Tactics

[caldrail]

Its occured to me that my description of roman initiative could be a little misleading. I'm actually discussing the state of affairs Post-Marius, in the era of the professional army. The question ofwhy this roman system sometimes failed is an important one, as it figures in some of their worst defeats, including Cannae.

 

The flip side to initiative is obedience. Any army must balance the two to arrive at what they consider is best. Now Rome had formed a citizen army in the greek hoplite style before the punic wars. The phalanx has some pros and cons (which I won't go into here), but what is fundamental is the need for discipline. In order to maintain the advance strict obedience is required. No soldier can act on his own in this sort of formation. Therefore with the phalanx the initiative required is minimal. Its brute force in a controlled manner, something very dear to the roman heart.

 

Later on the roman army was reorganised into the familar 'polybian' style, with legions consisting of the Hastatii, Princips, and Triarii. However, the culture of obedience was still in existence then. Soldiers were punished for breaking ranks, so that even if a man committed an act of outstanding bravery and saved the day, he may well still find himself executed for disobeying orders. The romans considered that such brutal discipline was necessary to maintain control of men in the heat of battle.

 

So how does this impinge on Cannae? The roman army at Cannae was ordered to advance in a giant quincunx formation. No subtlety at all, just steamroller the much smaller cathaginian army aside. Clearly, when it became apparent to the men involved that they were in danger of being surrounded, they did not react. They showed no initiative. They had been ordered to advance in a certain manner and were doing so. Once Hannibal closed the trap the romans became hopelessly disordered and command must of been all but impossible at that stage. Any chance of retaining the initiative had been well and truly lost.

 

Compare this performance to the legions of Caesar in his campaigns in Gaul. His troops respond to enemy threats very quickly, using local initiative, and in fact junior officers are commanding the army in some situations whilst Caesar is too busy fighting in the front line with his men. You might argue that his individual leadership had made all the difference (you would be right), yet the emergence of initiative against the culture of obedience is an important one.

Edited January 20, 2008 by caldrail

[CiceroD]

There's been a lot of discussion as to whether the standard quincunx formation closed gaps in the line shortly before engaging the enemy or not.

 

It is hard to imagine that they would have huge gaps in their lines

at the same time its equally hard to believe that the Roman army halted in front of the enemy to change their formation.

 

The "quincunx didn't change" hypothesis would be easier to understand if the maniples weren't square if they were wider then they were deep then there would be less of a dangerous flank on each maniple

 

do we have a good sense of how many ranks deep the typical maniple or cohort was?

[caldrail]

No, the quincunx would not close the gaps - to do so is ridiculous, forcing the legion to close ranks before getting to grips with the enemy, it then means they cannot effectively manoever without becoming disordered, and in some circumstances makes it easier for the enemy line to outflank and envelop them.

 

The gaps weren't huge, but don't forget, if the romans are attacked, the enemy will not attack the gaps - they will attack the nearest roman line instead. In any case, the gaps aren't as vulnerable as you might think, because in order to exploit the enemy must expose themselves to the action of the line behind, and in many cases, this would mean a side attack as the enemy soldiers turn to outflank the roman front line.

 

The quincunx as a whole wouldn't charge - to do so means the whole formation becomes disordered and in any case, only the front line is effectively in combat. This then is the get-out clause. Where a charge takes place, it is the first line of maniples that do so, leaving the remainder to march in support or charge themselves if the first line falters.

 

I believe Adrian Goldsworthy dicsusses maniple formation (and quincunxii) in his The Complete Roman Army.

[Horatius]

There's been a lot of discussion as to whether the standard quincunx formation closed gaps in the line shortly before engaging the enemy or not.

 

It is hard to imagine that they would have huge gaps in their lines

at the same time its equally hard to believe that the Roman army halted in front of the enemy to change their formation.

 

The "quincunx didn't change" hypothesis would be easier to understand if the maniples weren't square if they were wider then they were deep then there would be less of a dangerous flank on each maniple

 

do we have a good sense of how many ranks deep the typical maniple or cohort was?

