Describe A Battle

[Spartan JKM]

How about the Battle of Zama, a crossroads of history and a clash of titans?

 

With Rome's triumph in the 2nd Punic War, the empire beyond Italy was under way; all the wealth of Iberia, Sicily, and the African provinces subjugated would now provide funds (and luxuries) to conquer the Hellenized East. Trade was under the control of Roman ships and goods. However, democracy would weaken and the ultra stable agricultural infrastructure was inexorably disrupted. But that's another topic.

 

The Battle of Zama (or Naragarra or Margaron), like much of antiquity for that matter, presents ground for modern speculation. Polybius was a fine historian who wanted to establish the truth of events, but though we might expect him to have been hostile to the Romans for causing him to be exiled from his own country, he did work and live under the patronage of the Scipionic circle. This meant he was in a very favorable situation to understand how the Roman political and military systems worked. He could be critical of Roman actions, such as their seizure of Sardinia in the wake of Carthage's 'Mercenary War', but his absorbing interest as to why Rome came to be the dominant power in his world certainly led him to see things through Roman eyes.

 

Scipio was a brilliant general, evidenced here at Zama by the fact he knew he had the better army (particularly the cavalry arm), thus by not making any major mistakes, Hannibal could not exploit anything. His countering of the elephants was masterly, but the elephant drivers were trained to kill them if they became unmanageable. Killing an out-of-control elephant with a hammer and spike was no child's play, but it did not take years for men to learn this. Only Livy writes of this Carthaginian tactic, and only with regards to Hasdrubal Barca. But that doesn't mean Hannibal didn't undertake this countering practice. It would make sense that he did.

 

However, I disagree with anyone who claims Hannibal did anything 'stupid' at Zama. Actually, it is quite the contrary. To use the hastily-levied elephants in such numbers as a shock force was, in my opinion, the most prudent decision. Please try to remember that Hannibal certainly knew all about the strengths and liabilities of these pachyderms - certainly more than Scipio. He probably hoped they would do their stuff, but he could easily have known they would do exactly what they did do - swerve out to the flanks and disrupt things, which would aid his possible plan of deception of sacrificing his inferior cavalry to lure the better Roman/Numidian contingent away from the battlefield. He had done such things before with feigned withdrawals etc. (the ager Falernus, the Rhone, Tarentum). Moreover, there is nothing to indicate that the 45-47 year old Hannibal had lost any of his touch. I'll explain in a bit.

 

For the most part, I feel Livy and Appian take a back seat to Polybius. We don't know exactly the relative strengths of the 2 armies, but many feel that Hannibal did not outnumber Scipio as much as the ancients claimed. Remember, ths was a frontal engagement - no flank arttacks or oblique lines etc. - and though Scipio's army was more experienced (except Hannibal's 3rd line) and of higher quality, this wasn't Alexander against the motley levies of Asia, Caesar's X or XIII Legion against the unweildy Gauls, or even Belisarius' famed bucellarii against city mobs and Vandals. There is no way Scipio would have been hanging on in the final stages of the battle if his infantry had been outnumbered significantly, such as 50,000 vs. 23,000 or so as Appian claims.

 

Basically the armies were as follows:

 

Scipio: approx. 34,000 infantry and 6,100 cavalry.

 

Hannibal: approx. 40,000 infantry, 80 elephants, and 4,000 cavalry.

 

I'll be glad to explain how I surmised tese numbers if one asks. Both great generals took risks with their movements before the battle, Scipio to avoid fighting while without Masinissa (he endangered his communications and risked a flank attack), and Hannibal to bring on the battle in an attempt to interpose between Scipio and Masinissa (he wasn't fully prepared). Fortune was with Scipio when Masinissa arrived with 10,000 (10 Roman cohorts of infantry) men before Hannibal could intercept either one them.

 

Let's take a look at the Battle of Zama from Polybius Book 15.12-15,

 

"...When all was ready for battle on both sides, the Numidian horse having been skirmishing with each other for some time, Hannibal ordered the drivers of the elephants to charge the enemy. When the trumpets and bugles sounded shrilly from all sides, some of the animals took fright and at once turned tail and rushed back upon the Numidians who had come up to help the Carthaginians, and Massanissa attacking simultaneously, the Carthaginian left wing was soon left exposed. The rest of the elephants falling on the Roman velites in the space between the two main armies, both inflicted and suffered much loss, until finally in their terror some of them escaped through the gaps in the Roman line with Scipio's foresight had provided, so that the Romans suffered no injury, while others fled towards the right and, received by the cavalry with showers of javelins, at length escaped out of the field. It was at this moment that Laelius, availing himself of the disturbance created by the elephants, charged the Carthaginian cavalry and forced them to headlong flight. He pressed the pursuit closely, as likewise did Massanissa. In the meanwhile both phalanxes slowly and in imposing array advanced on each other, except the troops which Hannibal had brought back from Italy, who remained in their original position. When the phalanxes were close to each other, Romans fell upon their foes, raising their war-cry and clashing their shields with their spears as is their practice, while there was a strange confusion of shouts raised by the Carthaginian mercenaries, for, as Homer says, their voice was not one, but

 

Mixed was the murmur, and confused the sound,

Their names all various,

as appears from the list of them I gave above.

