was the army of the Eastern Emperor (Valens) which was defeated, but it was Rome and not Constantinople that was sacked in 410 AD - at least one generation later. The Eastern side was saved from that humiliation till 1204 when the crusaders sacked it.
Was Adrianople really the turning point? Why were the Romans unable to recover from the defeat?
Throughout Rome's history, there were numerous unexpected military disasters from which the Romans bounced back. Why was this disaster different?
Let's look at some of the disasters of the Republic and the Empire
I Republic
390 BC River Allia: Gauls rout Roman Army and subsequently sack Rome
218-216 BC Hannibal inflicts numerous defeats--most notably Cannae
105 BC Arausio: Teutones and Cimbri destroy a Roman army
70-73 BC Spartacus runs amoc in Italy, defeating several Roman armies.
53 BC Crassus defeated at Carrhae.
The scariest of the above was Arausio. The loss of Roman lives was probably greater than at Adrianople. These Germanic tribes were ready to ravage and plunder. If not for Marius' heroics, who knows if Rome would have been been able to survive.
II Empire:
9 AD Teutoberg Wald
85 AD Dacians threaten Rome--eventually conquered by Trajan
167 AD Macromani and Quadi reach Northern Italy--eventually beaten back
252 AD Decius defeated and killed by Goths
260 AD Valerian captured by Shapur
268 AD Goths sack Thrace and Greece
270 AD Aurelian abandons Dacia
363 AD Julian dies in Eastern Campaign
The evacuation of Dacia doesn't get as much attention as it deserves. Here the Romans just handed over Trajan's prize to the Goths. Not a whole lot different from letting them cross the Danube about 100 years later.
After all of these adverse events, the Empire was able consolidate it's resources, and stabilize it's frontier over and over again. Why were they not able to rebuld after Adrianople? Was it Theodosius' fault? I don't know what he did to deserve the title "The Great". He had some success against the Goths, but he did not fully subjugate them. Instead he gave them autonomy and used them to do some of his dirty work--a short-term solution to a long-term problem.
Here is the big question. What could the Romans have done after Adrianople to prevent the Goths from taking over? Should they have refrained from using them to fight their battles for them? Did they have a choice?
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Is it safe to assume that they did not have the Gladius prior to the 2nd Punic War? Is there any evidence that they used it in the 1st Punic War? If not, did the Roman army at the start of the 2nd Punic War have the Gladius? Was it the Roman campaigns in Spain (Scipio) that introduced the Gladius?
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There were so many other factors that contributed to Crassus' defeat by the parthians though. His inferiority in cavalry certainly, but more so his downright shocking deciscion making.
There are plenty of examples where a roman army that was infantry heavy defeated an army relying on it's cavalry superiority - they had tactics for just such a situation - just ask Pompieus Magnus
Pharsalus is a classic example of how a smaller Roman army was able to defeat another (Roman) army that had vast superiority in cavalry. Pompey's army was thrown together hastily. Much of his infantry was made up of eastern contingents-how well trained they were in Roman tactics is not all that clear. It looked like Caesar was up against another one of those Hellenistic combined-arms forces.
In these fromations, the mobility of the cavalry is limited by it's responsibility in protecting the infantry. It doesen't have the luxury of moving in and out, as the Parthians could. If they run off the field (as they did at Pharsalus), they leave the infantry exposed. Would the same thing have happened to Alexander's companion cavalry if they had to face on of Caesar's armies?
Do you know of any specific battles in which the Romans were able to decisively beat a horse-archer force like the Scythians or Parthians?
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[He may have been one of the many powerful classical figures who suffered from 'Alexander envy'. He spoke maybe 20 languages, and was a leader of mercurial talent, but his military ability was moderate at best. He set himself a goal that was not only beyond his ability, but beyond his resources.
He was certainly a prominent figure in Roman history, but if he had never been given the appellation 'the Great', I would have never wondered why.
Thanks, Spartan JKM
I have always been perplexed by the "ineptitude" of Mithridates and the Hellenistic kingdoms against the Romans. As pointed out earlier, their large combined-arms forces were easily defeated by much smaller Roman armies.