Why would they have to halt? I envision the second rank taking over smoothly with fresh men enabling the front rank to retire to the rear to recover. In cases like Cannae or Adrianople they were apparently packed so close together due to being surrounded they couldn't even raise their weapons so obviously this wouldn't work.This takes timing and practice but I assume they were well drilled in these tactics if they indeed fought that way. Always having fresh troops at the front ranks would seem to be a distinct advantage though. The goal of ancient warfare was to get your enemy to rout,tired men (and surrounded) men rout.

[CiceroD]

This still doesn't answer me as to whether maniples were square or broader than thick

[caldrail]

Why would they have to halt? I envision the second rank taking over smoothly with fresh men enabling the front rank to retire to the rear to recover. In cases like Cannae or Adrianople they were apparently packed so close together due to being surrounded they couldn't even raise their weapons so obviously this wouldn't work.This takes timing and practice but I assume they were well drilled in these tactics if they indeed fought that way. Always having fresh troops at the front ranks would seem to be a distinct advantage though. The goal of ancient warfare was to get your enemy to rout,tired men (and surrounded) men rout.

 

Bear in mind that once the melee is in progress it was likely the maniple would become disordered and effective control becomes diffilcult if not impossible, thus the drill you envisage might not be practical. However, in cases where the front line retain formation (this would be a defensive stance rather than the result of a charge) then such a manoever becomes possible, if perhaps ill advised, and I say that because although there's a possibility of sending tired men back and replacing them with fresh troops, this would be done on uneven ground with possibly bodies lying there. The prospect of the manoever resulting in men tripping over isn't one to be relished. Nonetheless, the roman sources do state that something like this took place, its just that I've always took that to mean the men rotate within the maniple as opposed to swapping maniples entirely, which could be exploited by a quick witted enemy.

 

Tired men don't necessarily rout. What matters more is their morale and situation.

 

As to whether maniples were square or broad, they're usually described as the latter, although there must have been variations on command.

 

Also there's a difference in the manner that roman soldiers fought melee over the centuries. Polybius describes roman soldiers as retaining a tight packed formation for maximum protection and support, using their gladius almost exlusively in a forward thrust between the shield, the classic roman swordplay.

 

Livy says something different. By his time the romans used a shorter sword, and were as likely to swing the thing about as thrust with it. The development of this style of sword and swordplay went hand in hand with developments in gladiatorial combat, and its not certain whether legions or gladiators were the fashion leaders. Also, the use of a swinging attack with a gladius means the romans had adopted either an open order for the fight, or that the older, more disciplined stance was a thing of the past, and that roman soldiers would often get stuck in without regard to formation, much like their opponents. In this situation, rotating troops is impossible, because the unit is disordered. There was nothing to prevent a trumpeter sounding a withdrawal however, and fresh troops might 'pass through', thus effectively achieving the same end in a somewhat less tidy manner.

[Horatius]

I guess we will never know for sure barring the discovery of some lost document. It is interesting to speculate though just why the Legions were so effective for so many centuries.Too bad they didn't have unit historians in the Legions specifically to document their campaigns,maybe they did but I just don't know about it hehe.

[Antiochus III]

Well, I think that the Romans probably employed very different tactics when facing different types of troops. When faced with a phalanx, the Romans most likely used a looser formation, but when faced with gaulish swordsmen, they were most likely in a tight formation. This s why Roman commanders were so successful in combat-they had adaptable troops that changed their formation to fight different enemies.One thing is for sure though-th Romans did NOT have any gaps in the very front of their battle line. How could anyone believe that? Let me explain: When given the chance to flank an individual unit (be it a whole army, or a single maniple), any smart soldiers would take the oppurtunity. Then they would pressure the flank so as to push the flanks together, and the men being flanked would begin to have much pressure on themselves and rout, leaving the men in the center to be cut down, causing heavy casualties. In the event that the men were so well-trained that they did not break, they would be pushed into such close quarters that they would have trouble fighting to the best of their ability. In fact, at cannae, the Romans must have been crushed so tightly together that they could barely move. It is just not plausable to think that commanders would actually ALLOW enemies to flank and rout their troops by forming a battle line wiht gaps in it. Notable exceptions include abbormal situations like at Zama, where lanes were formed to let elephants pass through.

