Pompieus

Attested Roman Auxiliary units from Dacia and the province where they served: Ala: I Ulpia Dacorum - Cappodocia Cohorts: I Ulpia Dacorum - Syria I Aelia Dacorum Milliaria - Britain II Augusta Dacorum equitata- Pannonia III Dacorum - Syria

According to Zosimus (1,61) and Historia Augusta (Aurel, 36), a confidential secretary named Eros (or Mnsestius) incurred his masters' wrath thru some misfeasance, and to save his skin forged a list of prominent officers who were (along with himself) marked for execution, and showed it to the supposed victims. Knowing Aurelians reputation for merciless severity they murdered him and discovered the deception only after the deed had been done.

The intent of "collegiality" was obviously to prevent outrageous or illegal behavior by a single magistrate by having a colleague available to block him. The obvious problem of divided authority was usually solved by assigning the magistrates to different "provincia" where they would not normally interfere with each other. Consuls were usually assigned to command separate armies in different theaters of war, praetors received the jurisdiction over citzens or over foriegners, or a geographic provincial command. Obviously, the system didn't always work but it is amazing that it usually did.

Sorry, but as you all say, this is nonsense. The literary sources identify every ancestor of Cleopatra VIII and Arsinoe all the way back to Ptolemy I. They were ALL known Macedonians (often siblings!) with only one possible exception - the grandmother who was apparently a concubine of Ptolemy VIII Lathyrus. This woman could concievable have been a native Egyptian - or a Martian! - but it aint likely. Considering the social and political enviornment in the Ptolemaic court, she was probably a Greek courtesan. Nor is it believable that her "African" characteristics are detectable in the 2000 year old skeleton of what is supposed to be her grandaughter. Apparently the forensic scientists are trying to take over history like the chemists have usurped biology.

Well, there's Tarns "Hellenistic Civilization" and the first chapter of "Greeks in Bactria and India"; Rostovstzevs "Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World" and his Chapter in Cambridge Ancient History Vol VII. But these are all pretty heavy going and VERY OLD - dating back to the 1920's. There must be some new stuff out there. I havn't been able to get hold of the applicable volume of the new edition of the Cambridge Ancient History yet, it usually has a good bibliography.

The Persian empire was based upon the Iranian nobility who lived with their retainers in fortified strongholds on their estates worked by serf peasants much like medieval barons in europe. It was these nobles and their retainers who provided the persian army with its cavalry - the best in Asia. Alexander apparently was trying to perpetuate this relationship, but when Seleucus and Antiochus succeeded to the asian part of Alexanders empire, they decided, like the Ptolemies in Egypt, that they must rely on the Macedonian and Greek elements for their rule. They settled as many Macedonians and Greeks as possible in numerous military colonies, turning southern asia minor, northern Syria and, to a lesser extent, parts of Babylonia and the eastern regions into Macedonian-Greek provinces in asia. These settlers, along with natives who accepted hellenization, provided the bureaucracy and the reserves of the Seleucid army and were very loyal to the dynasty, while all that was expected of the native elements, including the Iranians, was passive acquiescence. This at least is the theory of Tarn, Rostovstiev and Cary. Their evidence is the ease with which various satrapies set up their own dynasties (Cappodicia, Pontus, Elymais, Parthia, Bactria) as soon as central control and the Seleucid army dissappeared (as it did after Magnesia), and the relatively small numbers of Iranian cavalry attested in the Seleucid armies by Livy and Polybius (only 1000 or so at Magnesia) while the Bactrian kingdom of Euthydemus, Demetrius, Eucratides et al, which apparently did gain the loyalty of the Iranian nobles, mustered more than 10000 to oppose Antiochus III in 208 BC, and enough to split away and "conquer" half of India after 189. A little thin pehaps...what do you think?