 

As the whole battle was a hand-to-hand affair, the mercenaries at first prevailed by their courage and skill, wounding many of the Romans, but the latter still continued to advance, relying on their admirable order and on the superiority of their arms. The rear ranks of the Romans followed close on their comrades, cheering them on, but the Carthaginians behaved like cowards, never coming near their mercenaries nor attempting to back them up, so that finally the barbarians gave way, and thinking that they had evidently been left in the lurch by their own side, fell upon those they encountered in their retreat and began to kill them. This actually compelled many of the Carthaginians to die like men; for as they were being butchered by their own mercenaries they were obliged against their will to fight both against these and against the Romans, and as when at bay they showed frantic and extraordinary courage, they killed a considerable number both of their mercenaries and of the enemy. In this way they even threw the cohorts of the hastati into confusion, but the officers of the principes, seeing what was happening, brought up their ranks to assist, and now the greater number of the Carthaginians and their mercenaries were cut to pieces where they stood, either by themselves or by the hastati. Hannibal did not allow the survivors in their flight to mix with his own men but, ordering the foremost ranks to level their spears against them, prevented them from being received into his force. They were therefore obliged to retreat towards the wings and the open ground beyond. The space which separated the two armies still on the field was now covered with blood, slaughter, and dead bodies, and the Roman general was placed in great difficulty by this obstacle to his completing the rout of the enemy. For he saw that it would be very difficult to pass over the ground without breaking his ranks owing to the quantity of slippery corpses which were still soaked in blood and had fallen in heaps and the number of arms thrown away at haphazard. However, after conveying the wounded to the rear and recalling by bugle those of the hastati who were still pursuing the enemy, he stationed the latter in the fore part of the field of battle, opposite the enemy's centre, and making the principes and triarii close up on both wings ordered them to advance over the dead. When these troops had surmounted the obstacles and found themselves in a line with the hastati the two phalanxes closed with the greatest eagerness and ardour. As they were nearly equal in numbers as well as in spirit and bravery, and were equally well armed, the contest was for long doubtful, the men falling where they stood out of determination, and Massanissa and Laelius, returning from the pursuit of the cavalry, arrived providentially at the proper moment. When they fell on Hannibal's army from the rear, most of the men were cut down in their ranks, while of those who took to flight only quite a few escaped, as the cavalry were close on them and the country was level. More than fifteen hundred Romans fell, the Carthaginian loss amounting to twenty thousand killed and nearly the same number of prisoners.

 

Such was the result of the final battle between Scipio and Hannibal, the battle which decided the war in favor of Rome..."

 

OK. Breakdown time

 

We have to assign the motives of Hannibal and Scipio where Polybius does not.

 

Hannibal was weaker in cavalry and numerically stronger in infantry. Thus he would aim at a decision by his infantry (for the first time). His cavalry would have little hope of success, so he would somehow want to nullify the superior Roman/Numidian cavalry while his infantry won the day. Hannibal's use of 3 independent lines compensated to a degree for the lack of time in which to blend the varied elements into a homogenous command structure.

 

Scipio would need to handle the elephants first. He probably learned from Regulus' failure in 255 B.C., in which the elephants were attempted to be absorbed by infantry mass from doubling the intervals. The part that somewhat worked for Regulus, though probably inadvertantly, at Tunes was by abandoning the checkerboard formation, lanes were created, which created a line of least resistence for the elephants. But he was far outmatched in cavalry that day 53 years earlier. Scipio achieved the nullification of the elephant charge by creating lanes and deafening noise from bugles and trumpets (and probably exuding screams from his troops). Now he would doubtless attempt, in some form or another, his tactics which had worked brilliantly before, with increased efficiency, at Baecula, Ilipa, and the Great Plains. Overall, Scipio would attempt to expose Hannibal's wings with his superior cavalry squadrons, hold the enemy's first line, and send out his principes and triarii to outflank Hannibal.

 

But Hannibal adopted a Roman-style triple-line, and placed his 3rd line, his best, about 200 yards behind the 2nd. When his first 2 lines advanced, he evidently ordered his 3rd to stand fast. This could be the very first 'true reserve' in the history of warfare, and this disposition immediately thwarted Scipio from any outflanking maneuver.

 

I think Hannibal did indeed order his cavalry units to give ground in order to draw their counterparts off the field. Adrian Goldsworthy disagrees, but the likes of H.H. Scullard, J. Kromayer, and G. Veith all think so. J.F. Lazenby thinks it is likely. However, Hannibal was taking a risk by doing so, because it still involved their defeat, and the Roman/Numidian cavalry could return before he had finished off Scipio's smaller body of infantry. But he had to do something, and I don't think if they had held their ground they would have lasted long. Scipio had superior cavalry and proved his adeptness with 'boomerang' style tactics. Hannibal was a student of war, and a master of simple and double bluff. He knew his history, particularly that of the Hellenistic kingdoms (he had Greek tutors). He knew what happened to Antigonus when his son, Demetrius Poliorcetes, went off in pursuit of Seleucus' cavalry at the great battle of Ipsus in 301 B.C. Do you think Scipio ordered his cavalry to merely ride out and ride back in the manner they did? Why didn't Scipio try a flank maneuver, as Hannibal had done at Cannae? He was certainly capable. True, cavalry was notoriously difficult to control, but let me offer Professor H.H. Scullard's credible statement from his terrific Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician pg. 150,

 

"...Since it would take longer to convert a nominal into an actual flight than to drive a defeated enemy off the field, and since in fact the Roman cavalry only returned in the nick of time, it seems more probable that the Carthaginians deliberatley drew them away.