Were there armies really that bad or were they up against a foe (Romans) that not even Alexander could have succeeded against? If the Romans had not gotten involved in the east, could Mithradates or Antiochus have equaled Alexander's conquests? Mithradates did emulate Alexander in defeating the Scythians - not an easy task. I doubt the Romans could have easily beat the Scythians, considering what their cousins (Parthians) did to Crassus.
It is easy to say that the later Hellenistic armies were inferior to those of Alexander because of their poor performance against the Roman Legion. Maybe Alexander's armies looked good because their opposition was so bad. Anyone can be a great conqueror against lesser opponents. When looking at the Battle of Magnesia, Antiochus was not able to use the classic hammer and anvil tactic despite numerical superiority in cavalry. Was this really his fault or was it just a better army he was up against, that prevented him from carrying out an effective plan. Mithridates also had superiority in cavalry, but was unable to make use of it. What would Alexander have done against the Roman Army?
It seems that the Romans did well against combined-arms forces, but not so well against horse archers. It's almost as though the hellenistic infantry was a hindrance instead of a help, by taking away the hit-and-run option that a pure cavalry force has.
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Archelaus, a Cappadocian, was decisively defeated by Sulla twice, as Hamilcar Barca stated, but he did subjugate Bithynia and much of Greece during the 1st Mithridatic War. When commissioned by Mithridates do negotiate peace with Rome, he turned coat and aided Lucius Licinius Lucullus in the 3rd Mithridatic War, which lasted from 73-71 B.C. Lucullus had Pontus under Roman rule by 70 B.C.
Mithridates VI 'the Great' (Eupator Dionysius) of Pontus was probably Rome's most dangerous enemy in the last century B.C. Exploiting Rome's vulnerability during the Social War (91-87 B.C.), he took over Cappadocia and Bithynia, and shortly afterwards overwhelmed the army of Manius Aquillius. He was admonished by Sulla to stay in Pontus, and to be 'Friend and Ally of Rome'. He responded by repelling Roman forces (he may have been provoked), precipitating the 2nd Mithridatic War, which he won after consolidating his hold on Pontus and territories to the north. He enlisted the aid of pirates in the Black Sea. It was during the 3rd War he collaborated with Quintus Sertorius, the redoubtable Sabine knight of Iberia. But Mithridates suffered from handicaps, of which a couple were of his own bad doing: he was reputedly too cruel, even for the standards of his time, to gain the unwavering support necessary to defeat, or even check, Rome. He was indeed passionate in his opposition to the Romans, thinking himself a liberator of Rome's Greek subjects, calling himself 'the Deliverer'. Pompey vanquished him in 66 B.C. at Dastira (later Nicopolis in NW Greece). He had himself killed by a slave 3 years later, as he couldn't dispatch himself poison; he was too injured form constant consumptions of antidotes. He was reputedly trying to enable his body impervious to poison - or something like that.
Mithridatism would come to be known as the practice of taking increasing sub-lethal doses of the poison until one was able to tolerate lethal doses. Both the literary scholars Albert Housman and Jorge Luis Borges alluded to Mithridates in their poetry works.
He may have been one of the many powerful classical figures who suffered from 'Alexander envy'. He spoke maybe 20 languages, and was a leader of mercurial talent, but his military ability was moderate at best. He set himself a goal that was not only beyond his ability, but beyond his resources.
He was certainly a prominent figure in Roman history, but if he had never been given the appellation 'the Great', I would have never wondered why.
Thanks, Spartan JKM
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I am interested in knowing when was the first recorded use of the gladius by a Roman Army. They were certainly using it during the 2nd Punic War. Most sources state that it originated from the Spanish or Iberian sword, but when did the Romans first start using it?
Battle Of Tunis
in Gloria Exercitus - 'Glory of the Army'
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Very enlightening description of the hoplon. Were all of the hoplons held in that manner? Dropping the shield would endanger your neighbor more than yourself. Is that why it was disgrace for them to return without their shield?
What about the round Saxon shield. Was it better in individual combat, but less effective in phalanx formation?