Livy 39.32 says: The time for the elections was now approaching. It fell to Sempronius to conduct them, but Claudius reached Rome before him, as his brother Publius was standing for the consulship. The other patrician candidates were L. Aemilius, Q. Fabius and Ser. Sulpicius Galba. They had been unsuccessful in previous contests, and they considered that they had all the stronger claim to the honour because it had been denied them before. Only one consul could be a patrician, and this lent additional keenness to the contest. The plebeian candidates were all popular men: L. Porcius, Q. Terentius Culleo and Cnaeus Baebius Tamphilus, and they, too, had had their hopes of attaining the distinction deferred by previous defeats. Out of all the candidates, Claudius was the only new one. It was generally looked upon as a certainty that Q. Fabius Labeo and L. Porcius Licinius would be the successful candidates. But Claudius, unattended by his lictors, was bustling about with his brother in every corner of the Forum, notwithstanding the loud remonstrances of his opponents and of most of the senators, who told him to bear in mind that he was the consul of the people of Rome rather than that he was Publius' brother. Apparently the indignation of the senators was due to Appius' active advocacy, not that he used the presidency of the assembly to skew the result. Or perhaps they thought the other candidates were older and more deserving. Or maybe the campaign was a foretaste of the "democratic" reaction that would soon see the first instance of the election of two plebian consuls (172), a fact Livy passes over in silence (42.9). The Claudii were notorious for their support of "popular" politics and the succesful plebian candidate (Baebius) was a new man who actual did preside as consul over the election of his brother. However, as an example of political chicanery in what were supposedly the "salad days" of the Republic, the antics of the Servilii in 203-202 seem at least as unseemly. Cn Servilius Caepio (cos 203) left his province without permission (rescuing his father from the Gauls in the process) and his relative and colleague C Servilius Geminus tried to supplant Scipio in Africa, crossing to Sicily in defiance of the senate, forcing the appointment of a dictator to recall him. Munzer says (pg 136) that the elections of 203, conducted by another dictator appointed by C Servilius, "were prearranged for the preservation of the rule of the Servilian party in Rome" resulting in the election of Gaius' brother M Servilius Pulex Geminus. Marcus then made Gaius dictator, supposedly to hold the elections, but March and April passed without magistrates (Livy 30.39) and Gaius still dictator (illegally, as he should not have held office after the consul who appointed him retired). When he finally did hold elections, his partisan P Aeliius Paetus was elected. After this nonsense the dictatorship was not used again - until Sulla. The fierce political competition between aristocratic families and the bending of the laws in pursuit of power and office probably went back to the beginning of the Republic. Livy (or his sources) often chooses to ignore or pass over such unpleasantness.

Sometimes it's hard to tell if these fellows were brothers or cousins, but some candidates for precedent are: Cn & L Cornelius Scipio (260 & 259 both sons of L (filus) grandsons of Cn (nepos)), L & P Cornelius Lentulus Caudinus (237-236 both L filus Ti nepos) and C & M Servilius Geminus (203-202 both C filus P nepos; their cousin Cn Servilius Caepio Cn filus Cn nepos was consul in 203 as well). Livy's apparent indignation at the results of the election of 185 seems forced (or due to ant-Claudian bias in his source), as he passes over these precedents and the election of 182 almost without comment. Both consuls of 182 were engaged in Liguria and decided between themselves that Cn Baebius Tamphilus would return to Rome to conduct the elections. His brother Marcus was duly elected. Baebius directly presided over the election of his brother, he was a plebian and a novus homo, while Appius and his brother were distinguished patricians, and Publius was elected thru the intermediary of Appius' colleague. The succession of brothers to the consulship evidently became endemic for a while after 185. Other examples of brothers succeeding each other in the consulship in this period are: P & Q Mucius Scaevola (175 & 174), Sp & L Posthumius (174 &173) and M & C Poplius Laenas (173 & 172). Definitely unique was the consulship of two brothers in 179 (althoufg one was adopted) Q Fulvius Flaccus and L Manlius Acidinus Fulvianus. Servilii brothers were at it again in 141-140 with C & Cn Serviliius Caepio both Cn filus Cn nepos.