After getting rid of the Roman cavalry, though with little hope that his own could rally against them, Hannibal would throw all his weight against Scipio's numerically inferior enemy. The elephant charge, with which he had hoped to confuse his foe, miscarried somewhat, partly through Scipio's foresight in leaving gaps in his line for the animals to run through, partly because they were always of rather doubtful quality, and here fell afoul of the Carthaginian cavalry. However, they cannot have done great harm to their own side, since their drivers had the means of killing them if they got out of hand..."

 

I would like to add to Scullard's theory - Polybius only mentions it was Hannibal's left flank that was disrupted by scattered elephants. On the right flank he tells us that the scattered elephants, "...at length escaped out of the field. It was at this moment that Laelius, availing himself of the disturbance created by the elephants, charged the Carthaginian cavalry and forced them to headlong flight...". How did Gaius Laelius so easily send the Carthaginian cavaly, though green but not outnumbered (assuming Masinissa's 4,000-strong was not interdispersed with the Romans), into flight? The flight seemed immediate! The answer is they were most likely ordered to give ground.

 

B.H. Liddell Hart says on pg. 179 of his renowned Scipio Africanus: Greater Than Napoleon, "...Both Hannibal's flanks were thus stripped bare. The decisive maneuver of Cannae was repeated, but reversed..."

 

No, Sir Basil, with all due respect, Scipio's cavalry were off the battlefield too (Hannibal's cavalry squadrons never left the battlefield at Cannae), and Hannibal's disposed 3rd line prevented any outmaneuvering from Scipio's legions. This was entirely different from Cannae with the cavalry, as Scipio did not attempt any bold maneuvers. Perhaps he took the very open terrain into account. Scipio was not in a substantial favorable position whatsoever at this point.

 

Back to the possible intentions of the 2 generals, Hannibal prevented any outflanking by Scipio's infantry because of his disposed 3rd line being held back. If Scipio did not realize this in time and was too imbroiled in the fighting to make any changes, then his attack would be against the first 2 of Hannibal's lines, and when that was spent, Hannibal could attack with his fresh veterans, hopefully delivering a decisive blow as his cavalry was holding off Masinissa and Laelius.

 

Alternativley, if Scipio did realize Hannibal's trap of making him fight towards the 3rd line (thus blunting his energy and weapons) in time and forced to forget about any outflanking possibility, Hannibal was in no worse position, because Scipio would rely on the traditional Roman method of 3 supporting lines whose weight would fall on Hannibal's first 2 lines, after which the weary legionnaires would have to advance against Hannibal's intact 3rd line.

 

In my opinion, with the exception of the elephants, things were not going badly for Hannibal. His 1st line, the remnants of Mago's army, fought bravely against the hastati. However, according to Polybius, they received no support from the 2nd line, who 'acted like cowards'. It is likely that Polybius is wrong, and the 2nd line didn't support the 1st not from cowardice but because they were ordered not to at this point. Hannibal was attempting to keep his 3 lines as distinct as possible, with each line being thrown in separately. It was a sound plan, but the mercenaries of the 1st line turned against the 2nd line. If Polybius' account of the fierce struggle between the first 2 of Hannibal's lines is taken at face value, this incident may have been, as Georg Veith suggests, a stroke of fortune that saved Scipio and wrecked Hannibal's plan. By this time, if not a little sooner, Scipio certainly knew that he couldn't outflank Hannibal in face of the Carthaginian's well-disposed 3rd line. Thus he was challenged by the task of fighting a purely frontal engagement, in which Hannibal's chances were greater. Hannibal's first 2 lines, in cooperation, would have forced Scipio to use all his ranks. But they turned on each other, which Scipio prudently exploited by not commiting the bulk of his principes and none of his triarii, and then breaking off the battle to reorganize. Presumably many of the remnants, perhaps just a handful, of his first 2 lines had fled to his wings and were regrouped and implemented into the 3rd line.

 

Again, Hannibal was hoping that as many Romans as possible became involved at this juncture with his first 2 lines, so that he could use his 3rd line to deliver a devastating blow before Scipio's cavalry returned.

 

A couple of diificulties about Polybius' account come up. What happened after the clash between the mercenaries (1st line) and the Carthaginian militia (2nd line)? Polybius says, "...the greater number of the Carthaginians and their mercenaries were cut to pieces where they stood, either by themselves or by the hastati...", in other words, only Hannibal's veterans were left? This is not possible because if Hannibal's veterans stood alone and uncommited, he would not have needed time to reorganize, as his accepting (or permitting?) of the pause suggests. Moreover, Polybius' earlier statement is now contradicted by his later claim that, "...As they were nearly equal in numbers as well as in spirit and bravery, and were equally well armed, the contest was for long doubtful...", which could not have been so if nearly all the first 2 lines of Hannibal's had been scattered. Oh well, call me a nitpicker

 

Maybe Polybius meant the mercenaries alone, or simply exaggerated 'the greater part' of the Carthaginians. What is probable is that the hastati, and but a small portion of the principes, did not completely defeat Hannibal's first 2 lines, numbering some 20,000+ men.

 

The role played by Scipio's 2nd line, the principes, is a little cloudy. If Polybius means, "...the officers of the principes, seeing what was happening, brought up their ranks to assist..., that the principes aided the hastati in the normal manner, this would mean that both lines moved forward, which would explain the recovery of the hastati and the subsequent flight of Hannibal's first 2 lines. But Polybius later tells us, "... after conveying the wounded to the rear and recalling by bugle those of the hastati who were still pursuing the enemy...". Just the hastati. Mmmmm. Maybe we can asssume Polybius meant the principes kept close to the hastati during the intial advance, then halted and the hastati went on alone.