 

Antiochus III

[Antiochus III]

Oh, and I forgot to mention that armies probably had a much tighter formation near weak points of the enemy to try and break through and flank the enemy.

 

Antiochus III

[Antiochus III]

Adrian goldsworhty does disuss the quincunx in depth. He also states that it is improbable that Romans had gaps in the front of the battle line. As far as it taking to long to close gaps in the line, the Romans probably charged, and when charging, no force can stay at very close ranks. THey probably spread out naturally to fill in any gaps while charging. also, many of you are failing to see the chaos in a battle. Do you honestly think would miantain gaps in a line, or do you think the troops would run to nearest enemy and begin to fight?

Let's say, for argument's sake, that the Romans form up in a quincunx, with the hastati maniples being four men deep, and there being 10-12 feet between maniples. THe Gauls have a mob of battle hungry warriors wiht no large spaces between them. They charge, smashing against the front row of troops first. The warriors that aren't positioned directly in front of the enemy (they are by one of the gaps) are still being pressured forward by the warriors behind them, and from the momentum of the charge. Rather than staying still doing nothing, they see the Romans on the side of the maniple, (who have not closed ranks and formed a line across gap in the Roman line, and are directly behindthe man in the front of their row), and charge against them. Now, their are 4 Gaulish warriors facing the 4 Romans on the side of the maniple, and the same number on the other side of the gap on the next maniple. There is still a bit of a gap between the eight pairs of dueling soldiers(four on each side), through which many more gaulish fighters run through or are forced through by warriors to their rear. they begin to go around to the rear of the maniple, lowering the morale of the Romans in the rear, who fear being surrounded and begin to rout, so the whole maniple cuts and runs. Then the gauls continue to the principes line, and rout that, and then the triarii...

If you still think the Romans fought with gaps in their line after reading that, I i suggest looking at a diagram, which would help explain it. But, seriously, there is NO WAY that they had gaps in hteir line!!!!!!

 

Antiochus III

[caldrail]

No, they must have had gaps in formations because otherwise the units would press against each other and command & control becomes difficult. Charging into melee is another matter. This doesn't mean the gaps were very big, but lets remember the roman penchant for organisation and that there were practical reasons for seperating constituent units (you see exactly the same thing in later periods of warfare too, even amongst ill-disciplined native types). There's a great deal of difference in formation manoevering and the realities of melee, although even then the romans preferred (at least until the 3rd century) to remain formed up in close order for mutual support, and a further point in favour of gaps, believe it or not, is the threat of enemy cavalry. With clear cut gaps between constituent units its easier in the confusion of combat to know where you are, and to react correctly under pressure. For units under pressure from cavalry, this means forming up tightly to avoid being 'broken' by enemy action. This inevitably creates gaps in the ranks anyway.

[Gaius Octavius]

An enemy surging into close gaps, would be subject to 'flank' attack, as Hannibal's elephants were at Zama.

[caldrail]

Or as those cataphractii found out when they charged the enemy infantry only to have them open their ranks and let them in before unhorsing them. This sort of tactical chicanery was the key to success in ancient warfare. Thing is, apart from some minor differences in equipment and style, one man vs another is pretty much an equal contest. So if you want to win a battle, then you need to box clever - to outwit the enemy and gain the upper hand by subterfuge as well as military force. This after all was Hannibals strong point - He was a very clever tactician.

[Gaius Octavius]

..., but a poor strategist.

[caldrail]

Not as poor as you assume. The reason he didn't attack the city of Rome and secure final victory was because he could not afford to remain in one place. He had no supply line from Spain (nor via the sea) and he knew the romans could pull in reserves and surround him if they caught him in one place. What Hannibal was attempting was to bring Rome to its knees - and lets be honest, they were on the point of panic at one stage..