I would argue that the sources are fairly clear that there was serious disgruntlement as early as 151 BC; and that the problem wasn't that the property-owning citizens were unwilling to serve, so much as they were unwilling to be sent to dangerous, unprofitable and remote foriegn parts for 6-7 years (or more), and to find themselves ruined economically when (IF!) they returned. I think every imperial state has found that for long-term foriegn service there is no substitute for a volunteer force. As to the morale of the armies in the late republic, what do folks think of Gruens position in "Last Generation of the Roman Republic" (pg 365-384)? He questions the whole concept of "client armies" loyal to their general rather than to the state and proletarian proffessional soldiers "promoting warfare as a way of life". He says "Loyalty to the state lacked substance when the state itself was a phantom" and "Military service did not alienate the soldier from the Republic". He questions the personal quality of the military oath and argues that the soldiers of Lucullus, Cinna, Fimbria and Flaccus were not particularly loyal, and that Caesar and Pompey swapped legions without trouble. He says that soldiers often returned to civilian life with increased assets and status; and that the pre- and post-Marian army did not greatly differ in that they both consisted of rural citizens (athough laborers not farm owners) and that conscription continued along with volunteering until the end of the Republic. But mostly he argues that the civil wars were not ordinary times, and that when the general is also a magistrate or pro-magistrate it is not clear to the soldier who represents legitimacy and who represents revolution. He says of Sullas men "The soldiers took orders not from a rebel chief bent on overthrowing the Republic, but from a Roman consul, the head of state, challenging those who had usurped his authority".

A couple of thoughts. Supplying armies in the pre-industrial age was, as mentioned, mainly a matter of local foraging. Quite large armies could support themselves fairly well in populated regions PROVIDED THEY KEPT MOVING (see van Creveldt et al). An army stopped in place would quickly exhaust supplies of food and especially forage available in the area and be forced to move on. This partially explains the wanderings of the Cimbri and Teutoni. Roman commanders took great pains to establish a base to ensure the gathering and transport of supplies for their troops and animals in order to maintain the freedom to move or not as required by strategy. Roman commanders often used this advantage to force less well supplied forces to attack the Romans on favorable ground, or to afford them the time to besiege and take a fort or town. The question of a "standing army" in the middle republic is also an interesting one. From 194 BC on there were always at least 2 legions in the Spanish provinces and, after 146, at least 1 in Macedonia. Certainly when new governors went to Spain or Macedonia fresh troops went with them, but these supplementa, according to Livy, were only sufficient in number to replace losses, not the entire garrison. In fact, there is some evidence that soldiers sent to Spain were expected to serve there as long as 6 or 7 years before they could expect to return to Italy with a retiring governor. And when they got home, there was no guarantee they wouldn't be conscripted again, such men had valuable experience and were liable under the law for 16 years of service. Plus the pool of available property owning citizens was in decline. Service in Spain was dangerous and unpopular, and there are reported incidents of resistance to the levy in 193, 185, 180, 172, 169, 151, and 138 (including arrest of the consuls and threats of mutiny in the field). Doesn't it It seem that for all intents and purposes there WAS a standing army, but it was still being recruited in the traditional way - from the shrinking pool of land-owning citizens - and that this was causing unrest? Wasn't this the problem Tiberius Gracchus tried to solve by increasing the size of the recruiting pool in 133? Marius' action in recruiting from the proletarii would further relieve the pressure on the land-owning peasants (possibly part of his electoral power base?) as well as increase military efficiency by taking willing volunteers instead of disgruntled conscripts. And it would create new voting clients when his veterans were rewarded with land upon discharge, placing them back in the centuries of the 5 classes where their votes would count. Does current opinion consider the Cimbri and Teutons the first wave of the Germanic migrations or the last wave of the Celts?

While Livy's number (50,000 dead) is probably high, there is little doubt that casualties among the most important part of the Seleucid army, the greeks of the phalanx and "Silver Shields", were very severe at Magnesia. And since after the battle Antiochus was cut off from the recruiting grounds of Greece and Asia Minor, there was no way for him to replace them. The strength of the Seleucid monarchy rested on the army, the core of which was drawn from the Greek settlers in Anatolia, Syria and Mesopotamia, the Seleucids never really won the full support of the Iranian aristocracy. When these troops were decimated at Magnesia Antiochus probably had no option but to negotiate. In fact, the Eastern provinces that had recently been recovered (Armenia, Parthia and Bactria) broke away soon after the defeat.

There was Marcus Claudius Marcellus consul of 166, 155 and 152BC who was the grandson of the conqueror of Syracuse (M Claudius Marcellus cos 222, 215 214 210 and 208BC). He brought the war against the Arevaci and other Celtiberians to an honorable close in 151.