 

The hastati seemed to have got into a precarious position in pursuing the broken lines of Hannibal's poorer troops, which Hannibal was forcing out to the flanks of his 3rd line. They were dangerously exposed upon coming face to face with Hannibal and his veterans. Scipio had to relieve them quickly! They didn't follow the scattered mercenaries and Carthagininas because we later find them in the center when Scipio extended his entire body of infantry. They were recalled and Scipio reorganized his line. This is where Roman cohesion and discipline came into play. But Hannibal showed sound judgment by not immediately attacking the isolated hastati (perhaps a few principes); this would have entailed committing his last troops into the fight while Scipio had nearly 2 lines intact, which could now outflank him. Thus he was ready for a pause to reorganize too. The battlefield impeded both armies as it was encumbered with bodies and slippery with blood. An advance now had to be carried out carefully.

 

Scipio now lengthened his line by bringing up his rear ranks on the flanks of the hastati, with the gaps between the maniples closed up. There was now no need for Scipio to keep any intervals between his maniples, as the final blow with Hannibal's 3rd line should be as concentrated as possible, thus no seperate engagements were necessary. Depth was now of lesser value than maximizing his missile power upon Hannibal's last line. This was superb generalship, and Scipio was clearly making allowances for his (presumably) returning cavalry. He needed to be quick because Hannibal, solidifying his deeper line of veterans and remnanats of the 1st 2 lines, would have an advantage in a prolonged infantry clash at this point. Scipio could still not outflank him. The Carthaginian horse, whose commander we do not know, and Numidians under Tychaeus seemed to be (somewhat) achieving some success at keeping the superior enemy horses away from the infantry action. Remember, if it wasn't the case, and we'll never know for sure, that Hannibal did not sacrifice his horses to lure Scipio's cavalry units away, then this was not very measured leadership on the part of Scipio, Laelius, and Masinissa. It would have been similar to Rupert's pursuit at Naseby in 1645, who chased the Parliamentarian dragoons too far, thus his return was too belated to aid the Royalists' cause against Oliver Cromwell.

 

The infantry clash commenced, with the 2 great generals at the helm of 2 great units in a front-to-front slugfest. We can never know for sure who had the 'upper hand' here, but Hannibal's line of his veterans was deeper, so via deductive logic, Scipio would have been broken up. But if he wasn't waiting for the returning cavalry, his dispositions would have been different. He must have smiled form ear to ear when the approaching sound of hooves and rising dust of the desert were being caused by the thundering return of Gaius Laelius and Masinissa. They took Hannibal's veterans in the rear, and rolled them up. Hannibal, with a small escort of cavalry, fled to Hadrumentum. It is very ironic that many of the Cannae legions, whom Scipio levied in Sicily some 4 years earlier, were involved in one of Rome's greatest victory.

 

Polybius does give Hannibal some praise when he wrote in his Book 15.16,

 

"...Hannibal had shown incomparable skill in adopting at the critical moment all such measures as were in his power and could reasonably be expected to succeed...".

 

However, a couple of sentences later he writes,

 

"...For there are times when Fortune counteracts the plans of valiant men, and again at times, as the proverb says, 'A brave man meets another braver yet', as we may say happened in the case of Hannibal..."

 

Scipio 'braver' than Hannibal? Is that a fair, objective thing to state? Maybe Polybius didn't mean that by a modern interpretation. This was written 2 1/2 millenia ago, so much distortion could have filtered in down the ages.

 

Again, Scipio displayed brilliant generalship by not trying to do too much; he merely defending his advantage, but it worked. Hannibal tried to wear him down, but he was able to engage Hannibal's veterans with about 3/5 of his infantry hitherto uncommited. But like our own civil war (I am an American), the better general did not necessarily win, in my opinion. I am bias though; I think Hannibal was a remarkable leader, and his plight against such a dour foe for nearly 2 decades, in which he received only grudging support from home, was exemplary.

 

Thanks, Spartan JKM

Edited January 28, 2006 by Spartan JKM

[Neos Dionysos]

The Battle of Naissus

 

In 268AD, Pannonia, the Goths had invaded Roman territory the yeaar before and were devastating the land. Emperor Gallienus responded quickly and defeated them in the spring, but due to his constant challenges to the throne was unable to fully expel them. In the autumn of that year he led another attack with furture emperor's Aurelian leading the Cavalry and Claudius II leading the infantry. This battle broke the back of the Goths and they lost around 50000 soldiers and took thousands prisoner. Unable to completely destroy the Gothic threat due to yet another ursuper claiming the throne, Gallienus had to leave his seige of the remaining Goths and they broke out of the Roman containment and escaped over the Danube back to safety out of Roman lands. The Goths at one time threatened Rome herself and Galleinus, dispite having to deal with break off kingdoms and empires and constant challenges to his rule was able to exact a terrible cost onto the Goths in the battle and as they retreated they lost even more. This was indeed an astounding victory, especially since Rome was still in the middle of its crisis.

[Virgil61]

How about the Battle of Zama, a crossroads of history?

 

...

 

Thanks, Spartan JKM

 

Spartan, the blue quoted portions are difficult to read. Maybe I'm the only one with that problem.

[Pertinax]

How about the Battle of Zama, a crossroads of history?

 

...

 

Thanks, Spartan JKM

 

Spartan, the blue quoted portions are difficult to read. Maybe I'm the only one with that problem.

 

No your not! Could you change it please Spartan? Id like to read the full post!

[Neos Dionysos]

I can read it fine... and so I'll be happy to redo it...

 

1st "blue" passage.

 

Let's take a look at the Battle of Zama from Polybius Book 15.12-15,

 

"...When all was ready for battle on both sides, the Numidian horse having been skirmishing with each other for some time, Hannibal ordered the drivers of the elephants to charge the enemy. When the trumpets and bugles sounded shrilly from all sides, some of the animals took fright and at once turned tail and rushed back upon the Numidians who had come up to help the Carthaginians, and Massanissa attacking simultaneously, the Carthaginian left wing was soon left exposed. The rest of the elephants falling on the Roman velites in the space between the two main armies, both inflicted and suffered much loss, until finally in their terror some of them escaped through the gaps in the Roman line with Scipio's foresight had provided, so that the Romans suffered no injury, while others fled towards the right and, received by the cavalry with showers of javelins, at length escaped out of the field. It was at this moment that Laelius, availing himself of the disturbance created by the elephants, charged the Carthaginian cavalry and forced them to headlong flight. He pressed the pursuit closely, as likewise did Massanissa. In the meanwhile both phalanxes slowly and in imposing array advanced on each other, except the troops which Hannibal had brought back from Italy, who remained in their original position. When the phalanxes were close to each other, Romans fell upon their foes, raising their war-cry and clashing their shields with their spears as is their practice, while there was a strange confusion of shouts raised by the Carthaginian mercenaries, for, as Homer says, their voice was not one, but

 

Mixed was the murmur, and confused the sound,

Their names all various,

as appears from the list of them I gave above.

 

As the whole battle was a hand-to-hand affair, the mercenaries at first prevailed by their courage and skill, wounding many of the Romans, but the latter still continued to advance, relying on their admirable order and on the superiority of their arms. The rear ranks of the Romans followed close on their comrades, cheering them on, but the Carthaginians behaved like cowards, never coming near their mercenaries nor attempting to back them up, so that finally the barbarians gave way, and thinking that they had evidently been left in the lurch by their own side, fell upon those they encountered in their retreat and began to kill them. This actually compelled many of the Carthaginians to die like men; for as they were being butchered by their own mercenaries they were obliged against their will to fight both against these and against the Romans, and as when at bay they showed frantic and extraordinary courage, they killed a considerable number both of their mercenaries and of the enemy. In this way they even threw the cohorts of the hastati into confusion, but the officers of the principes, seeing what was happening, brought up their ranks to assist, and now the greater number of the Carthaginians and their mercenaries were cut to pieces where they stood, either by themselves or by the hastati. Hannibal did not allow the survivors in their flight to mix with his own men but, ordering the foremost ranks to level their spears against them, prevented them from being received into his force. They were therefore obliged to retreat towards the wings and the open ground beyond. The space which separated the two armies still on the field was now covered with blood, slaughter, and dead bodies, and the Roman general was placed in great difficulty by this obstacle to his completing the rout of the enemy. For he saw that it would be very difficult to pass over the ground without breaking his ranks owing to the quantity of slippery corpses which were still soaked in blood and had fallen in heaps and the number of arms thrown away at haphazard. However, after conveying the wounded to the rear and recalling by bugle those of the hastati who were still pursuing the enemy, he stationed the latter in the fore part of the field of battle, opposite the enemy's centre, and making the principes and triarii close up on both wings ordered them to advance over the dead. When these troops had surmounted the obstacles and found themselves in a line with the hastati the two phalanxes closed with the greatest eagerness and ardour. As they were nearly equal in numbers as well as in spirit and bravery, and were equally well armed, the contest was for long doubtful, the men falling where they stood out of determination, and Massanissa and Laelius, returning from the pursuit of the cavalry, arrived providentially at the proper moment. When they fell on Hannibal's army from the rear, most of the men were cut down in their ranks, while of those who took to flight only quite a few escaped, as the cavalry were close on them and the country was level. More than fifteen hundred Romans fell, the Carthaginian loss amounting to twenty thousand killed and nearly the same number of prisoners.

 

Such was the result of the final battle between Scipio and Hannibal, the battle which decided the war in favour of Rome..."

 

2nd "blue" part... with the blue also mixed with the normal white text.

 

True, cavalry was notoriously difficult to control, but let me offer Professor H.H. Scullard's credible statement from his terrific Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician pg. 150,

 

"...Since it would take longer to convert a nominal into an actual flight than to drive a defeated enemy off the field, and since in fact the Roman cavalry only returned in the nick of time, it seems more probable that the Carthaginians deliberatley drew them away.

After getting rid of the Roman cavalry, though with little hope that his own could rally against them, Hannibal would throw all his weight against Scipio's numerically inferior enemy. The elephant charge, with which he had hoped to confuse his foe, miscarried somewhat, partly through Scipio's foresight in leaving gaps in his line for the animals to run through, partly because they were always of rather doubtful quality, and here fell afoul of the Carthaginian cavalry. However, they cannot have done great harm to their own side, since their drivers had the means of killing them if they got out of hand..."

 

I would like to add to Scullard's theory - Polybius only mentions it was Hannibal's left flank that was disrupted by scattered elephants. On the right flank he tells us that the scattered elephants, "...at length escaped out of the field. It was at this moment that Laelius, availing himself of the disturbance created by the elephants, charged the Carthaginian cavalry and forced them to headlong flight...". How did Gaius Laelius so easily send the Carthaginian cavaly, though green but not outnumbered (assuming Masinissa's 4,000-strong was not interdispersed with the Romans), into flight? The flight seemed immediate! The answer is they were most likely ordered to give ground.