I don't know that the military reforms of Marius were "unnecessary". By accepting volunteers in lieu of conscripts did Marius do more than Richard Nixon ? There were serious problems in the Roman army in the second half of the second century BC. The property owning rural citizens (and allies too) objected to being conscripted and sent off to difficult and dangerous wars in Spain or Gaul. There were several instances of resistance to the levy in Italy, and mutinies and indiscipline in the field after 150 BC. The catalogue of disasters which occurred in Spain and Gaul prior to Numantia and Aquae Sextae show that something was wrong. Isn't it likely that prosperous Roman peasants didn't like being drafted and sent off to some remote foriegn land to fight people they knew nothing about any better than middle class American college students did in 1970? Certainly they were ready and willing to defend their homeland, but wouldn't it be hard to convince them that's what they were doing in the Sierra Morena (or in Khe Sahn)? Also the threat of the Cimbri and Teutones was not to be sneezed at. The fear of the "Northern Barbarians" was very real to the Romans, it harkened back all the way to the sack of Rome by the Gauls in 390 and the invasion of 225.

This is quite a thorny problem, and is one of those unpleasant, dirty little secrets that Livy tends to sweep under the rug (like the extended dictatorship of Servilius Caepio and several examples of a brother presiding over the election of his sibling). Of course the book in Livy is only available in fragments or an epitome, isn't it?, so there isn't much to go on. I believe that a sitting magistrate who was conducting elections could legally refuse to accept the nomination of a particular man. Perhaps Fulvius rejected Aemilius on this basis (saying, in theory, his "defeat" disqualified him) and thus claimed that the only remaining candidate was his partisan Manlius. That's quite a stretch, and pretty outrageous goings on if true. Whatever actually happened, Aemilius became Fulvius' sworn inimicus afterwards (or already was).

I imagine that the next great "Roman" generals chronologically are the emperors Maurice and Heraclius. Presumably they were more "Greek or Byzantine" than Belisarius?

Wasn't Nero's father a Domitius Ahenobarbus ("bronzebeard")?

Well... he was an opportunist and out for himself, but he was a dashing hero too...they aren't mutually exclusive. All Roman aristocrats were out for wealth glory and honors- that's what they did. Nor were they constantly and unquestioningly loyal to any political alliance, these shifted with the situation and always had. Antonius acted like any Roman aristocrat would relative to his "party" leader - loyal - to a point. Regardless of the coin images, Antonius was a dashing cavalry commander and a great leader and general. He was apparently wild in his youth (many young Roman aristocrats were) and evidently didn't totally clean up his act as he aged, but one can hardly accept the characterizations of Cicero and Octavian - his political enemies. The charge that he gave Roman territory to Clepatra is also exagerated by Augustan propaganda. Most of the "Donations" were not Roman territory but "client kingdoms" that could be disposed of by a proconsul as he saw fit.

Rome was dominant at sea when the war began. The Romans initially mobilized 220 ships to 100 Carthaginians. 160 went to Sicily to prepare for the invasion of Africa while 60 took the Scipio brothers and their army to Gaul to head off Hannibal at the Rhone (they arrived too late as they were delayed by a revolt of the Boii and Insubres in the Cisalpina). The Roman navy maintained its superiority through the long war, fending off various attempts by Carthage to support Hannibal by raising rebellions in Sicily, South Italy and Cisalpine Gaul, supplying the army in Spain, and keeping the Macedonians occupied in Greece. Some scholars think that the Romans maintained 215-220 ships most years, and possibly 290 in 208BC, others say the fleet varied from 220 in 218 to maybe 120 in 212 and 220-230 in 208. In any case this was apparently far more than Carthage and Macedon combined could man (one wonders why a rich commercial city like Carthage couldn't?). An interesting example of Sea Power 20 centuries before Alfred Thayer Mahan. By the way, Lew Wallace and Ben-Hur notwithstanding, Cadrail is right, Roman galleys were NOT rowed by slaves, the 300 or so rowers required by a quinquireme were proletarii without the property qualification to serve in the army, freedmen, possibly some slaves hired from their masters for the purpose, and locals from Sicily, Spain, Illyria or Greece. (Another question is how many ships and men were provided by the "Naval Allies" - Greek cities of coastal Italy as opposed to the Romans themselves. The sources don't say)

I think Marcus Portius has it right. Caesar recognized Antonius as the ablest and most useful of his partisans but he was ambitious and could be wild, willful and rash (thug and oaf may be a little strong - you can't go by Ciciero) like his friend Curio had been.I think Caesar made best use of him he could - with reservations. Note that Trebonius and several other conspirators were also partisans of Caesar. All of them were doing what Roman aristi=ocrats had always done, using their connections to get ahead.