 

B.H. Liddell Hart says on pg. 179 of his renowned (but extremely tendentious) Scipio Africanus: Greater Than Napoleon, "...Both Hannibal's flanks were thus stripped bare. The decisive maneuver of Cannae was repeated, but reversed..."

 

3rd "blue" passage, mixed with normal white text...

 

A couple of diificulties about Polybius' account come up. What happened after the clash between the mercenaries (1st line) and the Carthaginian militia (2nd line)? Polybius says, "...the greater number of the Carthaginians and their mercenaries were cut to pieces where they stood, either by themselves or by the hastati...", in other words, only Hannibal's veterans were left? This is not possible because if Hannibal's veterans stood alone and uncommited, he would not have needed time to reorganize, as his accepting (or permitting?) of the pause suggests. Moreover, Polybius' earlier statement is now contradicted by his later claim that, "...As they were nearly equal in numbers as well as in spirit and bravery, and were equally well armed, the contest was for long doubtful...", which could not have been so if nearly all the first 2 lines of Hannibal's had been scattered. Oh well, call me a nitpicker wink.gif

 

Maybe Polybius meant the mercenaries alone, or simply exaggerated 'the greater part' of the Carthaginians. What is probable is that the hastati, and but a small portion of the principes, did not completely defeat Hannibal's first 2 lines, numbering some 20,000+ men.

 

The role played by Scipio's 2nd line, the principes, is a little cloudy. If Polybius means, "...the officers of the principes, seeing what was happening, brought up their ranks to assist..., that the principes aided the hastati in the normal manner, this would mean that both lines moved forward, which would explain the recovery of the hastati and the subsequent flight of Hannibal's first 2 lines. But Polybius later tells us, "... after conveying the wounded to the rear and recalling by bugle those of the hastati who were still pursuing the enemy...". Mmmmm. Maybe we can asssume Polybius meant the principes kept close to the hastati during the intial advance, then halted and the hastati went on alone.

 

4th and last "blue" passage...

 

Polybius does give Hannibal some praise when he wrote in his Book 15.16,

 

"...Hannibal had shown incomparable skill in adopting at the critical moment all such measures as were in his power and could reasonably be expected to succeed...".

 

However, a couple of sentences later he writes,

 

"...For there are times when Fortune counteracts the plans of valiant men, and again at times, as the proverb says, 'A brave man meets another braver yet', as we may say happened in the case of Hannibal..."

 

That's all the blue...

Edited January 15, 2006 by Neos Dionysos

[Virgil61]

I can read it fine...

 

Yeah, wait till you hit 40.

[Neos Dionysos]

I can read it fine...

 

Yeah, wait till you hit 40.

 

 

HAHAHAHAHA!!

 

Hey, I'm 21 and I already feel like I'm 40... couple years at doing a labor intense job I think does that to you though I guess...

[Arvioustus]

It is refresing to see threads on the Roman victories , too mant historians just lament on Roman defeats. It should be obvious to note that the Roman empire was rich and desired by most. Entry had to be granted because ALL enemies lost to Rome or just fled from Rome. Those battles who Rome lost to( think perhaps all enemies one time or another) always payed the price later. Rome easily won most battles with all her adversaries except one, Hannibal, but he paid the ultimate price in the end. (interesting to note that against most others the Romans were always outnumbered but not against Hannibal!)

[Neos Dionysos]

It is refresing to see threads on the Roman victories , too mant historians just lament on Roman defeats. It should be obvious to note that the Roman empire was rich and desired by most.

 

Well, I think it is almost even, but if they do seem to focus too much on the defeats it may be because Rome had so many victories and accomplished SO much and took so much land, that a defeat is something that would be to the opposite of what you would expect and so therefore is very interesting and compelling to learn and preach about, perhaps because of their significance or the reprecussions of what happened due to the loss.

 

But I'd like to add, that one of my favorite victories and I ask how many here know about it, but the battle of "Ad Salices", mainly given the situations, the units envovled and what happened because of it.

 

So... who here knows about it w/o looking it up? Just curious...

 

This is kinda like when frankq, commented on the Sack of Corinth in 146 BC, lol... I again thank him for posting that because... I didn't know it happened...

[P.Clodius]

Some may argue the true character of a people/state is in how it handles defeat. If this is so then there can be no nation in history to rival ancient Rome. Defiance in the face of adversity is something to be admired, and the romans were the masters of defiance.

[Pantagathus]

As a big fan of Scipio Africanus

[Spartan JKM]

Spartan, the blue quoted portions are difficult to read. Maybe I'm the only one with that problem.

No your not! Could you change it please Spartan? Id like to read the full post!

 

I apologize if the blue quotes I used for quoting sources was obscure in post on Zama; I have changed it. Thank you for your interest.

 

I agree Pantagathus - Ilipa was a masterful win, and even surpasses Cannae in terms of tactical sophistication. But it was a form of defensive and deadly simplicity infantry control with which Hannibal excelled against a foe he knew was aggressive. Could Scipio have destroyed the yet uncommited African infantry by wheeling inwards with his cavalry? Where were Hasdrubal Gisgo's cavalry throughout the battle? Polybius does not tell us where they were and what they did. They must have been circumvented somehow by Scipio's brilliant maneuvers.

 

One of Scipio's victories scarcely gets mentioned - one I find significant (not to imply any engagement is trivial).

 

In 206 B.C. after the Battle of Ilipa, Scipio averted a dangerous situation when 8,000 of his men stationed on his lines of communication at Sucro, between New Carthage and Saguntum, mutinied; they were demoralized from long inactivity and deprived of the plunder needed to pay them etc. Scipio handled the whole thing splendidly, showing forgiveness to the men and dealing with the ringleaders accordingly.