I don't know... I thought Brando was a pretty good Marcus Antonius (http://films7.com/videos/marlon-brando-marc-antonys-speech-julius-caesar-shakespeare)"A plain blunt man who loved his friend." not a first century BC Stanley Kowalski. But they needed a better historical advisor...the consul would wear a toga to the senate wouldn't he? that doesn't look like one, and there's no purple stripe.

Publius Cornelius Scipio the conqueror of Hannibal. No other Roman commander defeated so great an opponent in battle. Scipio should be recognized for his strategic sense in defeating Carthage by conquering her base in Spain and forcing Hannibal to abandon Italy by invading Africa. His operational brilliance was shown by initiating the campaign in Spain by siezing the main Carthaginian base at Carthago Nova by a coup de main, and by his campaign against Syphax, Hanno and Hasdrubal prior to Zama. Finally his tactical innovations were evident in the battles of Baecula and Ilipa. Add to all this that he was a military diplomat superior to even Eisenhower in the way he dealt with Spanish tribesmen and Massinissa.

Syme is still a favorite of mine, Gruen certainly. One might suggest Lily Ross Taylor, Andrew Lintott, and A. E Astin.

Excellent (as usual) The cost of service to the Republic was obviously VERY heavy in terms of the lives of young aristocrats! A list of Consulships of the Cornelii Scipiones (post 366BCE) : L Cornelius Scipio 350 L Cornelius Scipio Barbatus (Cens 280)(Dict 306)(PM 304) 298 Cn Cornelius Scipio Asina (Tr 253/2) 260 L Cornelius Scipio (Cens 258)(Tr 259/8) 259 Cn Cornelius Scipio Asina (II) 254 Cn Cornelius Scipio Calvus 222 P Cornelius Scipio Asina 221 P Cornelius Scipio 218 P Cornelius Scipio Africanus P f L n (Cens 199)(PS 199) 205 P Cornelius Scipio Africanus (II) 194 P Cornelius Scipio Nasica Cn f (Tr 191/0) 191 L Cornelius Scipio Asiagenus P f L n (Tr 189/8) 190 Cn Cornelius Scipio Hispalus 176 P Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum (abd)(Cens 159)(PS 147)(PM 152) 162 P Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum (II) (Tr 155/4) 155 P Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus L f (Cens 142)(PS 142?) 147 P Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio (PM 141) 138 P Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus (II) 134 P Cornelius Scipio Nasica 111 L Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus 83 P Cornelius Scipio (suf) 35 P Cornelius Scipio 16 Metellus Pius Scipio (Cos 52) is left out as he looks like a Caecilius on my database. When I get a "MRR" I'll be able to add the Praetorships etc.

As others have said, the Arab Caliphs (Ommayid and Abbasid) tried very hard to conquer Asia Minor for nearly 300 years. Thier attempts culminating in the two sieges of Constantinople. The successful defense of Western Civilization from this threat was the great achievement of Byzantium. The West owes as great a debt to Leo III and Constantine IV as it does to Charles Martel's Franks or Themistocles and the Athenians. Without them we might all be writing in Arabic. If this seems far-fetched remember that the highly developed Iranian civilization, that had it's own native religion, culture and political entity (the Sassanian Empire) succumbed to the Arabs and is now part of the Islamic world. The Christian civilization of the West was in its infancy at the time and might well have been absorbed by Islam.

Isn't it remarkable that several of Caesars legates were involved in his assasination? Why do you suppose this was? They were not members of the old aristocracy, they were equites, and owed everything to Caesar; and Caesar's loyalty to his friends was well known. Were the less prominent men more loyal to the idea of the Republic? or were they pursuing the "main chance"?