 

Scipio had to turn north to the Ebro where a huge incursion was brewing with the Iberian chieftains Mandonius and Indibilis. They collected a force of some 20,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry, and marched south into the territory of the Edetani, who were loyal to Scipio, who could now also use this act, on a secondary benefit, of defiance by the chiefs to restore a sense of unity to his forces. Livy provides the figure for the numbers of the Iberian force, but no figures are given for Scipio's army.

 

This force under Mandonius and Indibilis (or Andobales) endangered the Roman lines of communication with Italy through Tarraco. Scipio had never mastered the interior of Spain, which would require years of guerilla warfare, but gained allegiance without fighting from many in the northern interior. The hostile native tribes in this area, now becoming somewhat united, would have been quite a problem with their skill in guerilla tactics. It was essential that the Iberians not be allowed to protract the rebellion by guerilla tactics. Scipio brilliantly forced a pitched battle on them on level ground by driving cattle into a level space between the opposing camps, and then sent his velites in to attack them when they started to round up the cattle. he then launched his cavalry which he had concealed. Infuriated, the Iberians deployed for battle the next day. This is exactly what Scipio wanted.

 

Polybius, The Histories Book 11.31-33:

 

"...Scipio, calling a meeting of his troops in New Carthage itself, addressed them on the subject of the daring design of Andobales and his perfidy towards them. Dealing at length with this topic he thoroughly arouse the passions of the soldiers against that prince. Enumerating in the next place all the battles in which they had previously encountered the Spaniards and Carthaginians together under the command of the Carthaginians he told them that as they had in all cases won the day, they should not now have a shadow of apprehension lest they should be beaten by the Spaniards alone under Andobales. He had therefore not consented to call in the aid of a single Spaniard, but was going to give battle with his Romans alone, that it might be evident to all that it was not due to the help of the Spaniards that they had crushed the Carthaginians and driven them out of Spain, but that they had conquered both the Carthaginians and Celtiberians by Roman valour and their own brave effort. Having said this he exhorted them to be of one mind, and if ever they marched to a battle in a spirit of confidence, to do so now. As for victory he himself with the aid of the gods would take the proper steps to secure it. His words produced such zeal and confidence in the troops, that in appearance they grew all of them like men who had the enemy before their eyes and were about to do battle with them at that instant.

 

After making this speech he dismissed the meeting. Next day he set out on the march. He reached the Ebro on the tenth day and crossing it took up on the fourth day after this a position in front of the enemy, leaving a valley between his own camp and theirs. On the following day he drove into this valley some of the cattle that followed the army, ordering Laelius to hold his cavalry in readiness and some of the tribunes to prepare the velites for action. Very soon, upon the Spaniards throwing themselves on the cattle, he sent some of the velites against them, and the engagement which ensued developed, as reinforcements came up from each side, into a sharp infantry skirmish round the valley. The opportunity was now an excellent one for attacking, and Laelius, who, as he had been ordered, was holding his cavalry in readiness, charged the enemy's skirmishers, cutting them off from the hillside, so that most of them scattered about the valley and were cut down by the horsemen. Upon this the barbarians were irritated and being in extreme anxiety lest it should be thought that this reverse at the outset had created general terror among them, they marched out in full force as soon as day dawned and drew up in order of battle. Scipio was ready for the emergency, but noticing that the Spaniards had the imprudence to descend en masse into the valley and to draw up not only their cavalry but their infantry on the level ground, he bided his time wishing that as many as possible of them should take up this position. He had great confidence in his own horse and still greater in his infantry, because in a pitched battle hand-to-hand they were much superior to the Spaniards both as regards their armament and as regards the quality of their men.

 

When he thought that conditions were as he desired he opposed his velites to the enemy who were drawn up at the foot of the hill, and himself advancing from his camp with four cohorts in close order against those who had come down into the valley fell upon the enemy's infantry. Simultaneously, Gaius Laelius with the cavalry advanced along the ridges which descended from the camp to the valley and took the Spanish cavalry in the rear, keeping them confined to defending themselves from him. In the long run the enemy's infantry, thus deprived of the services of the cavalry, relying on wos support they had come down into the valley, found themselves hard pressed and in difficulties. The cavalry suffered no less; for confined as they were in a narrow space and incapacitated from action, more of them destroyed each other than were destroyed by the enemy, their own infantry pressing on their flank, the enemy's infantry on their front and his cavalry hovering round their rear. Such being the conditions of the battle nearly all those who had come down into the valley were cut to pieces, those on the hill escaping. The latter were light-armed infantry forming the third part of the whole army, and Andobales in their company succeeded in saving his life and escaping to a strong place.

 

Having thus completely executed his task in Spain, Scipio reached Tarraco full of joy, taking home as a gift to his country a splendid triumph and a glorious victory. He was anxious not to arrive in Rome too late for the consular elections, and after regulating everything in Spain and handing over his army to Junius Silanus and Marcius he sailed to Rome with Laelius and his other friends..."

 

Livy, The History of Rome Book 28.33:

 

"...Ten days after leaving New Carthage he reached the Ebro, and within four days of his passage of the river he came within view of the enemy. In front of his camp there was a level stretch of ground shut in on either side by mountains. Scipio ordered some cattle taken mostly from the enemy's fields to be driven towards the hostile camp in order to rouse the savagery of the barbarians. Laelius was instructed to remain with his cavalry in concealment behind a projecting mountain spur, and when the light infantry who went to guard the cattle had drawn the enemy into a skirmish he was to charge from his hiding-place. The battle soon began, the Spaniards on catching sight of the cattle rushed out to secure them, and the skirmishers attacked them while occupied with their plunder. At first the two sides harassed one another with missiles, then they discharged light darts, which are more likely to provoke than to decide a battle, and at last they drew their swords. It would have been a steady hand-to-hand fight if the cavalry had not come up. They not only made a frontal attack, riding down all in their way, but some galloped round the foot of the mountain so as to cut off the retreat of the enemy. There was more slaughter than usually occurs in skirmishes of this kind, and the barbarians were infuriated rather than disheartened at their want of success.

 

In order, therefore, to show that they were not defeated, they marched out to battle the next morning at daybreak. There was not room for them all in the narrow valley, described above; two divisions of their infantry and the whole of their cavalry occupied the plain and the rest of their infantry were posted on the slope of a hill. Scipio saw that the confined space would give him an advantage. Fighting on a narrow front was more adapted to Roman than to Spanish tactics, and as the enemy had brought his line into a position where he could not employ all his strength, Scipio adopted a novel stratagem. As there was no room for him to outflank the enemy with his own cavalry, and as the enemy's cavalry which was massed with the infantry would be useless where it was, he gave Laelius orders to make a detour along the hills, escaping observation as far as possible, and keep the cavalry action distinct from the infantry battle. Scipio led the whole of his infantry against the enemy with a front of four cohorts, as it was impossible to extend further. He did not lose a moment in beginning the fight, for he hoped that in the heat of battle his cavalry might execute their maneuver unnoticed. Nor were the enemy aware of their movements till they heard the sounds of battle in their rear. So two separate contests were going on through the whole length of the valley, one between the infantry and the other between the cavalry, and the narrow width of the valley prevented the two armies from assisting each other or acting in concert. The Spanish infantry, who had gone into action trusting to the support of their cavalry, were cut to pieces and the cavalry, unable to stand the attack of the Roman infantry after their own had all fallen, and taken in rear by Laelius and his cavalry, closed up and for a time stood their ground and kept up their resistance, but at last all were killed to a man. Not a single combatant out of the cavalry and infantry which fought in the valley remained alive. The third division which had been standing on the mountain side, looking on in safety instead of participating in the fight, had room and time enough to make good their retreat. Amongst them were the two chieftains, who escaped in the confusion before the entire army was surrounded..."

 

The detailed accounts of this battle are pretty acceeding between our 2 primary sources. By brilliant tactics Scipio and Gaius Laelius, his great lieutenant, administered a severe defeat on this seditious force, and then won their friendship - at least nominal friendship. Indibilis and Mandonius, who had escaped with some light troops, threw themselves on Scipio's mercy. Scipio granted the Iberians security, and demanded no hostages. He did exact some indemnity, sufficient to supply the arrears of pay for his troops. Harshness would have alienated them, leaving festering sores. By granting easy terms, Scipio left an Iberia not embittered. He clearly saw the paramount strategic importance of the land, even long term, and an angry Peninsula would have been improbable to subdue if he were to get to the other needs in Italy and Africa. Iberia was practically now completely Roman; the empire, in essence, was veritably under way. Moreover, it was shortly after the Battle of the Ebro (if we may call it that) that Masinissa pledged his support should Scipio come to Africa.

 

Thanks, Spartan JKM

[WotWotius]

I personally believe that one of the greatest battles within the Roman empire was the battle of Wattling Street, 61AD whereby Suetonius Paulinus and the XI Gemina (numbering a tiny 20,000) successfully routed an army of 200,000 Britons fighting under Boudica (killing 80,000 acourding to Tacitus).

 

I say that it was such a great victory for a variety of reasons. For Instance, the site chosen by Suetonius was very good one indeed as it was a bottleneck backed by a cliff surrounded by a forrest. This would mean that the enemy would not only have no room to outmanover the Romans, but that narrow entrance would have also left them vunerable to missile fire.

 

Once engaged with the Britons, the Romans where able to encircle them with their cavalry, hamstring their horses, and cut the Britons to pieces.

 

However, the main reason the Britons lost so badly was not because of the terrain, but was due to their sheer stupidity; this is because the Britons were so certain of victory they brought their wives and children along to watch, with their families they also brought carts for the children to stand on to get a better view. And where did the Britons put them!?...around the entrance of the bottleneck!!! And as a result, the Britons were seemingly trapped when the tide of battle turned against them.

Edited January 31, 2006 by WotWotius

[Neos Dionysos]

I personally believe that one of the greatest battles within the Roman empire was the battle of Wattling Street, 61AD whereby Suetonius Paulinus and the XI Gemina (numbering a tiny 20,000) successfully routed an army of 200,000 Britons fighting under Boudica (killing 80,000 acourding to Tacitus).

 

Just a minor error in that.

 

Twas not the 9th Gemina, it was the XIV, (14th) Gemina which performed that amazing victory.

 

Also, it is also attested the Romans only numbered 10,000 since it was only the 14th and elements of the 20th Legion, and the Brtions 100,000 (Tactius), but Dio Cassius claims 230,000.

Edited January 31, 2006 by Neos Dionysos

[WotWotius]

sorry i was getting confused with the IX Hispana in Linclon.

 

Oh and when i mentioned the XIV Gemina i was including auxillaries and the remains of the XX Valeria Victricences (spelling?) who's numbers had been greatly reduced by Boudica's forces.